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Abstract
In western liberal democracies, voting behavior is often times characterized by sociological and
psychological indicators. Party identification and issues such as the economy dominant the vote
function of the electorate. In the post-Soviet space, party volatility and the competitive
authoritarian nature of regimes may result in voters failing to act as agents of accountability. In
this dissertation, I argue that the socio-psychological theory of voting behavior applies to postSoviet electorate in the Caucasus. I demonstrate that Armenian and Georgian voters rely on
partisanship as well as perceptions of the economy when casting electoral judgment on the
incumbent party. This research furthers the applicability of the socio-psychological theory
beyond countries with mature and durable party structures, and demonstrates that voters in
competitive authoritarian regimes can act as agents of electoral accountability.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In spring of 2018, the Armenian people took to the streets to demand the resignation of
their patron-in-chief, Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan. The newly appointed premier, whose reign
over the landlocked republic spanned a decade, had made a costly miscalculation. In 2014, while
advocating for a constitutional referendum to transition Armenia’s governing structure from a
semi-presidential republic to a parliamentary system, President Sargsyan had promised
Armenian citizens that he would not seek the role of prime minister if the referendums were
approved. However, following the 2017 parliamentary elections Sargsyan reverted and accepted
the position of prime minister. Despite the change of course, Sargsyan’s new title was shortlived. On the sixth day of his premiership, amidst widespread protests and disobedience
campaigns, Sargsyan resigned triggering a ‘domino effect’ that concluded with the December
2018 parliamentary elections and the political demise of Armenia’s party of power1, the
Republican Party of Armenia (RPA).
Armenia’s successful velvet revolution2 was not the only shift in the region. On
November 28th, 2018 Georgian voters elected Salome Zurabishvili, the country’s first female
president. The Georgian electorate, who had witnessed a similar rose revolution3 in 2003,
participated in the country’s last direct presidential election. In 2017, the Georgian parliament

1

A party of power is a governing party (a) that is affiliated with the executive (patron-in-chief); (b) whose members
maintain plurality or majority seats in the legislature; (b) that establishes a hierarchical structure of power diffusion
from within the party elite and (c) maintains a well-organized network of support coalitions (or selectorates). The
durability of parties of power differs across the post-Soviet region. Party of power translates to партия власти in
Russian.
2
The spring 2018 mass uprisings in Yerevan and throughout the country became dubbed as Armenia’s velvet
revolution by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Pashinyan, then a member of parliament and the opposition, led a
non-violent demonstration against the prime ministership of Sargsyan. Pashinyan’s categorization of velvet
revolution was in reference to the Czechoslovakian non-violence movement in 1989.
3
The rose revolution was led by Mikheil Saakashvili in the aftermath of the 2003 Georgian parliamentary elections.
The mass uprising was dubbed the rose revolution because Saakashvili and his supporters protested with roses as a
sign of peace.

1

adopted constitutional amendments that ultimately transitioned Georgia into a parliamentary
system. The willingness of both regimes to favor a parliamentary republic stemmed from a push
to rein in the powers of the unitary executive while expanding the scope of each country’s party
of power. In Georgia, Georgian Dream, the country’s party of power, actively pressed for the
adoption of a parliamentary system (RFERL 2017). Following a successful constitutional
amendment campaign, Georgian Dream then extended its control over the presidency by
supporting Zurabishvili’s candidacy through quasi-legal tactics.4 Interestingly, the manner in
which Georgian Dream secured victory for its candidate, Zurabishvili, was internationally
overshadowed by the fact that the country had elected its first female president.
The success of Georgian Dream, and its method of maintaining a support structure,
parallels that of the RPA. Both governing parties created patronal networks5, which then became
the basis for voter mobilization. In fact, the political behavior of incumbent parties in Armenia
and Georgia is a microcosm of parties of power throughout the post-Soviet space.6 Theoretically,
the ability of such parties to maintain a support structure is contrary to the notion of voters being
agents of accountability. Instead of holding their officials accountable for government
mismanagement, it may seem that voters in the post-Soviet republics are ignoring electoral

4

Georgia’s 2018 Presidential election was conducted under a two-round runoff system. In the first round, the
opposition candidate, Grigol Vashadze, came within one-percentage point of Zurabishvili’s vote share. The
closeness of the initial round created a worrisome atmosphere within Georgian Dream, whose founder, billionaire
Bidzina Ivanishvili, disclosed an intention by his charitable organization to cover the personal debts of some
600,000 Georgians.
5
A patronal network consists of patrons and clients who, as part of a network, compete for scarce state resources
(Hale 2015). These networks are usually pyramid-structured and are held together mainly through personalized
relationships. For more insight into the conceptualization of patronal networks and patronal systems in the postSoviet space, see Hale (2015).
6
In this dissertation, I use the terms post-Soviet space, post-Soviet regimes, and post-Soviet republics to mean the
original twelve republics of the Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. These countries share several commonalities,
including patronal structures (Hale 2015). The Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are not part of postSoviet studies because their political system, democratic consolidation, and economic transition is more aligned with
the European Union.

2

accountability and actively supporting the patronal structure of politics. Although post-Soviet
voters may respond to patronal appeals7, voter behavior in the region may also resemble the
partisan-centric models that are abundant in western liberal democracies. Unfortunately, a
comprehensive account of voter behavior in post-Soviet republics has yet to appear, particularly
in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Consequently, the behavioral traits of the post-Soviet voter
remain at odds with electoral accountability theorists.
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a theoretically-structured account of postSoviet voting behavior. In particular, I challenge prior scholarship (e.g. Rose et al. 2001; White
et al. 1997; Wyman 1996) that suggests that the underdevelopment of partisanship drives voting
in post-Soviet republics, implying a disconnect between the traditional determinants of voting
found in western liberal democracies and those of the post-Soviet regimes. Due to the prevalence
of competitive authoritarian regimes in the region, studies of voting behavior are scarce.
Although transitions towards a liberal polity began in the 1990s, democratic institutions,
multipartyism, and elections remain underdeveloped. Despite the prospects for deepening
democracy, the region has largely abandoned democratic norms, and instead embraced
competitive or full authoritarianism.8 However, by analyzing the behavioral traits of voters in
Armenia and Georgia, I demonstrate that even within the confines of competitive
authoritarianism, the voting determinants found in western liberal democracies may be similarly
applied to post-Soviet republics in the Caucasus.

7

Here, we can consider such members of the electorate to be patronal voters. A patronal voter is a member of the
electorate who basis his or her vote function primarily on personal acquittances with agents of patronal network.
8
As of 2019, Armenia remains the sole, post-Soviet country that has prospects for a successful democratic
breakthrough. Although it is too soon to rule out the velvet revolution as a success in ushering in liberal democratic
values, the country does seem to be moving in that direction.

3

My research objective is to analyze the electoral behavior of the post-Soviet voter. The
phrase ‘post-Soviet voter’ assumes a standard behavioral trait that can be exemplified throughout
the post-Soviet region, some twelve independent states. Although critics may contend that the
post-Soviet space is comprised of heterogenous electorates, I argue that voters in the region are
more similar than they are dissimilar. The concept of the post-Soviet voter stems from several
assumptions. First, inhabitants have a history of social uniformity. For almost eighty years, the
region was a political experiment for the creation of homo Sovieticus. According to Yemelianova
(2014), the prototype Soviet man was one that combined a secular Soviet identity with a
subordinate ethno-national trait. The region’s history of achieving a new type of homo politicus
paves the way for the attempt to study the post-Soviet voter. Second, the post-Soviet voter
resides in a relatively similar political environment. All twelve Soviet republics are authoritarian
regimes.9 Moreover, the organization of political, economic, and social life continues to be
dominated by informal political maneuvering, such as patronal networks10, telefonnoye parvo11,
and blat.12 Finally, for many post-Soviet citizens living in rural regions, economic life in the last
thirty years largely remained unchanged. Based on the tenants of modernization theory, the
stagnation of economic life throughout the rural region creates similar socio-political conditions.
In short, the region now comprises of a new political actor: The homo post-Sovieticus.

9

Using Levitsky and Way’s (2010) regime categorization, we can consider Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,
Russia, and Ukraine as competitive authoritarian regimes. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan can be categorized as full authoritarian regimes.
10
See Hale (2015)
11
Telefonnoye parvo translates to telephone justice. While the root concept was coined during the Soviet period (e.g.
Vaksberg 1986), its meaning translates to “the practice of making an informal command, request, or signal in order
to influence formal procedures or decision-making” (Ledeneva 2008: 326).
12
Blat, or “the use of personal networks in order to circumvent formal procedures” (Ledeneva 1998: 4) is a common
phrase used throughout post-Soviet societies to describe the pathway for political, economic, and social mobility. A
more specific definition is “the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and services in short
supply and find a way around formal procedures” (Ledeneva 1998: 1)

4

The motivation for this dissertation stems from three observations. First, for students of
authoritarian regimes, the Caucasus is one of the most dynamic regions of the former Soviet
Union. Since the collapse of the USSR, four former Soviet republics have experienced “colored”
revolutions, two of which have occurred in the Caucasus. Until Armenia’s velvet revolution, the
region contained three countries with three subtypes of authoritarian regimes. Armenia was
classified as a stable competitive authoritarian regime because of the incumbent’s ability to
maintain coercive structure and organizational strength (Levitsky and Way 2010: 208). By
contrast, Georgia is considered an unstable competitive authoritarian regime because of the
incumbent’s weak organizational strength and coercive structure, which in the past led to several
government overthrows (Levitsky and Way 2010: 221). Finally, Azerbaijan is categorized as a
full authoritarian regime due to Aliyev’s complete control of political power. Thus, the region
exhibits variations in subtypes of authoritarian regimes.
Second, despite the variation in autocracy within the Caucasus, the region remains
understudied in comparative politics. The lack of scholarly insight of the voters in the region
may be due to the priority that analysts assign to ‘high politics’. After all, the Caucasus contains
three separate frozen conflicts that have received much of scholarly interest from international
relations scholar. Another motivating factor is the fact that most voter behavior literature in the
region tends to assume a Slavo-centric context. An examination of the post-Soviet voter beyond
Russia and Ukraine can expand the breadth of voting behavior scholarship in the region.
A motivating factor for this study is my assumption that voters have universal demands
and interests, regardless of the type of regime. The Caucasus voter13, just like his or her

13

In this dissertation, the term Caucasian is used to denote its original meaning: people of the Caucasus. In western
societies today, the word Caucasian is used as a racial category and is entirely disengaged from the word, Caucasus.
This is due to the impact of Johann Blumenbach’s (1865) disputed research on racial classifications.

5

American counterpart, may base her or his vote on partisan orientation, an increase in economic
wellbeing, or the adoption of favorable policies.14 In this dissertation, I will seek to demonstrate
that the application of western voter behavior models indicates that both Armenians and
Georgians are partisan, economic, and issue-oriented voters.
The Social Psychology of Voter Behavior
The behavior of the electorate is a core pillar of political participation. In western liberal
democracies, where political participation is largely unconstrained, studies of voting behavior are
central to understanding the success of governments.15 In patronal polities, where the political
participation is heavily regulated and skewed toward securing the success of incumbent
governments, analysts assume that voter behavior is of less importance, and thus much less ink
has been spilled explaining the behavioral patterns of the electorate. One reason for this
academic neglect is due to how elections are perceived by the masses and administered by the
elite.
In patronal polities, elections are a mechanism by which the incumbent government
maintains its grip on power. Externally, patronal politicians employ elections to legitimize their
regime within the international community. Internally, governments use elections as a means to
create the illusion of electoral competition, to coopt the opposition, restructure patronal

14

A recent field experiment by Fumagalli and Turmanidze (2017) in Yerevan and Tbilisi demonstrates that voters
maintain party preferences that are partially based on policy and, to some extent, political considerations.
15
Western societies do not have flawless participation rules. For example, America’s voter ID laws can be
considered impeding on political participation.

6

networks, and increase the distribution of patronage.16 In other words, elections in patronal
societies are anything but an accountability mechanism of government performance. As a result,
the vote function of the electorate is of lesser importance because voters cast decisions in
occasionally free but constantly unfair electoral arenas.17
In western liberal democracies, by contrast, elections provide a periodic check of
government performance. During an electoral season, the incumbent party seeks to convince
voters that its political stewardship is worthy of an extension. If voters are satisfied with their
government, they reward the incumbent party by casting a favorable vote; if they are dissatisfied
with their government, they punish the government by casting a vote for the opposition. The
behavioral aspect of voter satisfaction and dissatisfaction is what concerns many voting behavior
scholars.
Among the theoretical perspectives, the socio-psychological model (SPM) has received a
disproportionate amount of attention.18 This approach posits voting as a convergence between
sociological and psychological influences. The former emphasizes social cleavages as main
predictors of one’s vote function. That is, the social group (e.g. race, religion, or class) to which
one belongs to directly determine her or his vote preferences. The latter factor emphasizes

16

This patronage can be individual-based, or when a voter is offered goods and services in exchange for their vote.
For example, during the 1998 Armenian presidential elections the headquarters of the incumbent’s campaign office
distributed kerosene to Armenian voters in exchange for supporting the candidate (OSCE, 2003). The patronage can
also be communal-based. For example, during the 2013 Armenian presidential elections the incumbent Republican
Party of Armenia constructed (and revitalized) several community parks and recreation facilities throughout the
Yerevan.
17
Except for Central Asian Republics, the remaining post-Soviet patronal polities are considered some form of
competitive authoritarian regimes. According to Levitsky and Way (2010), elections in such regimes are conducted
in a free but not necessarily fair setting.
18
Prior to SPM, voting behavior scholarship was largely comprised of sociological, psychological, and rational
(choice) perspectives. Each theory emphasized as specific behavioral aspect of the vote function. While each
provided a sound account of voting behavior, the analyses were incomplete. The sociological school neglected
psychological impacts on individual vote choice, while the psychological school neglected group-centric influences.
The prevalence of SPM is in its ability to account for (and include) competing theories of voting behavior, including
sociological, psychological, rational choice, and historical institutional (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).

7

psychological attachments as the main predictor of one’s vote function. One such psychological
attachment is party identification. According to the SPM, partisanship acts as the main predictor
of voting behavior. In other words, having a psychological attachment to a specific political
group leads one to eventually cast a vote for their preferred party. Proponents of SPM argue that
exogenous, sociodemographic variables, such as age and gender, are ‘funneled’ through party
identification, creating a funnel-of-causality process and demonstrating that the vote choice is
largely a function of partisanship.
The salience of SPM is its applicability in voluminous case studies.19 Despite this, its
application is largely limited to western liberal democracies. This is primarily due to two
reasons. First, western liberal democracies are ideal laboratories for election studies. Many
liberal democracies have had reoccurring elections without much political disruption. As a result,
there is longer time horizon under which voting behavior is observed. Second, western liberal
democracies are generally stable, which not only allows political parties to flourish and mature,
but also fosters the ever presence of partisanship. Because partisanship is a central component of
SPM, a stable partisan public results in SPM being largely applied to western polities. Thus, the
application of SPM in western liberal democracies is as unsurprising as it is intellectually
unstimulating.
For scholars to truly challenge the tenants of SPM and demonstrate its external validity,
the context for empirical research needs to move beyond western liberal democracies. The

19

For single country analyses, see: Aitkin (1977) regarding the Australian electorate; Campbell et al. (1960)
regarding the American electorate; Butler and Stokes (1969) regarding the British electorate; Converse and Pierce
(1986) regarding the French electorate. For cross-national works, see: Bengtsson et al. (2014) regarding the Nordic
electorate; Carlin et al. (2015) and Nadeau et al. (2017) regarding the Latin American electorate.

8

application of SPM in developing countries20 offers the best solution. However, developing
countries present some challenges to SPM. First, such countries lack a mature party landscape.
Although political parties in western liberal democracies are strong and durable, developing
areas are often characterized by party and electoral volatility (Powell and Tucker 2014; Roberts
and Wibbels 1999; Kuenzi et al. 2017). In developing countries, the emergence of new political
parties prior to an election is a common occurrence. In western liberal democracies, the
emergence of new parties prior to an election is quite uncommon and tends to occur in waves. 21
Second, many voters in developing countries tend to lack strong partisan ties beyond the
incumbent party. This is because opposition parties rarely survive for more than a few election
cycles. Just as voters are beginning to display partisan attachments, their party ceases to exist.
Finally, the lack of durable opposition parties does not automatically result in a complete nonpartisan atmosphere, for developing countries are abundant in parties of power. These party
hegemons tend to dominate the political landscape for multiple election cycles. Furthermore,
through patron-client relationships their political outreach extends into social and economic
spheres. Contrary to western liberal democracies, the economic mobility of the citizenry is
largely tied to the relationship with the parties of power. Thus, partisan attachments in the
developing world are not based on voter-party issue alignment, but on patronage (Kuenzi et al.
2017; Remmer 2007). The electoral atmosphere in developing countries offers the most

20

We can qualify post-Soviet republics as developing countries because their economic transitions and political
liberalization is still ‘developing’. Despite their upward trajectory during periods of Soviet development, their
stagnant path towards political liberalization and orientation to competitive authoritarianism is comparable with
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.
21
For example, the emergence of Green Parties in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, and more recently the
emergence of populist parties.

9

challenging test for the universality of SPM. Western-oriented analyses, while ideal for SPM,
severely limits that falsification of the theory.
The Post-Soviet Polity
In 1991, Armenia and Georgia emerged from seventy years of Soviet authoritarian rule.
During this period, the communist regime managed to alter perceptions of pre-Soviet realities.22
Socially, forms of ethno-national history were severally limited, if not outright banned. Instead,
homo-Sovieticus was the social fabric of Armenians and Georgians. Economically, free
enterprise and business-seeking behavior was forbidden, leading to the rise of the black market
and informal entrepreneurship. The central-planned economy that dished out limitations on
goods and services naturally created shortages, and black markets that attempted to capitalize on
scarcity. Politically, the Soviet state limited forms of political participation. Membership in the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), intolerance for political dissidents, and the
electoral hegemony of CPSU created omnipotent barriers of political activity on the part of the
Soviet citizen. When the Soviet regime collapsed, jubilant western scholars became victims of
their own imagination and predicted the spread of democratization across the entire region. The
transition to post-Soviet society demonstrated the profound impact that competitive authoritarian
regimes have on institutions and society (see, for example, Casper 1995). The inability to foster

22

Initially, pre-Soviet history and legacy was neglected. Over time, the Soviet system liberalized the practice of
ethno-national history so long that it complemented Soviet history. Although the Soviet Union suppressed forms of
national identity and other social considerations, the communist regime did provide an unprecedented amount of
economic development and progressive socioeconomic policies. For instance, the Soviet system created a model
affirmative action program that sought to empower many disadvantaged ethnic groups. The Soviet system also
increased female labor participation rates, provided near universal education for its population, and transitioned
many feudal economies and communities toward vibrating manufacturing hubs. One such case was Soviet Armenia,
which was said to maintain the largest concentration of manufacturing plants per capita throughout the USSR.

10

an open marketplace of ideas limited the development and growth of social justice, marketoriented capitalism, and partisan identity.
Unlike in western liberal democracies, partisan interactions in the post-Soviet space are
not defined along ideological lines. Rather, they focus on connections to the party of power or
the patron-in-chief. For example, the 1992 parliamentary election in Georgia included the
participation of multiple political parties. Despite this, voters identified most parties not by their
electoral platforms and their ideological orientations, but by their favorability (or
unfavourability) to President Eduard Shevardnadze. The 1999 Armenian parliamentary election
was conducted “…mainly among personalities rather than political platforms” (OSCE 1999: 2).
Since independence, the personalized nature of electoral campaigns has been the norm in the
Caucasus. Campaigns in the region are largely focused on the personality of the party leader,
rather than issue differentiation. This may impede the ability of the post-Soviet voter to engage
in issue-based voting.
Post-Soviet regimes have featured an abundance of new, short-lived parties. The parties
of power notwithstanding, most parties and blocs rarely survive beyond one election cycle. For
example, the 2017 Armenian Parliamentary elections consisted of five newly formed political
parties and two newly formed pre-electoral coalitions. This high turnover rate is due to the
personalization of political parties. As political personalities gain national recognition, they
immediately form parties and contest elections. However, after the party does not meet an
electoral threshold the personality may either rebrand their message under a new political banner
or completely wither away from the political scene. The presence of short-lived parties combined
with the comparative authoritarian nature of the political system creates unfavorable conditions
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for the success of SPM, a model which ultimately relies on political stability and partisan
maturity.
The Post-Soviet Voter
The characteristics of the post-Soviet voter presents further challenges to the
generalizability of SPM. Western liberal democracies facilitate an open marketplace of ideas
which translate to voters not only being conscious of their political preferences, but also acting
on them. Due to the Soviet legacy, the post-Soviet voter in the Caucasus inherits a regulated
marketplace of ideas, which then impacts ballot behavior. For instance, voter behavior in the
Caucasus is often void of candidate or party platform analysis. Instead, behavior is influenced by
wealthy individuals within the community, who act as power brokers and patrons of economic
mobility (Sahakyan and Atanesyan 2006). Election results in western democracies are uncertain,
despite an incumbency advantage. Voters cast ballots with the understanding that the results are
not predetermined. In the post-Soviet space, elections are a mechanism by which the party of
power justifies and extends its rule; their results are largely predetermined. The success of the
incumbent is based on its ability to sustain and expand its patronal network. Instead of the
incumbency advantage, the party of power is characterized by incumbency clientage.23
Incumbency clientage is the ability of parties of power to extend their rule by either
sustaining or expanding their patronal network prior to an electoral season. We can think of
incumbency clientage as a form of incumbency advantage that is prevalent in the post-Soviet
space. Parties of power are constantly seeking new clients, to successfully preempt the
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Incumbency clientage parallels the notion of incumbency advantage in western liberal democracies. However,
whereas incumbency advantage relies on formal agents (e.g. media, campaign contributions, etc.) to ensure the
sustainability of power incumbency clientage relies on informal methods (e.g. patronal networks, expansion of
clients, etc.) to ensure electoral success.
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emergence of rival parties and their patronal networks. This process of clientele accumulation is
furthered prior to an electoral season. Despite the presence of electoral manipulation, elections in
post-Soviet republics provide a heuristic for the level of support each patronal network
maintains. Thus, parties of power rely on incumbency clientage to maintain political supremacy.
In western liberal democracies voters cast ballots under a free and fair electoral process.
Voter fraud is extremely minimal, voter intimidation inside polling stations is non-existent, and
parties largely compete on an equal footing. In the post-Soviet space, elections are “often unfree
and almost always unfair” (Levitsky and Way 2010: 8). At the elite level, agents of the parties of
power use their status within their patronal network to influence the masses. As an election
season nears, it is quite common to observe government initiating infrastructural investment in
communities. For example, in the Kanaker-Zeytun district of Yerevan the incumbent government
regularly revitalizes parks and refreshes the asphalt roads prior to an election. Besides communal
reinvestment, the parties of power may canvas communities offering monetary support in
exchange for votes. The guarantee of such support is perfected through carousel voting and other
practices.24 The use of monetary instruments to ‘purchase’ electoral support is quite common in
the Caucasus. In the 2018 Georgian Presidential elections, the founder of the Georgian Dream
party, Bidzina Ivanishvili, announced that his charitable organization would pay the personal
debts of some 600,000 Georgian residents.25 This announcement occurred one week prior to the
runoff between Georgian Dream and the United National Movement, Georgia’s main opposition.
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Carousel voting occurs when the de facto party of power representative enter the voting booth, marks the ballot,
but does not cast it. Instead, the ballot is passed down to the next voter, who with their blank ballot and the premarked ballot enters the voting booth and casts the latter. The voter then gives the blank ballot to the party
representative who then marks the ballot and gives it to the next voter (Sahakyan and Atanesyan 2006). This process
ensures that voters are not casting ballots that are against the party of power.
25
This was not the first time that Ivanishvili used his assets to influence a political outcome. In September 2013
during Georgia’s presidential election, then-Prime Minister Ivanishvili pledged $1 billion of his personal wealth
towards a fund that would invest in Georgia’s economy (NDI 2014).
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Overall, the electoral climate in the post-Soviet space is heavily influenced and skewed towards
the parties of power.
In western liberal democracies, research suggests that voters are oriented toward political
parties whose platforms are closely aligned with their political preferences. In the post-Soviet
space, voters lack issue-based political orientation since parties lack positional political
platforms.26 Instead, voters form political preferences through other, more egotropic means. In
other words, voters respond to patronal cues based on egotropic political preferences. Contrary to
the sociotropic logic of the western voter, which asks ‘What has the party done for the country?’,
the post-Soviet voter asks, ‘What has the party’s network done for me?’ This egotropic thought
process is based on the notion that the relationship between voter and party is centered around
patronage. When entering the voting booth, post-Soviet voters will analyze political parties,
based on the type of patronal network they belong to. If their party is unable to provide
pocketbook improvements, they may defect. If their party can provide pocketbook
improvements, they may commit. Thus, partisan identification does not occur based on issue
convergence but on personalistic or egotropic ties to a party and its network. In all, the behavior
type of the post-Soviet voter differs from the sociotropic type we witness in western liberal
democracies.
Empirical Limitations
Prior to providing a brief synopsis of each chapter, I want to discuss the limitations of the
research. First, post-Soviet voter behavior is generalized from a study of two countries in the
Caucasus: Armenia and Georgia. Although the ability to generalize results from the Caucasus to
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Political platforms in the post-Soviet space tend to be centered on valence issues. The economy, crime, and
corruption are examples.
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the rest of the post-Soviet region is a formidable challenge, the two cases under consideration do
exhibit the potential to produce generalizable findings. The post-Soviet space consists of full
authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes.27 According to Levitsky and Way (2010),
competitive authoritarian regimes are divided between unstable and stable types. Levitsky and
Way categorize Armenia as a stable competitive authoritarian regime and Georgia as an unstable
competitive authoritarian regime. Thus, observing voting behavior in the two sub-groups of
competitive authoritarian regimes helps the prospect of generalizing vote patterns in Armenia
and Georgia to the rest of the post-Soviet space.28
Another limitation to the current study is the different methodological design of each
survey. The Armenian case study consists of a pre-electoral voter behavior analysis implemented
via telephone survey. The Georgian case study consists of a pre-electoral public attitudes survey
implemented via face-to-face interviews. As shall be discussed in Chapter 3, the two survey
modes are considerably different and may be prone to skewed responses. Aside from the varying
survey types, the two samples also differ in size. The Georgian sample size is extensively larger
than the Armenian sample size. The different methodological component of each survey prevents
the convergence of both samples into a truly cross-national sample. The inability to combine
both samples into a single multivariate model forces the presentation of descriptive and
inferential results in a separate manner.
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While classification of a certain type or sub-type of regime is not a static process and post-Soviet countries have
evolved between various authoritarian typologies, we can consider the twelve original Soviet republics into one of
three regime types: full authoritarian, stable competitive authoritarian, and unstable competitive authoritarian.
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are categorized as fully
authoritarian regimes. Armenia, Belarus, and Russia are categorized as stable competitive authoritarian regimes.
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine can be considered as unstable competitive authoritarian regimes.
28
The Caucasus is an ideal setting for testing the post-Soviet voter since each of the three countries that make up the
region have a distinct regime type. Ideally, this project would include voting behavior analyses from Azerbaijan as a
proxy for a full authoritarian regime type. Unfortunately, I was not able to conduct field research in Azerbaijan due
to the ongoing issues with western organizations and researchers.
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Third, since the research design relies on survey items, the methodology may contain
random measurement error. Consequently, its presence can adversely impact coefficient
estimates towards null findings (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Healy and Lenz, 2017). This “iron
law of econometrics” which causes suppression of coefficient estimates to zero, cannot be
avoided in sample surveys (Hausman 2001). Ideally, one way to reduce such error is to rely on
voter registry data and compare the information with the survey results. Unfortunately, both
governments were unwilling to provide such data for comparison.
A fourth methodological limitation is the cross-sectional nature of each data set. The
Armenian sample relies on a survey administered in March 2017, and the Georgian sample relies
on a survey administered in June 2016. Both surveys were conducted within six months of each
country’s legislative elections. Thus, each survey measured political opinions at a specific point
in time. Therefore, the cross-sectional nature of the data severely limits the ability to demonstrate
causality. In addition, a single snapshot of electoral behavior limits the ability to generalize
voting behavior traits beyond a specific time period.
Finally, this study focuses on Armenia prior to 2018. The 2017 parliamentary election
was conducted under a partially free but unfair electoral setting. In many ways the outcome of
the 2017 election was the first step towards the 2018 velvet revolution, which ultimately ended
Sargsyan’s political career and RPA’s control over the country.29 That said, the current analysis
does not consider the political shift that occurred following the resignation of the Sargsyan
administration and my survey analysis of the Armenian voter is limited prior the 2018 events.
Manuscript Path
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The victory of RPA created a domino effect, which ultimately resulted in the political exodus of the party. In
2017, RPA’s victory led to the party’s ability to nominate Serzh Sargsyan as the country’s prime minister.
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Prior to addressing the contents of each chapter, I want to briefly discuss the composition
of voting behavior works. Conventionally, the content is presented in a block manner, where
each chapter analyzes specific sets of behavioral determinants (e.g. sociodemographic,
socioeconomic, partisan, etc.), and the previous indicators are included in the subsequent
chapter. The empirical chapters of this manuscript follow a similar order, beginning with
sociodemographic vote determinants and concluding with the impact of economic and noneconomic issues. Where this manuscript differs is in the presentation of the preceding material.
Instead of combining each theoretical and methodological design of an indicator into the
empirical chapter, I present standalone theoretical and methodological chapters, prior to
introducing the empirical chapters. Standalone theory and research design chapters provide a
better flow of the manuscript and a parsimonious understanding of the material. The rest of the
dissertation is divided into seven chapters:
The second chapter introduces the theoretical foundations of the study. First, I discuss the
three classic voting behavior perspectives, beginning with the sociological, rational, and the
socio-psychological models. Each school presented a distinct understanding of what factors
influenced the vote choice. The earliest school posited a sociological understanding of the vote.
That is, individuals were influenced by group-oriented indicators. This notion was challenged by
the second school, who assumed the act of voting as a utility-maximizing calculation that is
mainly concerned with self-interest. Finally, the third school synthesized both group-level and
individual-level indicators, ultimately positing partisanship as the leading predictor of the vote.
After discussing the historical perspectives, the second part of the chapter constructs the postSoviet vote function. Paralleling the funnel of causality thesis, I divide the vote determinants into
the following groups: sociodemographics, socioeconomics, partisanship, and the economy. In
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modeling the post-Soviet voter, I combine works in each of the groups and then proceed with
hypotheses formation.
In the third chapter, I discuss the research design of the study. I rely on a block recursive
technique to predict the incumbent vote intention of the Armenian and Georgian electorate. A
block recursive approach best fits voting behavior analysis since its emphasis on regression
blocks parallels the funnel of causality approach outlined in the previous chapter. Next, I outline
how previous post-Soviet surveys have operationalized political behavior and the limitations
such surveys presented. This discussion then leads to the research design of the post-Soviet
voter. I rely on two surveys, the Armenian Election Study (ArmES) and the Georgian Public
Attitudes Survey (GPAS), to gather voter behavior data and operationalize incumbent support
and its predictors. The former is an original field research conducted by the author prior to the
2017 Armenian parliamentary elections. It is the first election study of its kind in the Republic of
Armenia.
Chapter four through seven are the four empirical sections of the dissertation and each
addresses a specific set of determinants of the vote function. The fourth chapter applies three
sociodemographic determinants to the vote function: sex, age, and geographical settlement. I test
three assumptions: younger voters in Armenia and Georgia are less likely to vote for the
incumbent party; female voters in Armenia and Georgia are less likely to vote for the incumbent
party; and rural voters in Armenia and Georgia are more likely to vote for the incumbent party.
The sociodemographic results are mixed. Age is the only variable that is statically significant
across both electorates (ρ ≤ .01). In Armenia, neither sex nor geographical settlement is
predictive of incumbent vote intention. However, rural Georgian voters tend to be more likely to
vote for the incumbent.
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Socioeconomic vote determinants are the theme of the fifth chapter. The socioeconomic
indicators consist of three variables: educational attainment, employment status, and household
income. I propose that higher educational attainment is inversely related to an incumbent vote
intention; that employed respondents will be more likely to vote for the incumbent; and that
households with income in the upper quartile are more (or less) likely to vote for the incumbent.
The results for the Armenian sample suggest that only employment status is statistically
significant (ρ ≤ .05) with incumbent vote intention. For the Georgian sample, the socioeconomic
determinants provide better predictability with all three covariates statistically significant (ρ ≤
.05).
In chapter six, I include the omnipotent partisan variable into the vote function. Despite
the infancy of partisan identity in the region, I expect incumbent partisanship to be a leading
predictor of the vote due to the fact that incumbent parties tend to be more durable than
opposition groups. In both samples, I find that the impact of partisanship is not only statistically
significant (ρ ≤ .01) but also substantively significant. The results for both the Armenian and
Georgian electorate suggest that incumbent partisan attachment is by far the leading vote
predictor in the Caucasus.
The last empirical chapter considers a central issue for Armenian and Georgian voters:
the economy. I test the impact of prospective-egotropic economic perceptions on the incumbent
vote function and find that positive economic wellbeing is associated with higher probability of
an RPA and Georgian Dream vote. The impact of economic attitudes appears to be identical for
both groups of voters. Both Armenian and Georgian voters relate their positive egotropicprospective perceptions with a vote for the incumbent.
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In chapter eight, I provide a comparative analysis between the two electorates, to what
extent we can draw on generalizations of the post-Soviet voter based on the findings in the
Caucasus and consider future research avenues. Above all, Armenian and Georgian voters rely
on their party identification when casting an electoral judgement towards the incumbent. This is
followed by prospective perceptions of their pocketbook as well as socioeconomic variables such
as employment status and household income. In short, the electorate in the Caucasus is both a
partisan and an economic voter. Beyond measures of the economy, I find that youthfulness
impacts the vote function of both groups. Essentially, both Armenians and Georgians are quite
similar in their vote patterns.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE POST-SOVIET VOTER
The dominant theories of voting behavior have largely been driven by scholarship on
western democracies. The introduction of the sociological voter, the rational voter, and the sociopsychological voter (see: Campbell et al. 1960; Downs 1957; Lazarsfeld et al. 1948) have all
occurred through analysis of elections in western societies. Despite this, many recent works have
successful applied these three theoretical perspectives to non-western countries and regions
(Bratton et al. 2012; Carlin et al. 2015; Nadeau et al. 2017). Unfortunately, scholarship has yet to
thoroughly analyze the socio-psychological determinants of the vote beyond Russia in the postSoviet region.30 That is not to say that a poverty of political behavior scholarship exists. Hale’s
(2015) conceptualization of patronal politics sums up political behavior among elites (Also see:
Baturo and Elkink 2015). According to Hale, elite-based political behavior is not oriented around
“abstract” concepts such as ideology. Rather, it is tied to interpersonal networks (Hale refers to
them as patronal networks) and the pursuit of material gains. Although Hale accurately describes
the state of politics in the region, his discussion of patronalism is limited to behavior of the
political and business elite.
Since the introduction of elections in post-Soviet polities, scholars have observed specific
contents of the sociological and socio-psychological voting model. For example, the first batch
of works traced the impact of sociodemographic characteristics, particularly region, on the vote
choice in Russia and Ukraine (Birch 1995; Clem and Craumer 1996; 2000; Kubicek 2000).
Another batch of works addressed the impact of economic reforms on the vote choice
(Muyagkov and Ordeshook 2005; Wade et al. 1993; Duch 1995; Warner 2001). A final batch of
30

Recent works tracing voting behavior in the Caucasus lack the theoretical pillars of SPM. For example,
Babunashvili’s (2017) analysis of retrospective voting in Georgia omits party identification from its list of
covariates. In an analysis of the 2010 Kyrgyz election, Huskey and Hill (2013) model sociological factors on vote
choice but fail to include the impact of party identification.
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scholarship analyzed the development of partisanship in the region (Brader and Tucker 2001;
Colton 2000; Miller et al. 2000; Miller and Klobucar 1999; Rose et al. 2001; White et al. 1997;
Wyman et al. 1995; Wyman 1996). Many of these studies lacked the methodological foundation
of SPM and, in many cases, ignored the central vote determining factor: party identification (But
see: Colton 2000). More importantly, these batch of works interpreted the post-Soviet voter
through a Slavo-centric analysis: case studies in Russia and Ukraine. Consequently, much of
what we know about the post-Soviet voter stems from the Russian and Ukrainian voter. This
critique is not meant to undercut the intellectual weight of such works, for they provide the
necessary theoretical backdrop under which we can construct traits of the post-Soviet voter.
However, to fully grasp a common vote function among the region’s electorate, we must observe
voting behavior beyond the Russian and Ukrainian electorate.
In this chapter, I lay out the theoretical backdrop to study the post-Soviet voter in the
Caucasus. The chapter is divided into two sections. I begin by tracing the evolution of voting
behavior perspectives. The earliest propositions concentrated on sociological groups as core
determinants of the vote choice and relied on the U.S. electoral setting. Advocates of the
sociological school categorized the electorate into social groups (class, region, etc.) and
concluded that political preferences of the electorate were driven by sociodemographic and
socioeconomic group membership. Challenges to the sociological perspective came from the
rational school and the socio-psychological school. The latter revised the sociological
perspective and posited that sociological variables were exogeneous to the actual vote. Instead,
social group memberships were central to the formation of partisan identity. Although
subsequent theories challenged SPM, the salience of party identification has withstood many
criticisms and today is considered the leading vote predictor across different countries.
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The second section incorporates existing literature on post-Soviet voting behavior into
each of SPM’s blocs: sociodemographics, socioeconomics, partisanship and issues. As
mentioned earlier, voting behavior works in the region predominately address the vote function
within the Russian electorate. The evolution of political behavior and voting in Russia has, in
many ways, mirrored other post-Soviet republics. In the region, we have witnessed the rise of
parties of power, party volatility among opposition groups, the influence of patronalism, the
presence of carousel voting and other types of voting irregularities, and the emergence of
patronal voting. These similarities, and the scarcity of voting behavior works in the Caucasus,
allows one to rely on the Russian polity as a backdrop for hypothesis building.
The comparability between voting behavior in Russia and the electorate in the Caucasus
stems from common Soviet political history, which naturally produced a distaste and distrust of
politics and political parties that continues to this day.31 The common patronal environment that
the region transitioned to, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, furthers the ability to draw
comparisons between observed Russian voting behavior and the electorate in the Caucasus.
Patronal politics, I argue, not only defines relationships among elites but also between elites and
the voters. In constructing the theoretical pillars of the post-Soviet voter in the Caucasus, I
contend that patronalism can help explain the SPM vote function.
Classic Voter Behavior Perspectives
Scientific inquiries tend to produce outcomes that are largely a byproduct of their time.
That is, we can often relate the propositions behind many theories to the social climate under
which they were proposed. This statement applies to the evolution of voting behavior theories.

31

See Libaridian (1999) for an analysis on citizenry distrust of political parties in Armenia.
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For example, the salience of the sociological model was mainly due to the political climate
during which ballot behavior was observed. One of the first works demonstrating the presence of
sociological predictors traced voting behavior during the US Presidential election in 1940
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1948). Then, the political climate was heavily influenced by the incumbency of
Roosevelt, who was vying for a third term. Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1948) approach to evaluate the
impact a campaign season had on voting preference produced counter results due to the fact that
many voters had their minds made up prior to election season. This was because the
unprecedented motive to seek a third term produced polarizing attitudes towards a Roosevelt
presidency. Thus, the context of the election shaped the conclusions reached.
Sociological Theory
The earliest theoretical perspective that analyzed voting behavior posited vote choice as a
function of sociological indicators. Commonly referred to as the Columbian school, the
sociological perspective was advocated by Lazarsfeld and colleagues (1948; 1954) who were one
of the first social scientists to rely on panel-structured studies of the electorate. In their first
work, The People’s Choice (1948), Lazarsfeld et al. set out to model vote intention in Erie
County, Ohio during the 1940 U.S. Presidential election. The pioneering study found that (1)
individual political preferences was largely influenced by the political homogeneity of the
family; (2) most individuals had made up their vote intention months prior to the start of the
campaign; (3) the media and campaign had minimal impact on vote intention and (4) most of the
electorate voted in line with their social group. Specifically, the authors found that one’s
socioeconomic status, religion, and residence was a leading predictor of their vote. Based on a
single-county study, the authors concluded that social characteristics determined voting
preferences (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948: 27).
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Subsequent analyses in Voting (Berelson et al. 1954) furthered their argument that voters
are driven by sociological factors and are minimally influenced by the election season. Using
data from residents of Elmira, New York, Lazarsfeld and colleagues expanded the sociological
forces to include such factors as union membership. The twin studies presented a compelling
account of voting behavior: that one’s vote function was primarily driven by placement within a
collective group. In addition to demonstrating the salience of sociological forces, advocates of
the sociological model also discussed the role of partisanship in political behavior. However, the
interaction between social characteristics, partisanship and vote choice was overlooked. The
inability to distinctively conceptualize party identification and assign it a central role in the vote
function would become a criticism lobbed by scholars from Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Socio-Psychological Theory
The Michigan school, led by Angus Campbell and colleagues, challenged the central
assumption of the sociological model, that social groups are a direct predictor of voting behavior,
and asserted that while sociological characteristics were central to political behavior they were
not directly predictive of voting behavior. Instead, these factors were influential in predicting
political socialization and the emergence of partisanship. One of the first works by the Michigan
school was Campbell and Kahn’s The People Elect a President (1952), where the authors
demonstrated the instability of the sociological vote function. An analysis of the 1948 election,
led Campbell and Kahn to conclude that sociological factors failed to predict voting behavior. In
a follow-up work, Campbell and colleagues outlined a new theoretical perspective of voting
behavior. In The Voter Decides (1956), the authors expanded their criticism of the sociological
model and introduced the tenants of what became known as SPM.
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The logic of SPM differed from the sociological model. First, this perspective accounted
for non-sociological variables within the vote function, particularly attitudinal variables. These
included partisanship, issues, and candidate evaluation. Campbell and colleagues conceptualized
partisan identification as a psychological process of “affective orientation” (Campbell et al.
1960: 121). The authors posited party identification as the central predictor of the vote choice.
According to Niemi and Weisberg (1993), this new approach introduced “political variables”
into the vote function and provided a more dynamic interpretation of voting.
Second, SPM revised the arrow of causality between sociological forces and voting
behavior. Instead of directly impacting the vote choice, Campbell and colleagues posited that
sociological variables influenced the formation of party identification. In turn, party ID shaped
perceptions of issues and candidate evaluation. This is referred to as partisan rationalization,
whereby voters form positions on issues and candidates through a partisan lens.
Pioneers of the Michigan school expanded their theoretical approach in the The American
Voter (1960) by illustrating the vote choice through a funnel of voting behavior. The funnel of
causality is reproduced and illustrated in Figure 2.1. The funnel’s outer tip consists of
sociological forces. These include both sociodemographic (e.g. age, sex, residence) as well as
socioeconomic (e.g. education, class, income) characteristics. Membership in these social groups
over time influences that formation of the next block: party identification. The formation of party
identification then impacts the narrow end of the funnel: issues and candidate evaluation. At the
end of the funnel is the vote choice, which is directly and indirectly influenced by all the
previous four blocks.
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Figure 2.1: Funnel of Causality
Time
Sociological indicators

Party Identification

Issue
Candidate

Vote Choice
Campbell and colleagues posited a chain reaction between the four blocks that, over time,
produce the vote choice. Contemporarily, the funnel of causality is divided between long-term
and short-term predictors (See: Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2016). The first two blocs,
sociological factors and partisan identification, are considered long term because their influence
rarely changes from election to election. For example, it is quite rare for American voters to
change their partisan identification between election cycles. Sociological groups also tend to be
constant between elections, although we may expect socioeconomic mobility to change over
long periods of time. The next two blocs, issues and candidate evaluation, are considered shortterm forces because issue perceptions change from one election to the next.32 Indeed, it is rare
that a single-issue item can dominate multiple consecutive election cycles. In all, the funnel of
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For example, America’s involvement in Iraq was a central issue during the 2004 Presidential election. However,
in 2008 the central issue during the Presidential election was the economy. Moreover, how voters perceive a specific
issue may change from one election to the next. In 2004, voters had a generally positive perceptions of the general
wellbeing of the economy. In 2008, however, the electorate was quite pessimistic about the overall state of the
economy.
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causality illustrates a synthesis between sociological and psychological forces in predicting the
vote choice.
Rational Theory
The rational voter model owes its existence to the work of Anthony Downs. In An
Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), Downs set out to “rationalize” political behavior and
demonstrate that the economics of voting was a central aspect in the decision-making calculus of
the electorate. The rational argument contends that prior to entering a voting booth, individuals
weigh the benefit of voting against its cost. According to Downs, for most of the electorate the
cost of voting outweighs the benefit. This is primarily due to the high information barriers faced
by the average voter. The cost-benefit function, however, differs for partisan voters, who
naturally face a lower cost threshold. Thus, the economics of voting becomes more favorable to
partisans than to non-partisans.
Morris Fiorina’s (1981) analysis of retrospective traits in American elections expanded
the scope of the rational school. In the period between Campbell et al.’s theoretical proposition
and Fiorina’s Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (1981), voting behavior
scholars began to criticize the central pillar of SPM: the durability of party identification. Using
election data in the 1960s, critics contended that a substantial number of voters switched their
partisan loyalty between elections cycles (e.g. Dobson and Meeter 1974; Dobson and Angelo
1975; Meier 1975). Fiorina’s work was a response to the pattern of studies suggesting the
instability of partisanship. Fiorina took SPM’s account of partisanship and revised the causal
link. For Fiorina, party identification was as much of a byproduct of changes in the sociopolitical climate (e.g. issues, events, etc) as it was an input to such events. Fiorina conceptualized
party identification in a rational manner, defining it as the difference between one’s experiences
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with political parties (Fiorina 1981; 1986). Fiorina’s analysis of partisanship and voting behavior
differed from Downs. The former based both concepts on retrospective considerations, while
Downs professed a link between political behavior and prospective decision making.
Contemporary voting behavior works have relied on some variant of SPM to model the
vote choice across different polities (Bratton et al. 2012; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Nadeau et al.
2017). The advantage of SPM is its central treatment of party identification, its synthesis of
sociological and psychological factors, and the parsimony of the model, rooted in the funnel of
causality (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). In the section below, I first discuss existing voting behavior
scholarship in post-Soviet republics. Relying on this literature and a descriptive analysis of
voters in the Caucasus, I form eight hypotheses related to the sociodemographic, socioeconomic,
partisan, and issue vote determinants.
Traits of the Post-Soviet Voter
To what extent does SPM predict the vote choice in the post-Soviet region? In this
section, I highlight notable works that have analyzed the vote function in post-Soviet republics.
Not surprisingly, the current crop of research is dominated by single-country studies.33 In
addition, an overwhelming majority of the works have observed voting patterns using the
Russian electorate. Although a few studies incorporate SPM’s funnel of causality approach (see:
Colton 2000; Colton and Hale 2009), the rest omit various variables found in the “funnel”,
including partisanship (see: Rose et al. 2000; White et al. 2002).
Voting behavior analysis in the post-Soviet space has followed a similar path as
scholarship in the West. Recall that early works suggested sociological factors impacting voting
33

In voting behavior studies, specifically economic voting, there is an evolution of scholarships that begins with the
dominance of single-country studies and, over time, expands to cross-national analyses.
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behavior. In Russia, studies of ballot behavior in the initial post-Soviet elections concluded that
voters were driven by sociological factors (e.g. Clem and Craumer 1996; White et al. 2002).
However, analysis of more recent elections points toward the emergence of partisanship as a
leading predictor of the vote choice (Miller and Klobucar 2000; Miller et al. 2000). Despite this
similar path, one cannot ignore the different degrees of party emergence between the West and
the post-Soviet region. For example, during the period of Lazarsfeld and colleagues case study,
America’s political system consisted of two mature and durable parties. In Russia and other postSoviet republics, the emergence of political parties and party identification did not occur
instantaneously and initially the region was abundant in party volatility (see: Chapter 6). Thus,
the early salience of sociological factors in Russian voting behavior may be due to the infancy of
the party politics.
Sociodemographics
In western liberal democracies, sociological indicators influence political participation,
particularly voter turnout (see: Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). For example, U.S. turnout levels are
higher for middle aged and older groups than for younger voters. In additional, educational
attainment and higher income tends to be associated with higher turnout rates. How then do
sociodemographic characteristics shape political behavior in the post-Soviet space? An early
work by Wyman et al. (1995) provides a descriptive analysis of the Russian electorate during the
1993 Russian parliamentary elections, concluding that the relationship between age and political
participation is similar to western democracies. Specifically, elder Russian voters were more
likely to vote than younger Russian voters. When it came to voter residence, Wyman and
colleagues found that rural residents tended to participate in larger percentages than urban voters.
Age
30

Beyond turnout rates, studies found young Russian voters favored market reform parties,
while older voters preferred communist or socialist parties (Clem and Craumer 1996; Colton
2000; Colton and Hale 2009; Wyman et al. 1995; Wyman 1996). Since 1993, this has translated
into young voters preferring the incumbent candidate, Yeltsin34 and then Putin35. According to
Wyman et al. (1995) the preference for parties of the old regime among older voters stems from
the volatile economic swing experienced by the electorate following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Many individuals not only lost their jobs, but also experienced a severe purchasing power
devaluation of their pensions.
In the Caucasus, the preference of youth voters toward pro-market parties has been
documented in the case of Georgia and the United National Movement (UNM) (Jones 2012). In
fact, Kmara, a youth-led political activist group, was instrumental in fostering the change of
power between Shevardnadze and Saakashvili during the 2003 rose revolution. Since the
ascendance of Georgian Dream as the country’s party of power, the youth vote has remained
partially loyal to UNM. However, Babunashvili’s (2017) inquiry into the incumbent vote
function of the Georgian electorate was unable to find any statistical significance between age
and vote for the incumbent in 2012 and 2015 election.
In Armenia, much less ink has been spilled on the relationship between age and political
behavior. Despite a lack of scholarly insight, we can deduce the assumption of young voters
disfavoring the RPA based on the events leading up to the velvet revolution. Since at least 2010,
Armenia’s youth has been the main organizer of anti-RPA protests. This includes the 2012
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Throughout the 1990s, President Yeltsin was the incumbent, and although he failed to establish a durable party of
power during his tenure, his support coalition consisted of pro-market parties.
35
Colton and Hale (2009) find an inverse relationship between age and a Yeltsin/Putin/Medvedev vote. That is,
through 2008, older voters have been less likely to vote for all three past presidents.
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ecological movement to save Mashtots Park, 2013 Yerevan bus fare protests and the 2015
electric Yerevan movement.36 Beyond the three youth-led, counter incumbent protests, the
participation of Armenia’s youth in the 2018 velvet revolution was a central factor in Sargsyan’s
abrupt resignation.
Based on the collection of works analyzing the relationship between age and vote choice
in the post-Soviet republics, I hypothesize that:
H1a: Young Armenian voters are less likely to vote for the RPA.
H1b: Young Georgian voters are less likely to vote for Georgian Dream.
The two hypotheses imply that both Armenian and Georgian youth voters are antiincumbent voters and that both voter sub-groups behave in a similar manner. The fact that the
youth are anti-incumbent decision-makers does not mean that their vote calculus is not
incumbent-oriented. In fact, an anti-incumbent vote may still be considered an incumbentoriented vote. That is, upon entering the voting booth youth voters in Armenia and Georgia
isolate the incumbent from other parties and cast a negative electoral judgement. This
phenomenon is relatable to negative voting (See: Kernell 1977; Fiorina and Shepsle 1989). In the
case of Armenia and Georgia, the youth’s opposition towards government may not necessarily be
based on a set of policies. Instead, the origin of the displeasure may be found in the
dissatisfaction with the patronal system of governance.
Sex
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The 2012 Mashtots park protests was aimed at preventing Armenia’s government from reallocating park land to
private construction firms. The 2013 bus fare protests were a reaction to an increase of public transportation fairs by
fifty-percent. The youth organized a boycott of all public transportations by providing free rides to users of public
transportation in their personal vehicles. The 2015 electric Yerevan protest was a reaction to an increase in
electricity rates.
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Scholarship analyzing the relationship between sex and vote choice is not as voluminous
as other sociodemographic characteristics. Although early works provide conclusive findings
vis-à-vis age, residence and vote choice, the impact of the voter’s sex on her or his vote choice is
mixed. During the Yeltsin era, a gender effect of the Yeltsin vote produced null results (Colton
2000). However, upon the ascendance of the Putin and Medvedev duo to the Russian presidency,
Colton and Hale (2009) discover that female voters were more likely to favor Putin and
Medvedev.
In the Caucasus, scholarly inquiry on the relationship between sex and vote choice has
also received little attention. One of the few works that test this relationship is Babunashvili’s
(2017) analysis of the Georgian voter. Unfortunately, the author is unable to find a statistically
significant relationship between sex and incumbent vote intention. That said, we can deduce a
pair of hypotheses from the current political structure in Armenia and Georgia.
In both countries, the patronal systems and patron-client networks are patriarchal. In fact,
through the conceptualization of a patronal structure as outlined by Hale (2015), the upper
echelon of sub-patrons in both countries consist entirely of men. Despite pressure from the
Council of Europe, which led to the introduction of gender quotas in Armenia’s and Gerogia’s
national assembly, both systems maintain their patriarchal character. This is not to suggest that
women are absent among political elites in Armenia and Georgia. However, the patronal
structure of Armenia and Georgia, as suggested by Hale (2015), is completely dominated by
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male patrons with female politicians taking on a technocratic role within each party of power.37
The descriptive narrative of political systems in the Caucasus suggests a male-dominant
playing field that is not very inclusive to patronal roles for females. Based on this, the pair of
hypotheses between sex and incumbent vote share state that:
H2a: Armenian female voters are less likely to vote for the RPA.
H2b: Georgian female voters are less likely to vote for Georgian Dream.
The presence of an anti-incumbent vote choice is also applicable to female voters. In both
countries, the patriarchal system transcends the political sphere and is also present in business
settings. The interconnectivity between the political and economic arena not only suppresses
opportunities for women, it also may lead female voters to blame their lack of economic mobility
on the current government. The 2017 ArmES provides a glimpse into the lack of upward
mobility and perception of meritocracy among female voters. When asked whether respondents
agreed that: ‘in order to increase one’s economic wellbeing, one must be a member or affiliated
with the ruling party’ female voters agreed with this statement almost ten percentage points
higher (44 percent) than male voters (36 percent).
Geography
In post-Soviet republics, the impact of geography on vote choice can be interpreted along
two avenues. The first is a conventional understanding of geography that divides the electorate
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In Armenia, two female politicians can be considered in leadership positions. In the RPA, former minister of
justice and vice president of the National Assembly, Arpine “Surb Arpi” Hovhannisyan, was a technocratic
politician who became the “female” face of the party. Despite her political position, Hovhannisyan’s role and power
within the RPA does not fit the narrative of a patron or sub-patron. Another female politician whose party leadership
does not translate into patron-status is Naira Zorabyan of the Prosperous Armenia Party (PAP). Despite being in
PAP leadership, Zorabyan, too, is a technocratic politician that lacks any connection with patronal pyramids.
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into settlement types: urban or rural. The second interpretation considers the specific region of
the country where the voter resides. Both types have been found to influence the vote choice
during the Yeltsin era. For example, the Yeltsin vote was strongest in larger Russian cities
(Colton 2000; Kolossov et al. 2003) as well as in Northern Russia (Clem and Craumer 1996).
Rural voters and voters residing in Southern Russia tended to be least likely to prefer a Yeltsin
presidency (Wyman 1996). However, the statistically significant relationship between geography
and incumbent vote choice has disappeared during Putin’s tenure (Colton and Hale 2009; White
and McAllister 2003).
The impact of regions on vote choice is most apparent in Ukraine (Hinich et al. 1999;
Kubicek 2000). Political behavior in the European country is divided along ethnic, linguistic, and
geographic lines. Eastern Ukraine tends to be more heterogeneous and includes a substantial
ethnic Russian population, who speak Russian and have supported the Russian language as a de
jure second official language of the country. Western Ukraine, on the other hand, is more
ethnically homogeneous and consists almost entirely of ethnic Ukrainians. Voters in Western
Ukraine are hostile towards policies of Russification. Ukraine’s politicized geographic division
dates back to Ukrainian independence and the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk. In fact, since
Ukraine’s independence, every Ukrainian election has been marked by politicized regional
divisions (Bloom and Shulman 2011).38
The impact of geography on vote choice in the Caucasus is profound, particularly in rural
regions. The dominance of sub-patrons in both polities has resulted in villages and small-sized
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Preliminary reports suggest that the 2019 Presidential election was the first national election to not include this
dichotomous regional division. However, it is much too early to reach this empirical conclusion. Even if Presidentelect Zelensky was able to avoid the East-West vote choice discrepancy, this occurred primarily because of the
unpopularity of another Poroshenko term.
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cities coming under the political domain of both parties in power. During election seasons both
the RPA and Georgian Dream over perform in rural villages, where politics is often structured
around the local party boss (See: Chapter 4). The skewed level of support is because rural
settlements lack the economic diversification present in the urban settings and thus are at the
mercy of sub-patrons and their business conglomerates. This makes rural residents more
tolerable and trusting of the government, than individuals residing in urban areas (Jones 2015:
18). In a study of Georgian voters, Babunashvili’s (2017) found a positive and statistically
significant relationship between rural settlement and vote intention for Georgian Dream prior to
the 2016 parliamentary elections. Thus, incumbent loyalty among rural voters translates to the
following two hypotheses:
H3a: Rural Armenian voters are more likely to vote for the RPA.
H3b: Rural Georgian voters are more likely to vote for Georgian Dream.
As opposed to young voter and female voters, the rural residence of Armenian and
Georgian respondents is said to positively influence their incumbent vote choice. Overall, all
three sociodemographic vote determinants provide an incumbent-centric understanding of the
vote choice among both electorates.
Socioeconomics
In post-Soviet republics, socioeconomic indicators have been considered central to
political behavior. This is because the economic shock, that impacted most post-Soviet citizens
after the collapse of the USSR, shifted many households from middle class-based socioeconomic
status to an impoverished state. The 1990s witnessed an era of privatization, monetary
devaluation, and the withdrawal of the social welfare state. In most cases, the privatization of
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factories led to their liquidation and closure. Throughout the region, unemployment became
rampant and income scarce. The distribution of “communal sphere services” – electricity, gas,
and water – which were largely rent free during the Soviet Union, now required hefty payments
(Collier and Way 2004). In turn, socioeconomically disenfranchised voters shifted their attention
to the incumbent government, blaming them for their household’s economic misfortune.
Education
The Soviet Union’s legacy of universal access to education and near complete literacy
rates created an electorate throughout the region that was disproportionately educated compared
to Western as well as non-Western countries. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, the higher
educated Russian population became hostile to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation
(CPRF) and, instead, preferred right-wing parties (Colton 2000; Kolossov et al. 2003). This was
primarily due to support of economic restructuring programs during the Yeltsin era, among the
higher educated. Despite clear evidence of support for economic reforms, the relationship
between educational attainment and support for Yeltsin is mixed (Clem and Craumer 1996;
Colton 2000). Since the Putin presidency, the impact of educational attainment on a Putin vote
appears to be null (Colton and Hale 2009; White and McAllister 2003).
In the Caucasus, the politicization of education has translated into an educative effect
among the electorate, whereby higher educated voters tend to oppose the incumbent. The one
exception to this was President Mikheil Saakashvili’s first term (2004 – 2007). When Saakashvili
successfully ousted the Shevardnadze regime, one of his first reforms was towards Georgia’s
education system. During the late 1990s, Shevardnadze had politicized the hiring of educational
administrators and centralized educational institutions. By the time of the rose revolution, college
students grew increasingly hostile toward Shevardnadze’s policies and became a leading support
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group for Saakashvili’s presidential ambitions. The youth movement Kmara, which was
established at Tbilisi State University in 2000, took their displeasure towards Georgia’s
education system to Tbilisi streets and found a natural ally in Saakashvili (Kandelaki and
Meladze 2007). In turn, when Saakashvili became president he proceeded to depoliticized and
decentralized the administrative structure of Georgia’s education system (Tangiashvili and Slade
2014).
However, Saakashvili’s second term (2008-2013) was marked by unilateral coercive
actions and controversial policies, culminating with the police torture scandal.39 This fractured
his support among higher educated voters. Empirically, the loss of the educated support coalition
was highlighted in Babunashvili’s (2017) analysis of the Saakashvili’s UNM party. The author
was unable to find a statistically significant relationship between higher educated voters and
support for UNM during the 2012 parliamentary election. The educative effect was also nonexistent with support for Georgian Dream prior to the 2016 parliamentary election (Babunashvili
2017). However, following the consolidation of power by Georgia’s new party of power and the
party’s patronal practices, we can assume that higher educated voters may be less supportive of
Georgian Dream.
In Armenia, the politicization of education has created a similar counter effect. RPA’s
stronghold on educational administrators resulted in the entire system acting as a support
coalition for the RPA. This in many ways paralleled Shevardnadze’s policies. Both regimes
pursued a top-down politicization model of extracting resources from educators (bribes,
extortions, etc.) and using the system as a support coalition prior to elections. When Sargsyan
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In September 2012, video footage surfaced in Georgia showing prisoners being tortured by guards. This became a
rallying cry for the opposition, Georgian Dream, who associated this act with Saakashvili’s unilateral policies,
which had created a culture of unaccountability within Georgian bureaucratic ranks.
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resigned, Armenian airwaves broadcasted multiple educators who disclosed the coercive tactics
of the RPA, including mandatory withholding of instructor bonuses to the RPA and mandating
classrooms to RPA rallies.
In Armenia and Georgia, both parties of power have fostered a social environment
whereby “individuals organize their political and economic pursuits primarily around
personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments through chains of actual
acquaintance…” (Hale 2015: 9-10). Naturally, social relations under a patronal environment are
not conducive to meritocracy. As such, the economic value of higher education is influenced by
one’s “chains of acquittances.” A higher educated individual who lacks a widening scope of
acquittances realizes that the network of acquittances supersedes educational attainment in
“political and economic pursuits.” Thus, in patronal systems we can expect higher educated
voters to orient their vote function against the incumbent:
H4a: College educated Armenian voters are less likely to vote for the RPA.
H4b: College educated Georgian voters are less likely to vote for Georgian Dream.
The dissatisfaction with the incumbent government among Armenian and Georgian
voters applies to both recent college educated students as well as those who were educated
during the Soviet era. This is because the value of their education is depressed by the
sustainability of patronal politics. Higher educated voters view the current government as an
impediment toward their economic mobility. As such, they are more likely to electorally punish
the government than are voters who lack higher education.
Employment
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In post-Soviet republics, the scarcity of job opportunities makes employment a source of
satisfaction with the government. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region has
witnessed outward migration patterns from the Caucasus and Central Asian republics into Russia
for employment purposes. Although today Russia maintains employment figures comparable
with the West40, its unemployment statistics were nearing double digits during the initial
independence years (World Bank 2019). In Colton’s (1996) study of the Russian electorate,
unemployment was found to be a statistically significant predictor of the incumbent vote. Recent
studies, however, have been unable to unearth a unidirectional relationship between
unemployment and vote choice (Colton 2000; Treisman 2011; White and McAllister 2003). The
shift in the predictive power of unemployment with the Russian electorate may be due to
asymmetrical impact of unemployment within vote functions. It has been suggested elsewhere
that unemployment is salient only to voters who perceive being unemployed or when the
unemployment rate is considerably higher (Singer 2013). Thus, a gradual decrease in the number
of Russians who are unemployed may have altered the relationship between unemployment and
incumbent support.
In the Caucasus, the unemployment rate has constantly been in the double-digits. In fact,
both Armenia’s and Georgia’s current rate of unemployment is higher than was Russia’s at any
time since the collapse of the USSR (see: World Bank 2019). Not surprisingly, jobs have
consistently been rated by Armenian and Georgian voters as the most pressing issue facing their
country (CRRC 2010; 2011; 2012; NDI 2016; Oganesyan 2017; 2018). Varying waves of the
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In recent years, Russia has averaged around five percent unemployment rate (OECD 2018).

40

Caucasus Barometer Survey as well as the 2016 GPAS and the 2017 ArmES arrive at a similar
conclusion: that Armenian and Georgian voters are most concerned about jobs.
Given the abundance of unemployment in the region, the security of employment might
then be a predictor of incumbent vote intention. This assumption becomes more solidified when
we incorporate the influence of patronalism on employment opportunities. Since economic
pursuits are based on a network of acquittances, many of those who are employed may owe their
political allegiance to the government. Thus, they are more likely to be satisfied with the current
government. In Georgia, an empirical study points to higher probability of a Georgian Dream
voter among respondents who disclosed being employed (Babunashvili 2017). In Armenia,
descriptive evidence points toward employed individuals preferring the incumbent government
(SAS 2017).41
Based on the previously established link between employed voters and incumbent
support, I hypothesize that:
H5a: Employed Armenian voters are more likely to vote for the RPA.
H5b: Employed Georgian voters are more likely to vote for Georgian Dream.
The above hypotheses do not take into consideration whether the employed Armenian or
Georgian citizen votes for the incumbent out of free will or is coerced to do so. Although the
coercive aspect of voting for the incumbent among employed voters has been speculated, the
leadup to Armenia’s 2017 parliamentary elections demonstrated that such practices are
occurring. After the election, an audio recording was released of management from a wellknown supermarket chain coercing its staff of not only vote for the RPA but to promise in
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writing to have their family and friends vote for the incumbent or risk being separated from their
place of employment (SAS 2017).
Household Income
Household income is considered an important indicator of socioeconomic status and
voter turnout (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). In Russia, initial studies found that while income was not
related to turnout (Wyman et al. 1995; Wyman 1996), household income was a significant
predictor of the Yeltsin vote in the 1996 presidential election (Colton 2000). Not surprisingly,
during Russia’s period of economic instability, in the 1990s, higher household income was
associated with support for Yeltsin. However, more recent work analyzing the impact of
household income on the Putin vote has produced inconclusive results (White and McAllister
2003).
In the Caucasus, the scarcity of income elevates this socioeconomic vote predictor. While
its impact on the vote choice is relatively unknown, we can speculate voting behavior traits
between the Armenian and Georgian electorate based on theory of patronal politics and Caucasus
Barometer data. According to the former, voters in Armenia and Georgia operate within a
patronal environment whereby their material gains are attributable to their network of
acquaintances. Since these networks are often times politicized, we can assume that voters with
higher household incomes will prefer the incumbent. This is because the voters’ acquaintance
network is often allied with or prefers the government. Based on the theory of patronalism, we
expect that:
H6a: Armenian voters whose household income is in the top quartile are more likely to
vote for the RPA.
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H6b: Georgian voters whose household income is in the top quartile are more likely to
vote for the Georgian Dream.
Theoretically, patronalism fosters the connection between households with high incomes
and support for the incumbent. However, upon further investigation it appears that economic
affluent Armenian and Georgian voters may not be as favorable to the government as suggested
above. In the 2015 Caucasus Barometer, forty-eight percent of Georgian respondents in the
highest household income bracket disclosed distrustful attitudes toward the government.42 In the
2017 Caucasus Barometer, sixty-two percent of Armenian respondents in the same income
bracket disclosed a similar sentiment towards their government. Although trust in government
differs from incumbent vote intention, the two are relatable. Thus, the below two hypotheses
offer a counter assumption:
H6c: Armenian voters whose household income is in the top quartile are less likely to vote
for the RPA.
H6d: Georgian voters whose household income is in the top quartile are less likely to vote
for the Georgian Dream.
Party Identification
In western liberal democracies, the development of party identification is influenced by
political socialization (Hyman 1959). This process occurs over several years and even decades.
In the post-Soviet space, the emergence of party identification has been identified in several
studies (e.g. Colton 2000; Miller et al. 2000; Miller and Klobucar 1999). Despite this, it is
important to note that the political socialization process under which party identification

42

Only three percent disclosed rather or full trust in their government.
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flourishes has largely been absent in the region (Colton 2000). This is because party politics in
the post-Soviet region is a relatively new occurrence that lacks transcendence across generations.
Whereas in the West, party identification tends to be inherited from one’s family (see: Campbell
et al. 1960), most parties in post-Soviet republics have not existed beyond a few election cycles.
This higher degree of party volatility limits the transferring of party identification from one
familial generation to the next.
Another reason for the limitation of partisanship relates to the platforms of parties. In
post-Soviet republics, many parties lack a coherent, positional and durable policy platform, and
instead are vehicles of patronage that often address valence issues.43 This minimizes the
connection between a voter’s issue proximity and that of the party. Instead, party identification
may be due to a psychological attraction to the party leader. In fact, Wyman’s (1996) analysis of
early Russian elections demonstrated that voters preferred parties largely because of the party’s
leadership, instead of the party program. Thus, the process by which post-Soviet voters gain
political attachments staunchly differs from what we witness in the West. Instead of a direct
association between the voter and the party, we may speculate that this relationship is instead
impacted by the party leader and party identification flourishes initially flourishes through a
psychological attraction to the party leader.
In Russia, early analysis in the development of party identification produced two
competing theoretical camps. The first posited that given the infant nature of Russia’s political
system, party identification would gradually emerge over time (Rose et al. 2001; White et al.
1997). The second camp contended that partisanship need not take decades to emerge and
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political behavior of Russians was in fact driven by partisan considerations (Brader and Tucker
2001; Miller and Klobucar 1999; Miller et al. 2000).44 Evidence of partisanship in the vote
choice was found in Russia’s 1996 presidential election (Colton 2000). Colton not only identified
the statistically significant role of partisanship in Yeltsin’s vote function, but also in the vote
choice for three opposition candidates, Zyuganov, Lebed, and Yavlinsky. A recent work by
Colton and Hale (2015) expanded the analysis through 2008 and concluded the presence of copartisan identity in the incumbent vote function of the Russian electorate.
In the Caucasus, the development of party identification has seldom been studied. That
said, we can apply the near-universal influence of party identity to both Armenian and Georgian
voters. Doing so, results in the following two hypotheses:
H7a: Armenian voters who identify with the RPA are more likely to vote for the RPA.
H7b: Georgian voters who identify with Georgian Dream are more likely to vote for the
Georgian Dream.
In the two hypotheses above, I contend that voters in the Caucasus who identity with the
incumbent party will be more likely to disclose a vote intent for the party. A limitation to the
convergence between partisanship and the vote is the high level of party volatility in the region.
However, the volatile party structure does not impact all parties equally. In fact, aside from
incumbent parties, party volatility is dominant among opposition parties. Parties of power are the
most durable political organizations in the region. The is evidenced by RPA’s decades long
governing mandate and Georgian Dream’s near-decade long incumbency.
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Interestingly, much of the debate surrounding the development of partisanship and the varying degrees of
partisanship in Russia was attributable to the specific phrasing of the party identification question (e.g. Brader and
Tucker 2001).
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Issues
The ability of voters to relate their issue perceptions to incumbent support is fundamental
to the accountability thesis. In post-Soviet republics the economy has been the central focus of
the electorate. The high degree of salience given to economic issues in post-Soviet republics is to
be expected since the region has only recently recovered from the economic digression that
occurred following the collapse of the Soviet Union. For much of the 1990s, the average postSoviet citizen was economically worse off than they were during the Soviet Union. Despite the
improving economic situation, wealth disparity is widespread throughout the region (See:
Habibov 2012).
Economy
The impact of economic attitudes on the vote choice is among the largest subfields of
voting behavior literature (See: Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013). Economic dimensions of the
vote are valence, positional, and patrimonial. Valence economic voting interprets the economy
through a lens of general wellbeing. Here, the economy takes on a valence structure as voters
prefer a good economy to a bad one (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2009; 2011). Positional economic
voting encompasses issues where a distribution of position exists (e.g. taxation, interest rates,
etc.) and voters prioritize their economic issues and positions. Thus, voters who prioritize
unemployment over inflation will tend to support left-wing parties over right-wing parties.
Finally, patrimonial economic voting posits an impact on the vote via asset ownership.
Proponents of patrimonial voting contend that levels and types of asset ownership predict the
vote choice. Specifically, maintaining large sums of assets and/or high-risk assets (e.g. stocks,
businesses, etc.) result in voters preferring right-wing parties over left-wing parties (Nadeau et al.
2010; Persson and Martinsson 2016)
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Perceptions of the economy can occur along four dimensions: retrospective, prospective,
egotropic, and sociotropic.45 When the electorate relies on retrospective or prospective measures
of the economy, they are relating change in either past or upcoming economic attitudes with their
vote choice. When voters rely on egotropic or sociotropic attitudes, they isolate changes in either
their pocketbook or the national economy. In western liberal democracies, studies have found
that voters generally rely on retrospective and sociotropic perceptions of the economy (Fiorina
1978; 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; 1981; Lewis-Beck 1986).46
In post-Soviet Russia, voters are driven by a mixture of all four economic voting
dimensions.47 For example, Colton’s (1996) individual-level analysis of the 1995 Russian
parliamentary election suggested that voters act as sociotropic voting agents. However, Hesli and
Bashkirova’s (2001) study of the Yeltsin vote between 1991 and 1997 concluded that voters are
egotropic and prospective-oriented. Research analyzing the economic vote during Putin’s
presidency find that voters are sociotropic-oriented (Colton and Hale 2009; Rose 2007; Treisman
2014) and egotropic-oriented (Colton and Hale 2009; Treisman 2014). Treisman’s (2009)
analysis of the economic vote between the Yeltsin and Putin presidency suggests that the
economy was a stronger determining factor for Yeltsin than for Putin due to the economic
volatility experienced in the 1990s.
Besides Russia, the presence of economic voting has been observed in Ukraine. Bloom
and Shulman (2011) modeled the economic vote during Ukraine’s 2010 presidential election.
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The former two types relate to time, while the latter two types relate to space.
Although scholars have pointed out the presence of pocketbook (Gomez and Wilson 2001) and prospective
perceptions (MacKuen et al. 1992) in the vote choice, the wider research tends to conclude that voters rely on past
perceptions of the national economy.
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One of the first studies to examine economic voting in the region was Duch’s (1995) analysis of the economic
vote and support for Gorbachev. Duch found that Soviet citizens were incumbent-oriented economic voters who
relied on both retrospective and prospective measures of the pocketbook. However, the study was conducted during
the Soviet Union and is does not necessarily fall within the post-Soviet period.
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Using macro-level analyses, the authors found that unemployment rates hurt the incumbent,
Victor Yushchenko. Interestingly, higher unemployment numbers also hurt Yushchenko’s
former orange revolution ally, Yulia Tymoshenko. These results suggest that along with the
presence of economic voting within the incumbent vote function, the 2010 election was also a
referendum on the outcomes of the orange revolution.
In the Caucasus, the impact of economic voting on the vote choice has been scarcely
analyzed. To my knowledge, only Babunashvili (2017) and Turmanidze’s (2017) work has
analyzed traces of the economy in the vote function of the Georgian election.48 However, neither
work relies on a standard conceptualization of economic voting dimensions (e.g. retrospective,
egotropic, etc.) and proper wording of questions relating to these dimensions. Instead,
Babunashvili creates an index of short-term and long-term socioeconomic issues and models
them against the incumbent vote function. The author operationalizes short-term factors as the
job performance of the current government in relation to economic issues (e.g. agriculture,
economy, pensions, etc.). Long-term factors are operationalized as the change in the same
economic issues from the last election period. The author’s findings suggest that Georgian voters
are largely driven by ‘short-term’ economic factors.49
Turmanidze (2017) conducts can experimental study on the benefits of pre-electoral
ambiguous campaign promises in Armenia and Georgia and finds the presence of grievance
asymmetry in the political behavior of Georgian voters. Grievance asymmetry results when
voters place more weight toward negative economic events than positive economic events. The
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This suggests a short time-horizon on the part of Georgian voters.
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author finds that Georgians emphasize negative economic information over positive economic
information.
Despite the scarcity of studies on economic perceptions in the Caucasus, the type of
economic attitudes considered in here is within the scope of valence economic voting. Hence, I
hypothesize respondents who disclose an increase in their economic wellbeing to be incumbentoriented voter.
H8a: Armenian voters who perceive a positive change in their prospective-egotropic
attitudes are more likely to vote for the RPA.
H8b: Georgian voters who perceive a positive change in their prospective-egotropic
attitudes are more likely to vote for Georgian Dream.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined three theoretical foundations of voting behavior. All three
perspective prescribe a different basis of the vote function. Of the mentioned theories, SPM has
the widest depth when it comes to analyzing the vote choice of the electorate. The strength of
SPM is the central role given to party identification as a predictor of the vote. Although partisan
formation tends to be a gradual process that involves a larger experience of political
socialization, this approach does not summarize political socialization and the development of
partisanship in the post-Soviet space. After all, the level of party volatility in the region prevents
the passing down of partisanship from one generation to the next (See Campbell et al. 1960).
Thus, it may be suspect to what extent partisan identity influences the vote in the Caucasus.
In the next chapter, I outline the research design of the study. To account for party
volatility in the region, I limit the vote choice to incumbent parties. These parties of power have
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maintained a relatively stable presence in the past several elections. For example, the RPA has
contested every election since 1995 and has been in a senior coalition member of government
since 1999.50 Georgian Dream, on the other hand, is a relatively new party of power and has been
in government since 2012. Modeling the vote choice in Armenia and Georgia through an
incumbent-centric lens corresponds to the set of incumbent-oriented hypotheses outlined in this
chapter. Furthermore, it provides a stable example of two political parties whose lifecycles are
not limited to a single election. In all, the impact of SPM on the vote choice for the Caucasus
electorate can be properly measured through an incumbent-centric approach.
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The RPA joined government in 1995 as a junior coalition member. In the aftermath of the 1999 parliamentary
election and the October terrorist attack on Armenia’s national assembly, the RPA assumed the role of senior
coalition member. Between 1999 and 2018, the RPA consecutively won elections and continued to hold the title of
senior coalition member.
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CHAPTER 3: MODELING THE POST-SOVIET VOTER
Political attitudes surveys are central to voter behavior studies.51 In the post-Soviet
republics, such surveys are vital towards analyzing political behavior and public opinion. The
importance of individual-level survey analysis is furthered by the abundance of competitive
authoritarian regimes in the region, which lessen the use of aggregate measures of elections since
the actual incumbent vote share is often based on manufactured support or fraudulent ballots. In
addition, aggregate measures of voter behavior produce homogeneous accounts of the electorate
while unable to consider differences in voter attitudes. Relying on individual-based interviews
avoids the issues of interval validity that dominant aggregate election studies.
In the previous chapter, I outlined the theoretical foundation of the socio-psychological
voter behavior model and how the funnel-of-causality ultimately results in the vote choice. In
this chapter, I apply each block within the funnel to analyze incumbent vote intention for both
the Armenian and Georgian electorate. The rest of the chapter is divided into three parts. The
first discusses the conventional methodological approaches adopted in previous works. Here I
concentrate on pre- and post-electoral surveys and block recursive modeling as a method of
incorporating both long-term and short-term vote predictors. The second section then models the
post-Soviet voter by first discussing the contents of both ArmES and GPAS and then the relevant
data within each survey. Since both surveys were administered prior to each election, I am
interested in modeling the predictors of vote intention. I rely on both sociological and
psychological factors to predict the incumbent vote intention of the Armenian and Georgian
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Today, most studies that seek to analyze voter behavior rely on political attitudes or election study surveys. Prior
to the adoption of surveys, voting behavior studies were primarily driven by historical analysis of parties, policy
positions and campaigns (Niemi and Weisberg 1993).
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electorate. The final section summarizes the research design of the dissertation and lays out the
path of the subsequent empirical chapters.
Conventional Methodological Approaches
Since first incorporated by advocates of the Columbia school, surveys have been a central
tool for voting behavior scholars. In such studies, the use of surveys serves at least four
important functions. First, they allow the researcher to avoid making an ecological fallacy, which
results in individual-based inferences made from aggregate, country-wide data. Reliance on
territorial-unit observations (province or country) to make inferences about voting behavior is
problematic because the unit of analysis does not consider behavioral traits of voters. Political
attitudes surveys circumvent this problem by observing the political behavior of voters
themselves.
Second, the availability of surveys allows researchers to avoid making inferences about
the homogenized voter. Not only do aggregate level studies commit an ecological fallacy, such
inquiries are also unable to distinguish between voter types and thus imply that the electorate is
homogeneous. Since the introduction of political attitudes surveys, scholars have been able to
demonstrate the multidimensionality of the vote and present arguments for a heterogeneous
account of the electorate.52
Third, political attitude surveys allow researchers to measure the change in attitudes
between election cycles. This process begins with a pre-electoral survey that samples given

52

For example, in voter behavior research it has been assumed that voters are largely sociotropic decision-makers.
That is, they base their perceptions of the economy on national trends, rather than pocketbook changes (Kinder and
Kiewiet 1979; 1981). Using political attitudes surveys, subsequent works have argued for pocketbook voting with
certain types of voters, including political sophisticates (Gomez and Wilson 2001) and financially-scarce voters
(Singer and Carlin 2013).
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households about the political environment prior to election day. A percentage of households
who agree to be re-interviewed are then revisited following the election. This panel-structured
surveying method allows researchers to not only measure the impact of the campaign season but
also analyze the durability of issue preferences and candidate evaluations.
Finally, surveys allow researchers to test the relationship between subjective perceptions
and objective measures. For example, changes in respondent perceptions of the national
economy should relate to macroeconomic swings. This analysis is key to uncovering a potential
dysconnectivity between the actual politico-economic shifts and whether voters correctly of
incorrectly perceive them.
Pre-electoral Surveys
Pre-electoral studies survey the public prior to an election. This method presents both
advantages as well as challenges to the overall political behavior of the electorate. One
advantage is the stimulus effect, whereby participation in the survey boosts voter turnout.
Advocates of the stimulus effect point toward the survey as an activating agent of political
interest among the participants. Thus, engaging respondents with election-centric questionnaires
“stimulates” their interest in the upcoming election (Clausen 1968; Yalch 1976; Granberg and
Holmberg 1992). The stimulus effect, however, does not impact all respondents equally.
Granberg and Holmberg (1992) point towards asymmetrical effects between low-interest and
high-interest respondents. Specifically, they suggest that the stimulus effect is more evident
among individuals that have higher levels of political interest.
Pre-electoral surveys, however, also present some challenges. First, respondents who
partake in such surveys may already be high interest individuals, compared to the average
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citizen. The ability to partake or optout from an electoral survey may be systemically related to
one’s interest in politics. Thus, individuals who refuse to participate are those that are of low
political interest. Another challenge is accounting for the over-reporting of turnout rates that
occur in pre-electoral surveys (e.g. Clausen 1968; Marsh 1985; Trauggott and Katosh 1979).
Survey turnout rates are considerably higher than actual turnout rates. As such, the challenge in
pre-electoral surveys that contain higher turnout rates is figuring out whether the imbalance is
due to respondent selection or social desirability bias.53
Scholars who rely on pre-electoral studies are often interested in the vote intention of the
electorate. In other words, the voting question that is asked is prospective. For example, ‘if
elections were held tomorrow for whom would you vote?’ Because the survey is pre-electoral,
the question cannot ask for the actual vote since the act has not yet occurred. For the research
design, the vote intention question presents some advantages. First, it is less likely to be impacted
by response bias. In a post-electoral survey, the vote question that tends to be asked is the actual
vote. For example, ‘in the election held on date X, which party did you vote for?’ At first glance,
an actual vote question may seem methodologically superior to a vote intention question. If we
are trying to obtain voting behavior information, asking how one voted in retrospect is preferable
than asking how one would vote in a futuristic date. However, the actual vote question has been
plagued by inaccurate responses. In fact, an important issue associated with election surveys is
the overestimation of the winner’s vote share. This ‘halo effect’ was evident in the first batch of
surveys analyzing post-Soviet Russian voter behavior (Wyman et al. 1995). Since the winner is
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Advocates of respondent selection bias contend that individuals who elect to be interviewed are already politically
active individuals who are more likely to vote than individuals who refuse to partake in surveys (Traugott and
Katosh 1979). Advocates of the social desirability bias contend that individuals face social pressure to respond in the
affirmative when asked whether they intend to vote.
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unknown in a pre-electoral survey, the respondent’s vote choice is more likely to be accurate.
Another advantage of presenting a ‘voter intention’ question is being able to track changes into
the respondent’s vote calculus as the election nears. Early pre-electoral surveys assumed a panelstructure and tracked the changes in responses as the election neared (see Lazarsfeld et al. 1948).
Periodically revisiting the same respondent allows surveyors to measure how political messages
and other external events impact the vote choice. A further refinement of this approach includes
combination of pre- and post-electoral studies. Today, this is the standard approach in several
election studies, including the American National Election Study (ANES). The advantage of this
approach is that researchers can revisit the respondent following an election and analyze the
presence of post-electoral changes in their sentiment and perceptions.
Block Recursive Modeling
The inclusion of voting behavior-related questions from surveys parallels the funnel-ofcausality approach laid out in the previous chapter. According to the authors of The American
Voter, the vote function is a combination of both sociological and psychological variables. The
fact that the funnel-of-causality approach comprises of a hierarchical set of both sociological and
psychological factors complements block recursive modeling. Like a nested regression
technique, block recursive modeling consists of isolating exogenous variables from endogenous
ones and introducing the former followed by the latter in varying blocks. In voter behavior
studies, each block corresponds to each set of variables within the funnel (see Campbell et al.
1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Applying the funnel of causality via a block recursive model
results in several subsets of equations that are interrelated. For instance, the first block contains
sociodemographic and socioeconomic vote predictors.
ܸ ݁ݐൌ ݂ሺݏݎݐ݄ܽܿ݅݀݊݅ܿ݅ܽݎ݃݉݁݀݅ܿݏǡ ݏݎݐܽܿ݅݀݊݅ܿ݅݉݊ܿ݁݅ܿݏሻ
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The above equation isolates the impact of the exogeneous variables. Both
sociodemographic and socioeconomic indicators are considered long-term indicators of the vote.
This suggests that we do not expect to see much change in their impact on the vote function from
election to election. For example, in the United States an individual who is deeply religious and
relates religious doctrine to political opinion will be more likely to prefer the Republican party
and vote for the party’s nominee. The association of religious views with party vote choice rarely
alters from one election to the next.
ܸ ݁ݐൌ ݂ሺݏݎݐ݄ܽܿ݅݀݊݅ܿ݅ܽݎ݃݉݁݀݅ܿݏǡ ݏݎݐܽܿ݅݀݊݅ܿ݅݉݊ܿ݁݅ܿݏǡ ݄݅ݏ݊ܽݏ݅ݐݎܽሻ
After including sociological vote determinants, the next ‘block’ incorporates political
anchor variables. Partisanship is one of two anchor variables used to predict the vote.54 The
inclusion of partisanship in the vote function adds a socio-psychological vote component.
Partisans attachment is a psychological process that, when developed, tends to remain stable
from one election to the next. Thus, it too is considered a long-term vote predictor. In western
liberal democracies it is quite common for voters to maintain a specific party preference
throughout much of their lives. The anchoring effect of partisanship goes beyond sociological
predictors. Party attachment can also influence that way an individual assesses the political,
economic, and social world. Referred to as partisan rationalization, or the process of rationalizing
issues, events, etc. through a partisan lens, this phenomenon is how many voters perceive social,
economic, and political issues and events. For example, an individual preferring the incumbent
party will be less critical of the government for a bad economy than someone whose party
preference lies with the opposition.
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The other being ideology.
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ܸ ݁ݐൌ ݂ሺ݄ܿ݅ܽݎ݃݉݁݀݅ܿݏǡ ݏݎݐܽܿ݅݀݊݅ܿ݅݉݊ܿ݁݅ܿݏǡ ݄݅ݏ݊ܽݏ݅ݐݎܽǡ ݅ݏ݁ݑݏݏሻ
Below partisanship, we find social and economic issues. We can divide them into two
groups: valence and positional (see: Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011; Lewis-Beck et al. 2013).
Valence issues are those which enjoy a consensus in public opinion. We can think of such
examples as the overall health of the economy, corruption, and crime. Voters prefer a healthy
economy to a distressful economy; a less corrupt society to a corrupt society; and a crime-free
society to a crime abundant society. Positional items, on the other hand, are issues which divide
public opinion and require voters to take a distinct policy position. For example, the larger
economy is a valence issue. However, when addressing certain aspects of the economy, such as
taxation, a consensus does not exist. Although everyone prefers a healthy economy toward a
distressful one, voters differ about the issue of taxing the public. Some prefer a progressive
policy, while others prefer a flat taxation policy. Positional items are important because one’s
position is highly influential on their voting behavior. An individual who prefers a flat taxation
system over a progressive one may be inclined to support a party or candidate that shares her or
his policy preference.
ܸ ݁ݐൌ ݂ሺ݄ܿ݅ܽݎ݃݉݁݀݅ܿݏǡ ܿ݅݉݊ܿ݁݅ܿݏǡ ݄݅ݏ݊ܽݏ݅ݐݎܽǡ ݅ݏ݁ݑݏݏǡ ܿܽ݊݀݅݀ܽ݁ݐሻ
The final block relates to one’s perception of the candidates. Practically, the evaluation of
candidates is a direct determinant of one’s vote function. Voters who negatively evaluate a
candidate are less likely to vote for the candidate than voters who positively evaluate a candidate.
Overall then, SPM relies on sociological and psychological traits of the voter. Its approach is
illustrated through a funnel consisting out outer and inner layers. The former are sociological
factors. These exogeneous indicators then impact partisanship, the anchor of the vote.
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Partisanship acts as a rationalizing force that then influences issues and candidate evaluation.
Ultimately, the funnel’s output is the vote.
Modeling the post-Soviet Voter
Cross-national survey research in the post-Soviet region is scarce when compared to
other, developing areas. Although regional studies have existed, most analyses have been singlecountry studies that have concentrated on the Russian electorate.55 On the eve of post-Soviet
independence, two region-wide surveys were implemented by political scientists. The Survey of
Soviet Values (SSV), conducted by Raymond Duch and James Gibson (1990), was a study
performed in nine of the fifteen Soviet republics56 to measure commitment to democracy and
political participation.57 The SSV was an unprecedented study that relied on contemporary
measures of voter behavior by including sociological and psychological predictors. The SSV
became part of the larger Panel Study of Political Values in the Former Soviet Union (PVFSU),
which included the original SSV and a subsequent analysis undertaken in 1992.58
The second study, organized by Arthur Miller and colleagues, was limited to three
republics: Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. The New Soviet Citizen Survey consisted seven rounds
undertaken between 1990 and 2000.59 The questions within each wave had a specific theme. For
example, the 1990 wave was titled, ‘problems of peace and security’. The survey provided some
tenants of voting behavior, including perceptions of the economy and political parties.
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Some notable examples include, Duch and Gibson’s (1990) Panel Study of Political Values in the Former Soviet
Union, Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli’s (1990-2000) New Soviet Citizen survey, and Colton, Zimmerman, and Hale’s
(1995-2012) Russian Election Study (RES)
56
Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.
57
Some 1,559 individuals were interviewed across the nine Soviet republics during Spring 1990.
58
The PVFSU consisted of the original 1990 study in which 1,551 individuals were interviewed and a 1992 study in
which 4,309 individuals were interviewed. Between the two samples, some 698 were interviewed in both samples
(thus were panel interviews).
59
1990, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1998, and 2000.
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Specifically, Miller and colleagues used the series of surveys to address party development in the
three post-Soviet republics (Miller and Klobucar 2000; Miller and Klobucar 2003; Miller et al.
2000). That said, the main drawback of the New Soviet Citizen Survey series was the failure to
include items relating to actual voting behavior.
In the Caucasus, the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) undertook a decadelong project, the Caucasus Barometer (2008-2017), which sampled individuals in Armenia,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Each sample consisted of cross-national as well as country-specific
questionnaires. The cross-national portion of the survey addressed topics related to
socioeconomic development and social interactions. The survey included several questions
related to political institutions, including trust in government. One issue with the responses was,
in the case of Azerbaijan, the lack of variability. For example, when asked about trust in
President Aliyev, around eighty-four percent of respondents reported somewhat or full trust in
repeated waves. The survey did not include questions relating to political behavior, specifically
vote intention, partisanship, and other indicators. Overall, the Caucasus Barometer provided an
unprecedented insight into the social interactions of Armenian, Georgian, and Azerbaijanis. That
said, the survey failed to engage respondents with the necessary questions about their political
life and partisan orientation.
The Armenian Election Study (Oganesyan 2017; 2018) is a recent survey implemented
by the author.60 An in-depth measure of electoral behavior, ArmES is the first election study
implemented in the landlocked Caucasus republic. Currently, the survey consists of two preelection waves, both occurring prior to the country’s parliamentary elections. The second, 2018,
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Assisted by the American University of Armenia.
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wave of the survey was structured to (1) revisit the original panel survey in 2017, (2) analyze
perceptions of Armenia’s velvet revolution, and (3) expand the sample size. Despite the two
waves, I rely on respondent information gathered from the 2017 survey.
Survey analysis in the post-Soviet region has not been limited to scholars. Both the
International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) have
actively sought survey analysis in the region. The latter has implemented survey work in Georgia
since at least 2010. While not an election study in the traditional sense, the NDI’s periodical
GPAS has from time to time used questionnaires relating to voting behavior. One such wave
occurred in June 2016, fourth months prior to the 2016 parliamentary election. To analyze the
vote function of the Georgian electorate, I relied on this particular wave as it included the many
of the questions central to an election study. Below, I discuss the contents of each survey.
2017 Armenian Election Study
The 2017 ArmES included thirty-five questions divided into seven sections. The first
section addressed sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics of respondents. To make
sure respondents qualified for the survey, the first two questions were related to age and
citizenship. If the respondent was under eighteen years of age and/or not an Armenian citizen,
then the interview was terminated. The second section addressed political, economic, and social
issues. Specifically, I analyzed issue salience and perceptions of the economy. The third section
contained questions relating to partisanship and partisan intensity. The fourth section addressed
vote intention and the fairness of Armenia’s electoral process. The fifth section contained
questions relating to alternative types of voter behavior, including patronal voting. The sixth
section addressed the issue of corruption, including whether respondents perceived corruption
driven by supply, demand, or both. The final section centered on gender and politics. Here
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respondents were asked about the role and performance of women in Armenia’s parliament. This
was included in light of Armenia’s revised laws on gender quotas.
Initially, the questionnaire was created in English and discussed with members of the
research team at the American University of Armenia (AUA). To ensure comparison between
both samples, I borrowed the exact wording of GPAS questionnaires relating to vote intention
and perceptions of the economy and corruption. I held several working group discussions with
the ArmES research team. After this, I worked with the AUA staff to properly translate each
question into Armenian. Since the theoretical foundations of the survey are based on western
case studies, it was important to ensure the proper translation of certain phrases, including
egotropic voting, sociotropic voting, etc. Prior to the start of the survey, the research team
conducted several rounds of pre-sampling.
The telephone survey sampled one-thousand sixty-two households between March 14th
and March 31st, 2017.61 The time-period was chosen to narrowly precede the April 2nd election
date, thus minimizing any changes in voter perceptions and political behavior. The method of
phone number selection was implemented through random digit dialing (RDD). To account for
respondents with landline phones and mobile phones, as well as non-responses, an initial list of
one-thousand landline phones and one-thousand cellular phones was generated. To imitate the
demographic distribution of the country, the distribution of landline phone interviews occurred in
the following manner: Forty-percent of the landline phone interviews occurred in Yerevan, while
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The duration of the entire study lasted from March 1 st to March 31st. The first two weeks contained surveyor
training and the conduction of a pretest and its subsequent analyses. The actual survey began on March 14 and lasted
approximately two weeks. The survey was supervised by Jenny Paturyan, PhD and Valentina Gevorgyan. To ensure
that the study was completed in the necessary time, the survey team consisted of multiple political science graduate
students of AUA.
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sixty-percent of the landline phone interviews occurred in Armenia’s ten provinces (‘Marzes’).62
To imitate the demographic distribution of mobile phone carriers, the research team mirrored the
statistics of mobile phone carriers. In Armenia, there are three mobile phone operators. The most
voluminous is Vivacell MTS with approximately sixty-one percent of mobile subscribers;
followed by Beeline with approximately twenty-five percent of mobile subscribers; followed by
Ucom with approximately fourteen percent of mobile subscribers. To mimic this distribution,
610 Vivacell, 250 Beeline, and 140 Ucom phones numbers were generated.63 Finally, to ensure
that the assignment of phone numbers was a randomized process, a random number generator
was used.64 Each member of the survey team was required to make up to three attempts to
contact the generated phone number.65 The criteria for respondent inclusion was that the
respondent be (1) at least eighteen years old and (2) a citizen of the Republic of Armenia. These
two conditions ensured that the respondent was able to vote.
The use of a telephone survey was due to the inexpensive cost and the abundance of
phone subscriptions in the land-locked country. A 2014 ‘Freedom on the Net’ Report
(FreedomHouse 2014) listed 3.35 million mobile phone subscriptions, exceeding the total
population of the country. This does not necessarily mean that every Armenian citizen owns a
mobile phone; such an empirical conclusion is unrealistic unless one samples the entire
population. It does suggest, however, the abundance of mobile phone usage in the country.
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The territory of Armenia is comprised of eleven administrative districts. This includes ten provinces (‘Marzes’)
and the capital city of Yerevan. Since Yerevan maintains a distinct administrative status, it is not included in any of
the ten provinces.
63
Armenian mobile companies have distinct phone codes that associates each number with the subscriber. For
example, the following mobile phone codes are associated with the leading mobile provider, Vivacell: 077, 093,
094, and 098. Thus, if a mobile phone number begins with either one of the four codes then that phone number is
part of the Vivacell network.
64
The research team relied on https://www.random.org website to generate random phone digits.
65
To merit multiple attempts, the survey team had to receive a request to call at a later time or date; the respondent
is unavailable; a busy line; or the respondent fails to answer the phone.
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Telephone surveys also present some challenges to accurately sample respondents. First,
telephone surveys must find the proper mix of landline and mobile phone numbers to be
representative of the populations’ use of telecommunication services. The ArmES was able to
obtain an aggregate report of telecommunication subscribers from each company. However, a
sociodemographic report of each user was unavailable.
Second, telephone surveys must balance the scarcity of telecommunications in rural areas
with the abundance of them in urban areas. Throughout the post-Soviet space, many rural areas
contain frozen infrastructure from the Soviet period. Thus, some communities have all together
abandoned landlines and transitioned into mobile telecommunication. Fortunately, Armenia’s
large mobile communication market allowed the research team to minimize the impact of
inoperable landlines.
Third, telephone surveys also need to properly account for the balance in the landline and
mobile market. For example, if most Armenian mobile users rely on VivaCell, instead of Beeline
and UCom, then the sample should mirror this. An aggregate user report from each
telecommunication provider allowed the research team to properly distribute the samples across
landline and mobile respondents.
Fourth, reliance on telephone surveys excludes specific socioeconomic groups of
individuals who do not own a landline or mobile phone, while oversampling social groups that
are more likely to own a specific type of telecommunication device. For example, groups that
have been found to be underrepresented include elderly, low-income, and low-education
potential respondents. At the opposite end, young individuals have been oversampled using an
RDD technique (Green and Krosnick 1999).
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Fifth, telephone surveys tend to have a ‘no-opinion’ response bias, where respondents
quite frequently select non-response options (Green and Krosnick 1999). The tendency to select
non-response items can severely impact the distribution of responses, especially if the preference
of non-responses is not randomly distributed among respondents. In ArmES, non-responses with
political questions became an issue throughout the implementation of the survey.
Finally, reliance on the Armenian mobile market presents some challenges. For instance,
there is no clear way to differentiate between a non-working number and a number that is not inservice range. This creates issues in attempting to reach individuals who are out of the reception
area. To circumvent this problem, the surveyors were tasked with repeatedly calling a specific
number (up to three times) in different dates.
2016 Georgian Public Attitudes Survey
The 2016 GPAS was conducted by the NDI.66 The duration of the survey lasted from
June 8th to July 6th, 2016 and four-thousand one-hundred thirteen individuals were interviewed.
The Georgian survey occurred four months prior to the October 8th, 2016 election. The GPAS
analyzed a national representative sample of Georgians in rural and urban settings, across
Georgia’s nine regions (“mkhare”). Contrary to ArmES, the method of respondent contact in
GPAS was coordinated via face-to-face interviews. The respondent selection process began with
CRRC choosing Georgian voting precincts at random. Once locations were picked, interviewers
were sent to selected households. The Kish grid was used to isolate respondents. Once a
household was identified, interviewers conducted the survey and digitally recorded responses. In
all, some 4,113 individuals were interviewed for the GPAS survey.
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NDI subcontracted the survey work to CRRC. While CRRC conducted the interview process and gathered the
data, NDI retrieved the data.
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As mentioned above, the GPAS was conducted using face-to-face surveying technique.
Face-to-face surveys are considered preferential to telephone surveys. However, in many cases
the cost of conducting a cross-national face-to-face survey forces researcher to rely on the lesscostly option of telephone surveys. That said, face-to-face surveys are preferred for the following
reasons: First, in-person surveys are less likely to result in non-response bias. Non-responses
consist of individuals who fail to complete the survey, those that refuse to participate, and those
that are systematically left out of the sample pool (Keeter et al. 2006). Relying on a telephone
surveys can lead to greater likelihood of rejections because the surveyor may call individuals
during work hours, vacation, or other periods when the respondent is outside of their domicile
residence. Face-to-face surveys tend to be conducted at the primary residence of the respondent
and thus have a higher likelihood of completion. In a meta-analysis of some forty-five studies
that assessed response rates in face-to-face and telephone surveys, Hox and De Leeuw (1994)
found that the former had significantly higher response rates than the latter. In the case of
Armenia and Georgia, non-response rates were much higher with the Armenian sample than the
Georgian, furthering the claim made by the Hux and De Leeuw.
Second, face-to-face surveys are not bound by the limitation of telecommunications lines
and coverage. Whereas telephone-based surveys will be unable to reach a specific geospatial area
that lacks telecommunication lines, face-to-face surveys circumvent the issues associated with
phone-line accessibility (Blumberg and Luke 2006). As mentioned earlier, the limitation of
telecommunication can severely impact the representative sample of the survey and compromise
any generalizations made about a voter group.
Third, face-to-face surveys avoid a variety of negative externalities associated with
conducting the survey. For example, Holbrook et al. (2003) found that respondents in telephone
65

surveys complained about the length of interviews at higher rates than face-to-face interviews of
the same time. Furthermore, the level of disengagement with the survey is higher with telephone
interviews than with face-to-face interviews. Another negative externality that is minimized with
face-to-face surveys is the impact of social desirability bias among respondents (Holbrook et al.
2003).
Data and Parameter Estimation: Dependent Variable
The present study relies a standard operationalization of the dependent variable:
incumbent vote intention. The ArmES and GPAS include a standard vote intention question
which asked respondents, if ‘X’ parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, what party would
you vote for? The Armenian sample included a list of nine parties and pre-electoral coalitions,
while the Georgian sample included a list of seventeen parties and pre-electoral coalitions.67
Figures 3.1 illustrates the distribution of respondent’s vote intention for the Armenian sample.
Notice that most respondents disclosed a non-response by selecting either ‘don’t know’, ‘refused
to answer’, or ‘nobody’. Figure 3.2 omits the non-responses and only includes the distribution of
party responses. Not surprisingly, Armenian voters were largely divided between two political
groups: RPA and Prosperous Armenia Party (PAP). Interestingly, only twenty-seven respondents
disclosed a vote for the Yelk alliance, an opposition bloc led by current Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan, which cruised to election victory in December 2018 with almost seventy-percent of
the vote.68
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Compared to Armenia, Georgia has had larger number of political parties vying for representation in parliament.
This is partially due to the Georgia’s regime type – unstable competitive authoritarianism – which tends to produce
unstable winning coalitions and larger number of parties competing during an election season.
68
The dramatic change in support for Pashinyan between 2017 and 2018 demonstrates the shift of Armenian voters.
One reason for this swing may be the collapse of the country’s party of power (RPA) and the emergence of a new
party of power around Pashinyan (My Step Alliance).

66

Figure 3.1: Distribution of Armenian Vote Intention
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Armenian Vote Intention (DK, RA, NB excluded)
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4 report the distribution for the Georgian electorate. Since the onset of
independence, Georgian elections have been marked by considerable amount of political parties
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contesting elections. For example, the 1992 parliamentary election saw some forty-seven parties
competing for legislative seats. Thus, it is not surprising that a higher amount of parties contested
the 2016 Georgian parliamentary election, then the 2017 Armenian parliamentary election.
Although the number of parties contesting elections is different, the presence of non-responses in
the Georgian samples mirrors the Armenian sample. In the Georgian context, almost fifty percent
of respondents selected either ‘don’t know’, ‘refused to answer’, or ‘nobody’. The large number
of non-responses for a vote intention question is quite common in the post-Soviet region. This
may stem from a lack of ideological competition among the parties and/or the hesitancy of
respondents to disclose information related to their political preferences. In fact, many voters in
developing countries are hesitant to disclose their political opinion to surveyors due to fear of
being persecuted.69
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Georgian Voter Intent
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In Armenia, respondents are also hesitant in disclosing their political opinion because many of them associate
surveyors with the party of power or an international organization that, they believe, seeks to influence their opinion.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Georgian Voter Intent (DK, RA, NB excluded)
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To isolate a vote intention for the incumbent party, I recoded response values to resemble
a binary distribution. The incumbent vote intention variable assumed a ‘1’ if the respondent
disclosed a vote for the incumbent party (The RPA for the Armenian sample and the Georgian
Dream for the Georgian sample). The variable assumed a ‘0’ if the respondent disclosed a vote
for any other party.70 A central issue with the voter intention data is the number of nonresponses. In the Armenian sample, 486 individuals either refused to answer the question or
answered, ‘don’t know’. Moreover, some 195 individuals answered, ‘nobody’. This puts the total
number of respondents who selected a party choice at 381. In the Georgian sample, 1,818
individuals either refused to answer the question or answered, ‘don’t know’. An additional 226
respondents choose ‘no party’. Overall, some 1,627 (out of 3,671) disclosed a party choice.
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Respondents who answered, ‘don’t know’, ‘no party’, or ‘refused to answer’ were included in the opposition
category and assigned a ‘0’.
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Conventionally, previous works have either recoded non-responses as ‘0’ or omitted all
or some of the non-responses (e.g. Bratton et al. 2012; Nadeau et al. 2017). However, with the
pair of surveys, omitting these responses would severely limit the sample size. More importantly,
it will increase case selection bias. Thus, I recoded the three non-party responses and assigned
each response ‘0’.71 In Appendix A, I report the results of alternative coding structures.
Interestingly, omitting the non-responses increases the magnitude of the anchor and economic
covariates. Alternatively, another route is to code these items separately and estimate incumbent
vote intention using an ordered logit model, combining the non-party responses with opposition
voters increases the significance threshold, provides a conservative estimation of the likelihood
of an incumbent vote, and makes the results evermore significant. It may very well be the case
that many undecided voters ultimately chose to vote for the incumbent party. That said, treating
such values as a ‘0’, rather than a’1’, provides for a stronger link between sociological and
psychological indicators and the vote.
Data and Parameter Estimation: Independent Variables
A total of nine covariates are used to predict incumbent vote intention. These nine
variables can be grouped into four categories mirroring the funnel of causality:
sociodemographic attributes, socioeconomic indicators, partisanship, and issues. I recoded each
variable to complement the hypothesized effect laid out in the previous chapter.
The sociodemographic variables consist of age, sex, and geographical residence. Initially
age was coded as a four-item categorical variable: 18 to 34; 35 to 50; 51 to 69; 70 and above.
71
In voting behavior works, a debate exists as how best to code ‘don’t know’ and ‘refused to answer’ responses. In
Bratton et al.’s (2012) study of the African voter and Nadeau et al.’s (2017) study of the Latin American voter, these
non-responses are omitted from the model. In Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier’s (2016) work on the Hispanic immigrant
voter, only refusals are omitted from the model. For robustness purposes, I have included both the omission and
selective omission methods in Appendix A.
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These four groups were used to differentiate between young, middle-aged and elderly voters.
Aside from a categorical coding, I also recoded age as a binary variable to measure the impact of
being a post-Soviet respondent. I coded a post-Soviet respondent as one who was born in 1990
and beyond. Thus, respondents who fit this threshold were assigned a ‘1’, while respondents
born before 1990 were assigned a ‘0’. The reason for coding age as a dichotomous variable is
that the original categorical coding may not tease out the impact of being a post-Soviet citizen.
As mentioned in Chapter Two, I expect age to be negatively associated with incumbent vote
intention. More specifically, I posit that younger individuals who were born in a post-Soviet
period lack the Soviet legacy of patronal politics will be more critical of the incumbent
government.
The second sociodemographic indicator, sex, is coded as a binary variable taking on a ‘1’
if the respondent is female and ‘0’ if the respondent is a male. This coding structure allows me to
test hypothesis H2a and H2b, which posit that females will be less likely to vote for the incumbent
party due to the patriarchal nature of both patronal systems. Although the introduction of gender
quotas has increased female representation in Armenia’s and Georgia’s national assembly, the
patronal structure in both countries continues to be dominated by male chief patrons and subpatrons. I content that this may create an anti-incumbency effect with female voters.
The final sociodemographic indicator, residence, is coded as a binary variable taking on a
‘1’ if the respondent resides in a rural area. Recall that hypothesis H3a and H3b claim that rural
voters would be more likely to support RPA and Georgian Dream. This is because both
incumbent parties have relied on rural areas as the base of their support through the influence of
sub-patrons. Interestingly, the 2016 GPAS provided respondents with four choices about their
settlement: capital, urban, rural, and non-Georgian. This choice distinguishes the capital, Tbilisi,
71

from other urban areas. More importantly, the response items differentiate between Georgian and
non-Georgian settlements. The heterogeneous composition of ethnicities in Georgia has resulted
in non-Georgian communities residing in specific regions. For example, Armenian minorities in
Georgia tend to reside in Samtskhe-Javakheeti region, whereas Azerbaijani minorities tend to
reside in and around the Kvemo Kartli region. To mirror the responses of the Georgian sample,
the residence questionnaire in the ArmES separated urban settlement between the capital and
other urban areas. However, due to the ethnic and religious homogeneity in Armenia72, I did not
include a non-Armenian settlement response item.
The socioeconomic indicators consist of education, employment status, and household
income. In both Armenia and Georgia, the primary and secondary education system has changed
numerous times since the independence of both countries. Currently, both educational systems
have a comparable progression track. Students are given a choice to either enter a k-9 or k-12
educational system. When completing the former, a student may choose to continue their
education and enroll at a particular technical college. Followed by this, the student can then
advance to a university-level education. Alternatively, one can choose the k-12 track and upon
completing it, apply to the university. Thus, the k-9 route uses technical college as a substitute
for the latter two years of school. Since both surveys account for the completion of technical
college, I code education as a binary variable indicating whether the respondent completed
higher education. I define higher education completion as completion of a technical college or a
university. Here, I assume that individuals who obtain a higher education will be less likely to

72

Armenia is considered one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the world with ninety-eight percent of
the country’s residents being ethnic Armenians.
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vote for the incumbent government. This is due to the limited value of education in a patronal
system.
The second socioeconomic variable, employment status, is coded as a binary variable
indicating whether the respondent is employed. The 2016 GPAS first asked respondents whether
they considered themselves employed. If the respondent answered no, then a second question
was asked about their primary activity.73 The 2017 ArmES asked respondents, are you
employed? If not, are you retired, not looking for a job, or unemployed? Although the exact
wording of the question differs between the two surveys, both surveys isolate employed
respondents from the rest.74 Thus, coding a respondent who is employed as a ‘1’ and the rest ‘0’
allows me to compare employed Armenians with employed Georgians and their impact on
incumbent vote intention. According to hypotheses H5a and H5b, employed respondents will be
more likely to vote for the incumbent. This is due to the politicization of both public and private
employment in Armenia and Georgia. While merit-based employment exists throughout the
Caucasus, both Armenia and Georgia also contain a widespread nepotistic culture that has
become intertwined with the patronal system. Thus, employment status may result in both the
satisfaction with as well as the preference of the incumbent party.
The final socioeconomic variable, household income, is coded as a binary variable. The
2016 GPAS asked respondents about their household income in the previous month. The
response items were coded in Georgian Lari (GEL) and ranged between no income to more than
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The response items included, being unemployed and looking for a job; being unemployed and interested in a job,
but currently not looking; being unemployed and not interested in looking for a job; being a student; being a
housewife; being retired and looking for a job; being retired and interested in a job but currently not looking; being
retired and not interested in looking for a job; being disabled; and other.
74
This is because both questions begin by asking whether the respondent is employment and then moving onto the
next categories.
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1600 GEL. To draw comparisons between Armenian and Georgian household income, the
household income item in the 2017 ArmES was partially based on the income ranges in the 2016
GPAS. This was done by first converting each category to US Dollars and then creating an
approximate range of values for the Armenian sample to match the values in the Georgian
sample. In the 2017 ArmES, the household income questionnaire included response items
ranging from ‘up to 50,000 Armenian Drams (AMD)’ to over ‘700,000 AMD’. Hypothesis H6a
and H6b suggest that higher income households will be more likely to vote for the incumbent.
Instead of translating the original ordinal scale into the study, I recoded the income variable as a
binary item. Respondents who disclosed household income in the top quartile brackets were
recoded as a ‘1’, while the rest six income brackets were recoded as ‘0’. Similar to the
relationship between employment status and incumbent support, I predict that higher income
households will be more likely to disclose an incumbent-oriented vote intention.
The next indicator, partisanship, is coded as a binary variable with the party identification
of the respondent taking on a ‘1’ if the party is the incumbent and ‘0’ if the party is nonincumbent. Due to infancy and volatility of party systems, the Armenian and Georgian electorate
include a large percentage of non-partisans. Omitting them from the study would severely
decrease the number of observations. Thus, non-partisans were also coded as ‘0’. 75 The 2016
GPAS asked respondents, which party do you feel close to? Unfortunately, GPAS did not ask the
question in a standard format, which consists of two parts: a closed-ended question about
whether a respondent feels close to any particular party and then an open-ended question about
which party the respondent feels close to. GPAS only asked the latter. Thus, respondents were
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In the Chapter 6, I present a regression output where the party ID is coded categorically. This is to distinguish
between partisans and non-partisans. Thus, non-incumbent partisans took on a ‘1’
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skewed toward selecting a specific party. The 2017 ArmES used the two-pronged approach. This
resulted in a larger amount non-partisans in the Armenian sample than in the Georgian sample
(see Chapter 6). However, I am solely interested in identifying RPA and Georgian Dream
partisans. Thus, the different question format between the two surveys does not significantly
alter my results. It does however limit cross-national analyses because the question wording of
the Armenian sample decreases the total number of partisans.
The last indicator, the economy, is measured as a change in voter prospective-egotropic
perception. The 2016 GPAS asked voters, what are your expectations regarding economic
situation of your household for the next twelve months? This question can be considered a
prospective-egotropic measure of the economy. The response item contains a typical five-point
scale of wellbeing.76 The 2017 ArmES asked a similar question with the exact wording and fivepoint response scale. To test the difference in perception of a negative versus a positive change
in economic wellbeing, I kept the five-point scale but recoded response item between -2 and 2.
This allows the middle category, ‘will stay the same’, to be recoded as a ‘0’. According to
hypothesis H8b and H8b, I expect a positive change in the prospective-egotropic perception of the
economy to be associated with higher likelihood of incumbent vote intention.
Data and Parameter Estimation: Binary Response Model
Since the coding of the dependent variable is presented in a binary format, the estimation
of incumbent vote intention likelihood is interpreted using a binary response model.77 In the next
four chapters, I include three trials within each model. The first trial can be considered the
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A five-point scale of wellbeing includes, will worsen a lot, will worsen somewhat, will stay the same, will
improve somewhat, and will improve a lot.
77
Commonly referred to as a logit model.
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baseline trial as it simply regresses the covariates on vote intention. Although the baseline trial
presents an approximate output, it does not account for observation interdependence. The fact
that I am relying on voting behavior traits across Armenia and Georgia implies that I am treating
each observation (here, being the voter) as independent from one another. In reality, voters in
both Armenia and Georgia may share sociological similarities based on their settlement location.
For example, the popularity of the PAP is higher in the Kotayk region due to the province being
the hometown of its founder, Gagik Tsarukyan. The city of Gyumri, Armenia’s second largest
city, is largely hostile to RPA support. To account for the varying provinces, I include a second
trial, which controls for regional fixed-effects. The third trial further controls for respondent
interdependence by clustering the standard errors around the country region within each sample.
This accounts for voter similarities within regions. The latter two trials not only provide a refined
test of voter behavior, but also analyze the robustness of the relationships present in the baseline
model.
Conclusion
In voter behavior studies, SPM is methodologically applied using a block recursive
approach. Each block contains a separate group of predictors based on the funnel of causality.
Applying this research design to the Armenian and Georgian sample results in a four-stage
regression model, where the first set of predictors are introduced, followed by the second set, and
so on. The next four empirical chapters outline this pattern and test the statistical significance of
each set of predictors. In Chapter Four, I introduce and test the impact of the three
sociodemographic covariates. Chapter Five then adds the three socioeconomic predictors to the
model. Both chapters solely address the impact of sociological variables on incumbent vote
intention. The regression analyses in the fifth chapter outline the impact of the six sociological
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vote predictors. In other words, the regression output can be considered the complete
sociological for the Armenian and Georgian sample.
In the last two empirical chapters, I introduce partisanship and issues to the sociological
model. In Chapter Six, the addition of party identification considers a psychological covariate
within the list of predictors. Finally, Chapter Seven adds a valence issues: perceptions of the
economy. From the next four chapters, we are better able to not only understand whether the vote
function of Armenian and Georgian voters is in accordance to SPM but also what distinct
predictors drive incumbent vote intention within both groups.
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CHAPTER 4: SOCIODEMOGRAPHICS & THE VOTE
In the Caucasus, sociodemographic characteristics are an important aspect of the vote
function. The asymmetric dominance of parties of power often creates support and opposition
groups based on demography. The sociodemographic element of the electorate is most
widespread among young voters. In Armenia and Georgia, youth voters have not only actively
mobilized to protest the incumbent but have been a vital aspect of, both, the rose and the velvet
revolution. Georgian youth voters demonstrated their displeasure with the Shevardnadze regime
through the creation of the Kmara movement. In Armenia, youth voters were instrumental in
Pashinyan’s disobedience campaign against the authorities and the RPA.
Aside from age, geography has also been a vital source of political behavior with rural
voters in both countries preferring the patronage-abundant parties of power. This is evidenced by
the most recent presidential election in Armenia. In February 2013, incumbent Sargsyan faced
American-born Armenian politician Raffi Hovannisian and Armenia’s first post-Soviet foreign
minister. Sargsyan ran a traditional post-Soviet campaign of voter mobilization via patronage
and vote buying (OSCE 2013). This tactic proved to be a winning strategy with rural voters,
whose income scarcity made them susceptible to election irregularities.78 Sargsyan’s 2013
victory was in large part due to the asymmetrical support received in rural areas and sparsely
populated provinces (CEC 2019).79
The sociodemographic impact on vote choice was also present in Georgia’s 2013
presidential election. That election witnessed the consolidation of the executive by Georgian
Dream, which secured the presidency with Giorgi Margvelashvili’s victory. Sociodemographic
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Common irregularities included vote buying and being isolated by members of the community for not supporting
the incumbent party.
79
https://www.elections.am/presidential/
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differences were a clear driver of the Margvelashvili vote. Elder voters and those residing in
rural areas supported Margvelashvili, whereas young voters preferred the UNM candidate (NDI,
2013; 2014).80 For example, seventy-three percent of rural Georgian voters supported
Margvelashvili, compared to fifty-one percent in the capital and sixty-three percent in other
urban areas. Overall, sociodemographic factors were largely influential in how Georgian voters
perceived Margvelashvili and Georgian Dream.
In this chapter, I introduce three sociodemographic characteristics (age, sex, and
geography) to the vote choice model. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of demographic
characteristics and their impact on political behavior. Next, I rely on a troika of methodological
tests to analyze the sociodemographic vote function. I begin with a bivariate illustration of both
electorates. Then, I test for bivariate correlations using the tau-b statistic. Finally, I assess the
relationship between sociodemographics and incumbent vote intention using a binary response
model. The results suggest that the sociodemographic indicators are a better predictor of voter
behavior in Georgia than in Armenia. In both countries, I find youth voters less likely to support
the incumbent party. Beyond this, I find that rural voters in Georgia continue to prefer Georgian
Dream over its rival the UNM. The concluding section provides practical implications of the
sociodemographic on the vote.
Sociodemographic Characteristics of the Vote
In the latter Soviet years, Armenia’s and Georgia’s sociodemographic make up served as
a linchpin toward independence and economic reform. Both countries experienced the
emergence of anti-Soviet political activism, particularly among youth groups. The youth later
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Only fifty percent of voters between 18 to 35 disclosed a positive sentiment Margvelashvili. The highest support
came from individuals 56 and older, of which seventy four percent disclosed a positive sentiment.
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served as both a vital support coalition for Georgia’s Round Table Block (RTB) and the
Armenian National Movement (ANM). Georgia’s heterogeneous ethnic make-up and the
politicization of regional identity complicated the strife for independence. The nationalist
movement was largely a reaction to an earlier call for autonomy from Georgia’s Abkhazia region
(Jones 2015). Thus, simultaneous calls for independence created ethnic hostilities and led
Georgian residents to increasingly identify with their ethnic group. In Armenia, the
homogeneous ethnic makeup of the population combined with a pan-Armeno cause led to a
smoother transition toward independence.
In the Caucasus, Gorbachev’s reforms were positively received by the regions youth, who
began to voice their concern about Soviet policies, particularly around ecology (Ishkanian 2008;
Jones 2015). Concerns about the environment soon transformed into calls of nationalism. This
led to the ascendance of Ter-Petrosyan and Gamsakhurdia, in Armenia and Georgia respectively.
Both leaders maintained a wide network of supporters, including the country’s youth and
regional residents. These sociodemographic groups were among the most critical of the Soviet
system. In the case of Georgia, its rural residents supported Gamsakhurdia’s presidency as a
gesture against Georgia’s urbanized elite (Jones 2015).
Following independence, Armenia’s and Georgia’s governments continued to seek
support of the youth. For example, upon becoming president, Shevardnadze initiated policies that
were supported by the youth (e.g. market-oriented economic reforms) and maintained a
predominately young staff (Jones 2015). In Armenia, However, as both countries ascended
toward patronal politics, support among the youth decreased. In Georgia, this culminated with
the rose revolution, while in Armenia the youth’s support for Pashinyan was vital towards the
latter’s political success.
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Another sociodemographic group that has been important in Armenian and Georgian
politics is rural residents. During the Soviet Union, the lack of privatization and the inability to
engage in entrepreneurial farming led rural residents to be critical of the Soviet Union (Jones
2015). This made the rural voters a natural ally of RTB and ANM. Following independence,
rural voters have become an important coalition group of Armenia’s and Georgia’s parties of
power. The economic stagnation of rural communities has created opportunities for patronal
networks to penetrate villages, pledge economic assistance and sustain support. As evident from
the example in the Chapter’s introduction, the largest form of patronal loyalty exists in rural
areas, among voters whose materiality is directly related to agents of the party of power.
Descriptive Analyses
Age
In the post-Soviet space, age is an important indicator of political behavior. Older
individuals whose political socialization process was shaped by the Soviet system may hold
varying vote functions than those whose political opinions took shape after the fall of the USSR.
During the Soviet era, political behavior was limited. While people held dissenting views
towards the CPSU, a politically-organized opposition force did not exist. Thus, voters accepted
the erected political barriers around them. In the post-Soviet space, despite the high level of party
volatility among opposition groups, multiparty competition has occurred in every election.
Moreover, both governments have been quite tolerating of dissent. This generational divide may
indicate diverging behavioral voting patterns.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 distribute the age of respondents into four groups. In both surveys, we
notice that the oldest age group (seventy and above) is the less numerous. Of 1,062 Armenian
respondents, just ninety-four respondents, or nine percent of the entire sample, disclosed being
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above sixty-nine years of age. In the Georgian sample, this group constitutes approximately
seventeen percent of the entire sample. Beyond this, we find some differences among the two
surveys. In the Armenian sample, the categorical distribution between the other three age groups
is somewhat symmetrical, with the largest number of respondents being in the youngest age
group. In the Georgian sample, the categorical distribution is less symmetric, and it is older
respondents, between fifty-one and sixty-nine, who constitute the largest number of respondents.
This difference may be attributable to the differences in the survey method. ArmES reached
respondents via a telephone, while GPAS was conducted face-to-face. Since younger individuals
are more likely to possess mobile phones, then the near symmetric age distribution in the
Armenian sample may be due to the way the survey was administered.
Our first preview into the relationship between age and vote intention is illustrated in
Figure 4.3 and 4.4. Recall that in hypotheses H1A and H1B, I posited a negative relationship
between age and incumbent vote intention. The bivariate distributions produce mixed results.
The Armenian sample does not show substantial opposition to RPA by young voters. In fact,
about thirty-six percent of the youngest age group supported RPA. Interestingly, the group with
the smallest percent of RPA support are respondents aged between fifty-one and sixty-nine. The
largest percentage support for the incumbent government comes from the middle-aged citizenry,
with forty-six percent of respondents between thirty-five and fifty supporting the RPA.
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Figure 4.1: Age Categorized (Armenia)
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Figure 4.3: Vote by Age Group (Armenia)
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Figure 4.4: Vote by Age Group (Georgia)
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Our first preview into the relationship between age and vote intention is illustrated in
Figure 4.3 and 4.4. Recall that in hypotheses H1A and H1B, I posited a negative relationship
between age and incumbent vote intention. The bivariate distributions produce mixed results.
The Armenian sample does not show substantial opposition to RPA by young voters. In fact,
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about thirty-six percent of the youngest age group supported RPA. Interestingly, the group with
the smallest percent of RPA support are respondents aged between fifty-one and sixty-nine. The
largest percentage support for the incumbent government comes from the middle-aged citizenry,
with forty-six percent of respondents between thirty-five and fifty supporting the RPA.
The bivariate descriptive results for the Georgian sample are more favorable towards the
stated hypothesis. Figure 4.4 illustrates that Georgian Dream registered the least amount of
support from respondents between eighteen and thirty-four years of age. Approximately thirty
percent of respondents in this age group supported the incumbent party. Young voters appear to
be most sympathetic to UNM, the main opposition party. The current party of power, Georgian
Dream, however, received its largest support from middle aged respondents, those between the
ages of 35 to 50. Overall, the bivariate relationship between age and vote intention produces the
hypothesized effect in one of the two samples. The cross-national illustration does produce a
similarity between middle-aged Armenian and Georgian voters’ preference for the party of
power.
Sex
In Armenia and Georgia, political inclusion based on sex is becoming an increasingly
important issue. Both countries operate in a patronal playfield that is also highly patriarchal.
Although Armenia and Georgia have recently adopted measures to address the dominance of
men in the political arena, the party leadership and access to political resources are still malecentric. The patriarchal nature of the political system leads to hypothesis H2A and H2B, which
posit a negative relationship between respondent sex and incumbent vote intention.
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Figure 4.5: Respondent Sex (Armenia)
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Figure 4.7: Sex by Vote Preference (Armenia)
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Figure 4.8: Sex by Vote Preference (Georgia)
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Figures 4.5 and 4.6 provide the distribution of sex. Interestingly, both surveys
interviewed the same percentage of males and females. The respondent sample consisted of
thirty-four percent males and sixty-six percent females. This points to the fact that both the 2017
ArmES and the 2016 GPAS oversampled the number of female respondents since females in
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Armenia consist of 51.4 percent of the population and females in Georgia consist of 52.2 percent
of Georgia’s population (CIA).
What is the relationship between female voters and incumbent vote intention? Figures 4.7
and 4.8 illustrate the relationship between sex and vote preference. The descriptive results
suggest that Armenian and Georgian female voters tend to support the incumbent. In Armenia, it
is males that are less supportive of the RPA. In fact, a higher percentage of females support the
RPA than the PAP. This is quite surprising as the PAP is often branded as a female-inclusive
political party and contains one of the largest percentages of female MPs. Among all Armenian
female voters who disclosed a vote intention, forty percent supported the RPA, while thirty-eight
percent supported PAP. Interestingly, the gender inclusivity of PAP does not seem to result in
higher percentage of female voters, compared to RPA. In Georgia, female voters constitute a
larger percentage of the opposition vote than the incumbent vote. However, when assessing the
distribution of the female vote by party, we find that forty-two percent of females supported
Georgian Dream, while thirty-one percent supported UNM. Thus, the descriptive illustration
points toward a relationship that is counter to the hypothesized effect.
Geography
Geographical settlement is an important aspect of post-Soviet voter behavior. The
infrastructural discrepancy between urban and rural areas is a continuation of the Soviet era.
Throughout this period, the massive industrialization and urbanization came at the cost of rural
stagnation in selected areas. In the last thirty years, this process has continued to occur
throughout the region, with one main difference being the misappropriation of funds to ethnic
minority communities. In Armenia, a country that is heavily homogenized, the discrepancy
between ethnically Armenian residential communities and non-Armenian communities is
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present, although not severe. Ethnic Armenians constitute ninety-eight percent of the population
with Yezidi Kurds making up approximately one-percent of the remaining population (CIA Armenia). Kurdish-settled areas lack the political connections that results in patronage for the
local population. In Georgia, a country that is more heterogeneous, ethnic-based settlements are
politically and economically salient. Minority communities include Armenians, Azerbaijanis,
Ossetians among others (CIA – Georgia). These communities are also territorially segregated,
with Armenians residing mainly in northwestern Georgia and Azerbaijanis residing in
southeastern Georgia.
The varying ethno-geographical makeup between Armenia and Georgia is also evident in
how both surveys operationalized geography. The 2017 ArmES divided respondents into three
settlement categories: residence in Yerevan, residence in an urban setting (not including
Yerevan), and residence in a rural setting. Since the mode of the survey was the telephone, rural
respondents were underrepresented due to the scarcity of telecommunication in rural areas. The
2016 GPAS categorized respondents into four settlement types: residence in Tbilisi, urban, rural,
and non-Georgian territories. In Georgia, settlement distribution was more representative
although Tbilisi and other urban areas were still overrepresented, despite the mode of the survey
being face to face.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 provide the distribution of respondents by settlement type for both
samples. In Armenia, eighty-five percent of respondents disclosed residing in an urban setting,
while the rest fifteen percent came from a rural setting.81 Since respondent settlement is based on
self-reporting there may be cases where respondents who are residing in rural areas but reported
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This number is more than half the actual rural percentage of the population. The 2018 figure points to thirty-seven
percent of Armenia’s population residing in a rural setting (CIA – Armenia).
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an ‘urban’ settlement to describe their place of residence. In Armenia, the word rural is often
used in a negative connotation, describing an economically backward place and/or a socially
background people. Thus, the low percentage of rural residence may be due to the presence of a
social desirability bias. In Georgia, sixty percent of respondents disclosed residing in an urban
setting, although this number may be misleading since many respondents residing in nonGeorgian settlements may be residing in an area considered urban. The Georgian sample
provides a much more symmetrical distribution of the four settlements types, with fifteen percent
of respondents residing in non-Georgian territories and twenty-five of the sample residing in
rural areas.
Figure 4.9: Settlement Distribution (Armenia)
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Figure 4.10: Settlement Distribution (Georgia)
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Figures 4.11 and 4.12 plot vote intention by settlement type. In the Armenian sample, the
bivariate distributions suggest an almost symmetrical incumbent vote intention distribution
between Yerevan and other urban areas. Figure 4.17 also demonstrates a similar trend with PAP
voters. However, when we assess the vote intention of rural residents we find that RPA support
is relatively lower, while PAP support is relatively higher. The popularity of PAP in rural areas
in not surprising given the dire socioeconomic status of rural residents and their attraction to
PAP’s populous rhetoric. What is unexpected is the relatively low level of support for RPA
among the rural population. Recall that in previous elections RPA had relied on a large amount
of rural support. Thus, the lower level of RPA support among the rural residents calls into
question the legitimacy of their popularity.

91

Figure 4.11: Vote by Settlement Type (Armenia)
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Figure 4.12: Vote by Settlement Type (Georgia)
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Turning to the Georgian electorate, we notice that Georgian Dream is more popular in
rural areas than in urban settings. This provides preliminary confirmation of the party’s ability to
build its support coalition in rural regions. Percentage wise, Tbilisi and other urban areas register
the lowest level of Georgian Dream support, while rural and non-Georgian settlements consist of
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the highest percentages of incumbent support. Support for Georgian Dream among respondents
in non-Georgian settlements is quite surprising given that respondents from this area tend to be
less socioeconomically affluent (See Chapter 5). This relationship suggests the possibility of the
Georgian Dream patronage machine reaching beyond ethnic Georgians. In all, the bivariate plot
confirms support of the incumbent among rural residents in Georgia, but not in Armenia.
Bivariate Correlations
In the previous section, I provided a bivariate illustration of the three sociodemographic
covariates and vote intention. Here, I examine the relationship between each covariate and the
dependent variable using the Kendall’s Tau-b correlation measure. This correlation statistic
ranges from 0 to 1 with larger values inferring a strong correlation and smaller values assuming
low levels of correlation. Usage of a bivariate correlation test is a methodological improvement
from the cross-tabulation illustrations in the previous section. It can also provide us with further
evidence of the relationship between incumbent vote intention and sociodemographic
characteristics.
The two tables below, Table 4.1 and 4.2, provide the Tau-b measure of correlation for the
Armenian and Georgian sample. In the Armenian sample, age is the only covariate associated
with incumbent vote intention. Initially, I treated age as a categorical variable. However, upon
further analyses, I revised the measurement to include the differences between respondents born
during the Soviet Union and after. This measure is perhaps a refinement of treating age as a
categorical variable. Operationalizing age as a binary variable and differentiating respondents
based on whether they were born during or after the Soviet system can better explain support for
the incumbent. Beyond age, the association between the other two sociodemographic covariates
is not only counter to the theory but the correlation is not significant. For example, the bivariate
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association between being a female respondent and RPA vote share is weak, positive, and
statistically insignificant. The bivariate association between residing in a rural setting is weak,
negative, and statistically insignificant. All three attributes are counter to our expectations.
Overall, the Armenian model performs quiet poorly. That said, recoding age as a binary variable
suggests a relationship between the post-Soviet citizenry and opposition to the RPA.
Table 4.1: Sociodemographic Indicators and Incumbent Vote Intention (Armenia)
Age (18/34 = 1; 35/50=2; 51/69=3; 70 ≥4)
0.0427
Age (post-Soviet born = 1, Soviet born = 0)
-0.0912***
Sex (Female = 1, Male = 0)
0.0400
Residence (Rural = 1, others = 0)
-0.0275
Note: ***p ≤.01; p **≤.05; p *≤.10

Table 4.2: Sociodemographic Indicators and Incumbent Vote Intention (Georgia)
Age (18/34 = 1; 35/50=2; 51/69=3; 70 ≥4)
0.0731***
Age (post-Soviet born = 1, Soviet born = 0)
-0.0801***
Sex (Female = 1, Male = 0)
-0.0103
Residence (Rural = 1, others = 0)
0.0757***
Note: ***p ≤.01; p **≤.05; p *≤.10

In Table 4.2 we find that the sociodemographic covariates are a better fit in the Georgian
sample. Interestingly, our two measures of age are statistically significant and in the expected
direction. First, when we measure age as a categorical variable we find a positive and significant
relationship between older individuals and Georgian Dream vote intention, albeit the bivariate
association is quite weak. Second, when we recode age and divide the Georgian sample into
individuals born during or after the Soviet Union, we find a negative and significant relationship
between being born in independent Georgia and opposition to Georgian dream. Here again, the
relationship is quite weak. The next two variables provide mixed support for our hypotheses.
While the bivariate correlation between females and support for Georgia Dream is in the
expected direction, the relationship is not statistically significant. Rural residential setting,

94

however, is statistically significant and in the expected direction. Overall, the Georgian sample
performs better than the Armenian sample though that may be due to the large sample size of the
latter.
Inferential Results: Armenia
Table 4.3 presents the sociodemographic results for Armenian voters. Despite using
listwise deletion, the model retained 1,059 of the 1,062 samples. In the first trial, the age variable
is treated categorically, with the reference category being 18 to 34 years of age. Here, we witness
that none of the three age categories are statistically significant. In fact, the null results in the
first trial infer that sociodemographic covariates are not a significant predictor of RPA vote
share. However, to simply dismiss the impact of age is empirically premature. Recall, that
Armenia’s velvet revolution was ushered in by the country’s youth movement. Thus, in the
second trial I change the operationalization of the age indicator from a category variable to a
binary one. The variable, PS Age, denotes respondents who were born in 1990 and after. This
would make respondents twenty-seven years and younger as the category of interest. The
coefficient estimate of age in the second trial provide preliminary support for the abovementioned assumption. The relationship between post-soviet age and RPA vote intention appears
to be inversely related. That is, respondents born in 1990 and after are less likely to intend to
vote for the RPA by approximately nine percentage points.
In the next two trials I control for the impact of the respondent’s region. In the third trial,
I include a regions fixed effect. The addition does not alter the impact of age on RPA vote
intention. In fact, this improves the overall performance of the model via the higher LR Chisquared term. In Armenia, the strength of party machines varies from region to region. For
example, Kotayk is the regional bedrock of PAP since its founder, Gagik Tsarukyan, hails from
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that province. Thus, we can presume that support for RPA will be lower in Kotayk. The fourth
trial adds clustered standard errors around the regions. The reason for this is RPA’s support
differs within each region. Thus, we can assume that voters in the Shiraq region are likely
maintain similar voting attitudes than in Gegharkunik and Syunik. This is because voters in
Shiraq are largely critical of the RPA, while voters in Gegharkunik and Syunik are some of the
RPA’s most loyal supporters. The inclusion of region fixed effects does little to improve the
overall fit of the model. It does, however, decrease the significance threshold of the age variable
to below ninety percent. Overall, the sociodemographic model performs quite poorly with only
age significantly impacting the incumbent vote intention.
Table 4.3: Sociodemographic Vote Determinants (Armenia)
(I)
(II)
(III)
Age
35 – 50
51 – 69
70 ≥
PS Age
Female
Rural

(IV)

.04 (.03)
.03 (.03)
.05 (.04)
.02 (.02)
-.03 (.03)

-.09*** (.03)
.02 (.02)
.03 (.02)

-.08*** (.03)
.02 (.02)
-.03 (.03)

-.09 (.06)
.02 (.02)
-.03 (.03)

Region FE
Cluster SE

No
No

No
No

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Obs.
LR Chi2
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2

1,059
5.33***

1,059
11.59***

1,059
30.37***

1,059
30.37***

.01

.01

.04

.04

Note: Dependent variable is incumbent vote intention. Output is marginal effects.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10

Figure 4.13 illustrates the results above. Each horizonal line represents a
sociodemographic covariate and the ranges of each line are the confidence intervals. We notice
that the re-operationalization of the age term leads to its statistical significance, albeit with wide
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confidence intervals. The other two sociodemographic covariates are not only statistically
insignificant at the minimum threshold (***ρ ≤.10), but the direction relationship is counter to
the hypotheses. The coefficient estimate for the female covariate is to the right of zero suggesting
a positive relationship between females and RPA vote intention, while the coefficient estimate
for rural residence is to the left of zero suggesting a negative relationship between rural voters
and RPA vote intention.
Figure 4.13: Regression Coefficient Plot (Armenia)

Figure 4.14: Adjusted Predictions of Age

Figure 4.14 provides further analysis of the impact of post-Soviet age on incumbent vote
intention. First, we see that the 95 percent confidence interval is much narrower for Soviet born
individuals than post-Soviet born. This is due to the sample size difference between the two
groups. Of the 1,062 sampled, an overwhelming majority were born during the Soviet period
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(862), while approximately nineteen percent (200) are considered post-Soviet births. Second, we
witness a downward sloping line between Soviet born and post-Soviet born. This suggests that as
we move from one respondent group to the next, the probability of an incumbent vote decreases
by approximately eight or nine percentage points. Finally, the marginal prediction plot does not
offer much substantive significance. While we witness a drop in the incumbent vote share among
the post-Soviet born citizenry, its impact is substantively insignificant.
Inferential Results: Georgia
Table 4.4: Sociodemographic Vote Determinants (Georgia)
(I)
(II)
(III)
Age
35 – 50
51 – 69
70 ≥
PS Age
Female
Rural

(IV)

.08*** (.02)
.08*** (.01)
.09*** (.02)
-.01 (.01)
.06*** (.01)

-.12*** (.02)
-.01 (.01)
.06*** (.01)

-.12*** (.02)
-.01 (.01)
-.03 (.03)

-.12*** (.03)
-.01 (.01)
.06 (.05)

Region FE
Cluster SE

No
No

No
No

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Obs.
LR Chi2
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2

4,113
59.77***

4,113
52.12***

4,113
319.30***

4,113
71.33***

.02

.01

.09

.01

In Table 4.4, we observe the sociodemographic vote determinants for Georgian voters.
Overall, the sociodemographic predictability of incumbent vote intention is stronger in Georgia
than in Armenia. Looking at the first trial, we find that age is a significant predictor for Georgian
Dream vote intention. Compared to the youngest age category (18 to 34), all older age groups are
more likely to vote for Georgian Dream. In fact, as we progress through the groups the
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magnitude of the coefficient estimates increases. The results here suggest that compared to
young Georgian voters, older Georgian voters are between eight and nine percentage points more
likely to vote for the incumbent. Beyond age, we also notice that residing in a rural settlement
incentivizes one to vote for Georgian Dream by approximately six percentage points over
respondents living in urban areas. The relationship between female voters and Georgian Dream
vote intention, despite being in the right direction, is statistically insignificant. The baseline trial
performs quite well in empirically supporting the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter.
Georgian Dream is quite successful with older voters and rural voters.
In the second trial, I replace the categorical age variable with a binary variable denoting
whether the respondent was born after the Soviet Union. The results parallel Armenian sample
with post-Soviet Georgian voters being less likely to support the Georgian Dream government by
approximately twelve percentage points. The third trial adds region fixed effects, and we notice
that the rural covariate is no longer statistically significant. The fourth trial clusters the standard
errors around the region and minority settlements. This is done because Georgian Dream support
varies across regions, with some territorial communities being more supportive of the incumbent
government than others. From the last two trials, when accounting for spatial dispersion of
voters, the impact of region is nullified. However, the post-Soviet age covariate remains
unchanged.
An illustrative account of the result from Table 4.4 are provided in Figure 4.15. Of the
three sociodemographic covariates, two are statistically significant and in the right direction.
Compared to the illustration of the Armenian sample (Figure 4.13), the confidence intervals in
the figure below are relatively smaller. This may be due to the substantially larger sample size of
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the Georgian model. From Figure 4.15, we can conclude that the vote intention for Georgian
Dream is partially based on a voter’s age and to a lesser extent their rural settlement.

Figure 4.15: Regression Coefficient Plot (Georgia)

Figure 4.16: Adjusted Predictions of Age

Figure 4.16 further illustrates the impact of age on Georgian Dream vote intention.
Paralleling the findings of the Armenian sample, we notice a negative-sloped line suggesting that
post-Soviet born Georgians are less likely to favor Georgian Dream than Soviet born Georgians.
Despite this similarity, the line in Figure 4.16 is more inelastic compared to Figure 4.14. This
suggests that the impact of Soviet and post-Soviet age is greater for the Georgian sample than it
is for the Armenian sample.
Conclusion
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Do Armenian and Georgian voters rely on their sociodemographic group when casting a
vote for the incumbent? In this chapter I outlined three sociodemographic determinants of the
vote for RPA and Georgian Dream. In Armenia and Georgia, sociodemographic indicators
impact dissatisfaction with the party of power. Specifically, youthfulness is a significant
predictor of opposition to both incumbent parties. Post-Soviet voters are more likely to oppose
the incumbent government than their Soviet-born counterparts. This may be because young
Armenian and Georgian voters have experienced the ills of patronal politics. A system that
neglects meritocracy and advocates for the economies of affection is one where upward mobility
is severely limited to the patronal network one belongs to.
Beyond age, we find that rural settlement is a predictor for Georgian Dream support
among Georgians. This finding is also in line with the stated hypothesis and parallels the party
manifesto and election strategy of Georgian Dream. The success of Ivanishvili’s party is due to
its emphasis on socioeconomic disparity and the promise to address unemployment. Both of
these issues are highly salient among rural Georgians. This is evidenced by the large number of
rural Georgians (fifty-seven percent) who disclosed employment as the most important national
issue compared to urban Georgians (forty-eight percent).
The above findings provide three implications for incumbent electoral strategies. First,
incumbent parties must address the negative perceptions of their support among young voters. In
Georgia, disenfranchised young voters have a history of shortening the incumbent lifecycle of
parties of power. The unpopularity of Georgian Dream among young voters should be
interpreted as a warning to the sustainability of its incumbent status. The youth’s impact on
cutting short Shevardnadze’s political career and helping launch Saakashvili’s is testament to the
political power of this sociodemographic group. In Armenia, the results above paralleled the
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events of spring 2018. Young Armenian voters are the most important ingredient toward the
success of the velvet revolution.
Second, Georgian Dream’s emphasis on rural voters is shown to have electoral rewards.
The government can expand on this by continuing to concentrate on the socioeconomic needs of
the rural electorate. One fact that was not considered in this chapter is to what extent rural
support for Georgian Dream is driven by the party’s socioeconomic platform or by its patronage.
Given the party’s past reliance on patronalism, one may suspect that support among the rural
electorate is due to patronal politics.
Finally, both incumbent parties have failed to attract the female electorate. The
statistically insignificant relationship between female voters and incumbent vote intention
suggests that female voters are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with the incumbent government.
The fact that female voters are the majority of the voting group in both countries should
incentivize governments to create female inclusive administrations and target policies toward
female voters. Although the latter requires some form of democratization, creating reforming the
existent patronal environment to include female patrons or sub-patrons may help to increase
support for this important voting bloc.
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CHAPTER 5: SOCIOECONOMICS & THE VOTE
The collapse of the Soviet Union increased the salience of socioeconomic issues in the
Caucasus. The breakdown of the Soviet welfare state combined with the contraction of the postSoviet Armenian and Georgian state led to a sharp decrease in the standard of living across the
region. Instead of the omnipotent CPSU, the governing parties in the newly independent
republics constructed patronal systems that catered to their support coalitions. This resulted in
the politicization of education and economic mobility tied to chains of acquittances.
Consequently, socioeconomic issues became a leading cause for political coalescence among
voters critical of the regime in both countries.
The mismanagement of socioeconomic concerns was key to the collapse of the region’s
parties of power. For example, the politicization of education brought an end to the
Shevardnadze administration. In Armenia, the delegitimization of RPA’s popularity took shape
following the exposure of its coercive practices. In March 2017, Daniel Ioannisyan, a political
activist and head of the Union of Informed Citizens NGO, published scathing audio recordings
that he had made with dozens of officials within Armenia’s public education system.82 The audio
featured Ioannisyan, who pretended to be a member of the RPA, discussing the existence of
voter lists and other tactics used by officials to boost RPA support.83 Ioannisyan exposed more
than one hundred schools disclosing and discussing tactics that they were undertaking to increase
RPA support. School principals open admitted to coercing parents to support the RPA,
maintaining voter lists of parents who pledged their support, and threatening school teachers with
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The actual number of schools under consideration was 136. https://www.evnreport.com/politics/abusing-thelevers-of-power; https://www.paradiplomacy.tv/en/news/view/141.html
83
In post-Soviet Armenia, anecdotal evidence existed about parties of power using state education facilities to
coercively recruit and mobilize voters. For example, a common narrative stated that RPA officials had actively
mandated school heads to bus teachers and students to RPA rallies and RPA-sponsored events.
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penalties for refusing to support the party of power.84 The exposure would later serve as a
mobilizing call among Armenia’s higher educated student against the RPA.
In this chapter, I expand the Armenian and Georgian electorate’s vote function to include
three socioeconomic indicators: education, employment, and household income. I begin with a
brief discussion of the three indicators in the vote function of the Armenian and Georgian
electorate. Next, I provide a bivariate, descriptive analysis of the relationship between the
socioeconomic variables and the dependent variable. Following the bivariate results, I analyze
the tau-b correlation between incumbent vote intention and the three socioeconomic indicators.
Finally, I regress the impact of education, employment, and household income on incumbent
vote intention. The results dismiss the educative hypothesis (H4), confirm the employment
hypothesis (H5), and partially confirm the household income hypothesis (H6). The education
covariate is found to be statistically insignificant in the Armenian sample, but counter to the
expected direction in the Georgian sample. Employment is found to be a statistically significant
predictor of incumbent vote intention in both samples, thus confirming H5. And household
income is found to be statistically significant only in the Georgian sample, thus partially
confirming H6. The addition of the three socioeconomic vote determinants results in age and
employment as the two sociological predictors of incumbent vote intention among the Armenian
and Georgian electorate. In the last section, I discuss the unexpected relationship between
education and Georgian Dream support and offer some explanations of why college educated
voters seem to support Georgia’s party of power.
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Interestingly, in the midst of the velvet revolution several school teachers from Armenia’s ‘Monte Melkonyan’
school came forward and accused the school principal and childhood friend of former Prime Minister Serzh
Sargsyan, Ruzanna Azizyan, of keeping their regular teacher bonuses and donating the amounts to the RPA.
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Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Vote
The emergence of competitive authoritarianism and patronal politics in Armenia and
Georgia deepened the socioeconomic disparity among the population. The need to constantly
secure their networks resulted in successive patrons-in-chiefs orienting public spending towards
the consolidation and readiness of the regime. As Gallina (2010) suggests, this led to the neglect
of socioeconomic indicators, particularly limited spending on education. Instead of continuing
the Soviet investment in education, both the ANM and CUG politicized administrative duties of
such institutions and relied on their members for monetary support.85 Instead of providing
economic investments in rural communities, both regimes invested in their patronal figures. As
such, addressing socioeconomic disparity became of second-order importance for both
governments.86
An overview of Armenian and Georgian electoral politics in the early 1990s points
toward a voting behavior paradox: despite the decrease in socioeconomic conditions, incumbents
such as Ter-Petrosyan and Shevardnadze were widely popular among voters. This mismatch can
be explained by the political tactics of both regimes, who blamed the economic downturn on
militarized disputes. In the case of Armenia, the “external” causes of Armenia’s economic
downturn were beneficial for the ANM and President Ter-Petrosyan. The new Armenian elite
were able to avoid electoral accountability for the economic downturn and use the economic
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The politicization of educational facilities is common in the post-Soviet space. Its inception is primarily due to the
legal structure, which in many post-Soviet countries called for senior elected officials to hire the heads of education
facilities. For example, in Georgia during the Shevardnadze era, President Eduard Shevardnadze personally hired
and terminated high-ranking university officials (Jones 2015: 211-2). This not only created a patron-client
relationship between political officials and education administrators, it also extended Shevardnadze’s patronal
network into education institutions.
86
Georgia’s Gamsakhurdia openly downgraded socioeconomic concerns and emphasized identity issues. During his
short tenure, the prevalence of ethnic Georgians was prioritized over an economy in turmoil (Jones 2015).
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crisis to streamline market-liberalizing policies.87 The Armenian electorate, who had backed TerPetrosyan’s nationalist campaign, initially avoided blaming the first post-Soviet government for
its socioeconomic decline.
The politicization of educational institutions and the fostering of patronal politics by the
ANM and CUG gradually led voters to shift their support away from the parties of power. In
Armenia, the failure of neoliberal reforms to stabilize wages led voters to support his political
rival Vazgen Manukyan. Ter-Petrosyan’s share a support among less affluent voters was a
fraction of what it was in 1991. In Georgia, despite economic liberalizing policies that brought
inflation to single digits and real GDP growth rates to double digits, market-oriented reforms
failed to translate to socioeconomic development. The country’s implementation of privatization
policies did not cease the growing socioeconomic disparity. The lack of investment resulted in
shrinking household income. For example, in 2002 income was forty-percent of what it was in
1991 (Jones 2015: 192). In the scope of education, Shevardnadze’s politicization of college
administrations led Georgian college students, who a decade earlier had supported the
president’s economic reforms, to oppose Shevardnadze’s tenure. By the 2003 parliamentary
elections, Shevardnadze’s had lost his mandate to govern, particularly among the educated and
the less affluent.
The failure of ANM and CUD to alter the socioeconomic mobility of Armenians and
Georgians led both parties of power to be replaced by the RPA and UNM. In Armenia, RPA
presided over an unprecedented form of macroeconomic growth between 1999 and 2008 (World
Bank 2019). Despite this, the economic expansion did not trickle down to median Armenian
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The Pan-Armenian National Movement was victorious in a pair of elections following independence.
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voter. In Georgia, the outcome of the rose revolution led Saakashvili to implement a dual-track
policy of tackling income inequality and economic liberalization. The latter involved promoting
individual rights and entrepreneurship. However, by the end of his first presidential term
Saakashvili’s economic reforms did not produce substantial socioeconomic change. The
emphasis on market-oriented economics neglected the issues of income inequality and
unemployment (MacFarlane 2011).88
The UNM’s failure to address socioeconomic concerns of rural voters and the growing
hostility among the educated towards UNM’s strongarm politics led UNM’s coalition group of
the educated and rural voters to collapse. The party of power was defeated by Georgian Dream in
the 2012 parliamentary elections. In Armenia, RPA’s politicization of education brought about
an adverse reaction in the form of increased student protests. As mentioned earlier, this decision
had an unintended consequence: the political activation of students. The first presence of a
sizable youth group occurred during the 2013 public transportation protests. Student organization
were instrumental in calling for city-wide boycotts of public buses.89 This was followed by the
2015 Electric Yerevan protests, where student organizations played a vital role in mobilizing
young individuals and successfully opposing a substantial electricity rate increase. The impact of
student organization culminated with the 2018 velvet revolution, which saw nationwide
classroom walkouts and an active campaign to paralyze transportation throughout the country. In
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Jones (2015) describes the Saakashvili’s first term in the following: “…The reality of Georgia’s economy in 2007,
despite improvements, was low incomes, inadequate pensions, high unemployment (especially among urban
educated youth), weak social and health support, and unaffordable education” (Jones 2012: 8).
89
In July 2013, the Yerevan government ruled to increase public transportation from 100 Dram (about twenty cents)
to 150 Dram. The public reaction to this was swift. Several student organizations began non-stop protests, called on
for a boycott of public transportation, and even used their personal vehicles to transport Yerevan residents from one
transportation stop to another.
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all, socioeconomic groups both shaped the longevity and the stability of parties of power in the
Caucasus.
Descriptive Analyses
In this section, I analyze the bivariate relationships between the three socioeconomic vote
predictors (education, employment status, household income) and vote choice. Using data from
the 2016 GPAS and the 2017 ArmES, I find bivariate patterns between educational attainment
and support for Georgian Dream. I also uncover the highest percentage of incumbent support
among both Armenian and Georgian employed respondents. However, a linear bivariate
relationship between household income and incumbent vote intention does not appear to be
occurring among both electorates.
Education
In Chapter Two, I posited that educational attainment is negatively associated with
support for both the RPA and Georgian Dream. Specifically, college educated respondents will
be less likely to vote for the incumbent in both governments. In Armenia, this proposition is
derived from the increasing role student organizations have played in the overall anti-RPA
movements.90 In Georgia, the proposition is related to the increasingly negative perception of
Georgian Dream by student movements.
The 2017 ArmES asked respondents to disclose their level of education. Figure 5.1
provides the distribution of responses. The output illustrates a trimodal distribution of
educational attainment. Of the 1,062 individuals sampled, 312 disclosed completing middle
school, 260 disclosed completing a vocation or technical school, and 263 disclosed completing a
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https://www.rferl.org/a/this-round-of-armenian-protests-smells-like-teen-spirit/29182665.html
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postgraduate education. The combination of the latter two groups and the inclusion of
respondents with bachelor degrees suggests that sixty-six percent of respondents possess some
form of a post-secondary education. This descriptive result is not surprising as the many
individuals obtained their education under the Soviet banner, which explicitly advocated for an
educated homo Sovieticus. Figure 5.1 also suggests that individuals who complete middle school
and move on to complete high school are more likely to obtain a higher education degree. This is
because only fifty-one respondents (approximately five-percent of the entire sample) reported
only completing high-school, compared to three-hundred twelve (approximately twenty-nine
percent) who completed middle school. In other words, Armenian voters who complete high
school tend to proceed to higher education.
Figure 5.1: Level of Education (Armenia)
Elementary
School, 3, 0%
Middle School,
312, 29%

High School,
51, 5%

Above
Bachelor, 263,
25%

Bachelor, 173,
16%

Vocational/Tec
hnical School,
260, 25%

The descriptive patterns evident in the Armenian sample are partially found with
Georgian respondents. In Georgia, the middle school system runs from grades seventh through
ninth. Thus, a respondent with a nine-year education is equivalent to an Armenian respondent
with a middle school education. Figure 5.2 illustrates the distribution of education for Georgian
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respondents. Here we find both similarities and differences between the Armenian and Georgian
sample. For example, the education attainment cutoff for Georgians is not at the middle school
level but at the high school level. In fact, thirty-four percent of respondents reported completing
their education at the high school level. That said, the results from both samples demonstrate that
Armenian and Georgian voters are largely college educated individuals. In Georgia, some fiftysix percent reported having at least a technical degree.
Figure 5.2: Level of Education (Georgia)
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Hypotheses H4a and H4b posit that education will be negatively associated with incumbent
vote intention. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 provide a bivariate illustration between the two variables and
reveal findings that are contrary to the hypotheses. In figure 5.3, we notice that the percentage of
RPA vote intention is lower among respondents with secondary education than among
respondents with at least a vocational or technical degree. The difference between respondents
with either a middle school or high school education and respondents with a technical or a fouryear degree is approximately twenty percentage points. This runs counter to the assumption that
higher educated individuals will be less likely to favor the RPA.
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Figure 5.3: Education and Vote Preference (Armenia)
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Figure 5.4: Education and Vote Preference (Georgia)
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In the Georgian sample, we notice a similar pattern. Individuals with higher education are
more supportive of Georgian Dream. Almost half of all respondents with at least a four-year
college degree intended to support the incumbent government. For individuals with a high school
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degree, the level of support decreases to thirty-five percent. Thus, the descriptive results point
toward a public that may favor the incumbent government as their levels of education increases.
Employment
In the second chapter, I posited that both Armenian and Georgian voters who are
employed will be more likely to favor the incumbent government. The higher level of incumbent
support from employed individuals may stem from higher socioeconomic wellbeing. However, it
may also stem from a patronal voting. In both Armenia and Georgian, nepotism and relational
employment is abundant, especially within the public sector. Thus, the tendency to support the
party of power may not only stem from higher socioeconomic wellbeing but also the tendency to
tie the employment with the party of power.91
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 present the distribution of employment status among Armenian and
Georgian respondents. Before analyzing the illustrations, it is worth mentioning that the 2017
unemployment rate in Armenia and Georgia was approximately eighteen and twelve percent,
respectfully (World Bank 2019). When comparing the objective aggregate measures to the
subjective, individual-level responses, we find that in both cases, the percent of individuals
unemployed was higher in the latter. In Armenia, we notice that twenty-five percent disclosed
being unemployed. In Georgia, twenty-four percent of respondents self-reported being
unemployed.
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A parody of relational employment and patronal politics:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRr3wzsOi1U&feature=share
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Figure 5.5: Employment in Armenia
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Figure 5.6: Employment in Georgia
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Shifting our attention to the percentage of employed individuals, we find that forty-three
percent of Armenian respondents disclosed being employed, while thirty-one percent of
Georgian respondents mentioned being employed. Despite the different wording of the
employment questionnaire (see Chapter 3), we can make comparisons between Armenian
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employed respondents and Georgian employed respondents because both question type segregate
employed respondents from others.
Figure 5.7: Employment and Vote Preference (Armenia)
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Figure 5.8: Employment and Vote Preference (Georgia)
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In Chapter Two, hypothesis H5a and H5b proposed a positive association between
employment status and an incumbent vote intention. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 lend some support
towards this assumption. When distributing employment status across vote intention, we find that
in both samples the largest percent of incumbent vote intention is among employed respondents.
In the Armenian sample, among respondents who disclosed being employed, fifty-percent
intended to vote for the RPA. This statistic is almost twice the size of RPA support among
unemployed respondents, at just twenty-seven percent. Interestingly, fifty-two percent of
unemployed respondents disclosed a vote intention for PAP, a populous opposition party.
In Georgia, the incumbent government also maintains fifty-percent support among
employed respondents, the highest percentage of the four employment groups. The opposition,
by contrast, maximizes it support among the unemployed and retired. The fact that employed
voters are increasingly supportive of the incumbent whereas retired and unemployed respondents
are increasingly supportive of the opposition suggests that socioeconomic conditions may be the
reason for the diverging support.
Household Income
Household income is perhaps the most salient measure of socioeconomic wellbeing. In
the second chapter, I posited that household income would be positively related to a vote for the
incumbent in both Armenia and Georgia. The 2017 ArmES and the 2016 GPAS asked
respondents about their household earnings in local currency.92 Figures 5.9 and 5.10 present the
distribution of monthly household income. Not surprisingly, both figures are skewed to the left,
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The Armenian currency is referred to as the Dram (֏) and the exchange rate is approximately 480 to 1. That is,
480 Drams is worth approximately one U.S. Dollar. The Georgian currency is called the Lari (₾) and the exchange
rate is approximately three to 1. That is, 2.7 Lari is worth approximately one U.S. Dollar.
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signifying decreasing number of households with larger incomes. In Armenia, the income
bracket with the highest percentage of respondents was household incomes between 80,000
AMD to 149,000 AMD, which translates to $150 to $310. Out of 948 respondents who
disclosed their household income, only thirteen (approximately one-percent) reported earning
more than 700,000 AMD, or almost 1,500 USD.
In Georgia, the income distribution is oriented more towards the center. The bracket with
the largest number of respondents was household incomes between 261 GEL to 400 GEL, which
translates between 100 USD to 150 USD. Most Georgian households disclosed monthly income
between 50 USD and 300 USD. As a percentage, approximately three percent of Georgian
households were income earners in the top bracket. Overall, the household income distribution in
both samples points toward a population that located at the lower income brackets.
In Figures 5.11 and 5.12, we do not seem to uncover a bivariate relationship between
higher household income and support for the incumbent. In Armenia, the existence of a nonrelationship may be because there are not enough households at higher income levels that
disclosed their vote intention. Turning to the RPA’s main opposition, we find that support for the
PAP was common with lower income households. In fact, almost fifty percent of individuals at
the lowest income bracket preferred the PAP.
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Figure 5.9: Household Income in Armenia
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Figure 5.10: Household Income in Georgia
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Figure 5.11: Income and Vote Preference (Armenia)
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Figure 5.12: Income and Vote Preference (Georgia)
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Figure 5.12 plots the cross-tabulation for Georgian voters. Here too, a positive linear
relationship between higher income levels and support for Georgian Dream is not evident.
Percentage-wise, both lower income and higher income brackets seem to disclose a vote
intention for Georgian Dream. Moreover, support for the incumbent government is the lowest
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among middle income earners, who also demonstrate greater support for Georgian Dream’s main
opposition, the UNM. Overall, the bivariate plots fail to provide preliminary evidence of higher
income earners favoring the incumbent government.
Bivariate Correlations
With the following preliminary descriptive relationships in mind, this section provides a
further test of association between the dependent variable and the three socioeconomic
indicators. I rely on the Kendall’s Tau-b to measure the level of correlation present between the
incumbent vote intention and the education, employment status, and household income. Like
other measures of correlation, the Tau-b statistic ranges from 0 to 1. Values that are closer to 0
suggest weak or no correlation, whereas values that are closer to 1 suggest strong or perfect
correlation.
Table 5.1: Socioeconomic Indicators and Incumbent Vote Intention (Armenia)
Education (higher educated = 1, others = 0)
0.0539*
Employment Status (employed = 1, others = 0)
0.0917***
Household Income (upper quartile = 1, others = 0)
0.0383
Note: ***p ≤.01; p **≤.05; p *≤.10

Table 5.2: Socioeconomic Indicators and Incumbent Vote Intention (Georgia)
Education (higher educated = 1, others = 0)
0.0860***
Employment Status (employed = 1, others = 0)
0.0580***
Household Income (upper quartile = 1, others = 0)
0.0447***
Note: ***p ≤.01; p **≤.05; p *≤.10

Table 5.1 presents the correlation levels for the Armenian sample. All three variables
demonstrate low levels of correlation and thus a weak association between each socioeconomic
indicators and incumbent vote intention. In addition, only two of the three variables are in the
expected direction. Starting with education, we notice a positive relationship between education
and RPA vote intention (p ≤ .10). The direction of the relationship is counter to hypothesis H4a.
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The next variable, employment status, also demonstrates a positive relationship with RPA vote
intention (p ≤ .01), but here the direction of the relationship is in accordance with hypothesis H5a.
Finally, the correlation between household income and RPA vote intention is in the expected
direction. However, the association is not only weak but also statistically insignificant. Thus, we
find support for two of the three socioeconomic variables.
In Table 5.2, the direction of the correlation estimates for the Georgian sample mirrors
the results in the Armenian sample. Despite being statistically significant (p ≤ .01), the positive
correlation between education and Georgian Dream vote intention is contrary to hypothesis H4b.
The direction of the correlation estimate for employment status is both statistically significant (p
≤ .01) and in the expected direction. Finally, the correlation estimate for household income is in
the same direction as predicted by hypothesis H6b and is statistically significant (p ≤ .01). Overall
the socioeconomic indicators in the Georgian sample outperform similar indicators in the
Armenian sample. One unexpected result that was discovered in the earlier section, and
substantiated in this section, is the tendency for higher educated respondents to support the
incumbent governments in both Armenia and Georgia. In the next section, I analyze these
relationships using a multivariate analysis.
Inferential Results: Armenia
Are socioeconomic indicators a determinant of incumbent support? The pair of tables
below provide the regression output for the probability of an incumbent vote intention after the
inclusion of the three socioeconomic covariates. In Tables 5.3 and 5.4, the addition of education,
employment status, and household income improves the predictability of the overall model as
evidenced by the higher LR chi-square statistic and the pseudo R-squared term.
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The addition of the three socioeconomic indicators to the Armenian model results in only
employment status reaching the minimum statistical significance threshold (p ≤ .01) and in the
expected direction. Armenian respondents who disclosed being employed are six percentage
points more likely to vote for the RPA than non-employed respondents. This confirms a similar
relationship discovered with the bivariate illustration and tau-b correlation methodological
approaches. The robustness of this relationship is shown by the constant statistical significance
throughout the three trials, although the level of significance decreases (p ≤ .05) once standard
errors are clustered around the region.
Table 5.3: Socioeconomic Vote Determinants (Armenia)
(I)
(II)

(III)

PS Age
Female
Rural

-.09*** (.03)
.03 (.02)
-.03 (.03)

.08*** (.03)
.03 (.02)
-.04 (.03)

-.09 (.06)
.03 (.03)
-.03 (.03)

College Educated
Employed
Top Quartile HH Income

.02 (.02)
.06*** (.02)
.03 (.03)

.03 (.02)
.06*** (.02)
.04 (.03)

.02 (.02)
.06** (.03)
.03 (.03)

No
No

Yes
No

No
Yes

Region FE
Clustered SE

Obs.
1,059
1,059
1,059
LR Chi2
23.09***
46.94***
19.41***
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
.03
.06
.03
Note: Dependent variable is incumbent vote intention. Output is marginal effects. The omitted reference category for
‘college educated’ is all respondents without a college degree. The omitted reference category for ‘employed’ is all
respondents who are not employed (including retired, students, unemployed, etc.). The omitted reference category
for “top quartile HH income” is all respondents in the 80 percentile of household income.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10

Beyond this, we also witness that the age covariate retains its statistically significant
relationship from the output in Chapter 4. The rest four sociological indicators fail to impact
RPA vote intention. The relationship between household income and RPA vote intention is
statistically insignificant despite the coefficient estimate being in the predicted direction. The
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relationship between education and RPA vote share is not only statistically insignificant but the
sign of the coefficient estimate is in the opposite direction. In the regions fixed-effects trial,
accounting for respondents from Armenia’s eleven regions keeps the model largely unchanged.
The addition of region-specific clustered standard errors, in the third trial, impacts the
significance of the age variable. Here, the employment status becomes the sole sociological
predictor of an RPA vote. Overall, the four of the six sociological covariates perform quite
poorly in predicting RPA vote intention. Although being a young individual may dissuade an
Armenian voter from supporting the RPA, being employed increases the probability of an RPA
vote.
An illustration of the output from Table 5.3 is found in Figure 5.13. Here we notice that
that the confidence intervals in two of the six sociological covariates do not cross the zero
threshold, suggesting that age and employment status are statistically significant. The illustration
also demonstrates the relatively large confidence intervals of each covariate, a finding that
mirrors the illustration in Figure 4.19. The fact that age and employment status impact RPA vote
intention lead one to question the substantive significance of each covariate. Figure 5.14
illustrates the substantive significance of both age and employment status. Here, we find a linear
downward slopped line that illustrates a probability of RPA vote intention of approximately ten
percentage points between Soviet and post-Soviet respondents. On the right side of the
illustration, we see the substantive significance of employment status. Both lines are relatively
inelastic suggesting larges changes in RPA vote intention between the two types of age groups
and employment status. However, substantive significance of the employment covariate appears
relatively small vis-à-vis respondent age.
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Figure 5.13: Regression Coefficient Plot (Armenia)

Figure 5.14: Adjusted Predictions of Age and Employment Status

Inferential Results: Georgia
Table 5.4 presents the output for the Georgian electorate. The inclusion of the
socioeconomic covariates improves the overall predictability of the model when comparing the
LR Chi-squared and pseudo R-squared terms to Table 4.4. Moving on to the three covariates of
interest, we notice that in the baseline trial all three covariates are statistically significant. That
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said, the direction of the education coefficient estimate is contrary to hypothesis H4b, College
educated Georgians are five percentage points more likely to vote for Georgian Dream. Beyond
the educative effect, we find that individuals who are employed are two percentage points more
likely to vote for the incumbent. A larger magnitude is recorded by the household income
covariate, which suggests that Georgians in the top quartile of household income are five
percentage points more likely to vote for Georgian Dream. Overall, the three socioeconomic
indicators perform quite well, and we can conclude that the sociological elements within the
Georgian vote function is predominately driven by socioeconomic, instead of sociodemographic,
variables.
Table 5.4: Socioeconomic Vote Determinants (Georgia)
(I)
(II)

(III)

PS Age
Female
Rural

-.10*** (.02)
-.01 (.01)
.06*** (.01)

-.10*** (.02)
-.01 (.01)
-.01 (.03)

-.11*** (.03)
.01 (.01)
.06 (.05)

Higher Educated
Employed
Top Quartile HH Income

.05*** (.01)
.02** (.01)
.05** (.02)

.06*** (.01)
.03** (.01)
.03 (.02)

.05** (.02)
.02** (.01)
.05** (.02)

No
No

Yes
No

No
Yes

Region FE
Clustered SE

Obs.
4,080
4,080
4,080
LR Chi2
89.03***
355.87***
109.01***
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
.02
.10
.02
Note: Dependent variable is incumbent vote intention. Output is marginal effects. The omitted reference category for
‘college educated’ is all respondents without a college degree. The omitted reference category for ‘employed’ is all
respondents who are not employed (including retired, students, unemployed, etc.). The omitted reference category
for “top quartile HH income” is all respondents in the 80 percentile of household income.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10

In the second trial, the inclusion of region fixed effects slightly the model. Here the rural
settlement and household income covariates are no longer statically significant at the minimum
threshold level (p ≤ .01). However, when the standard errors become clustered around Georgia’s
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regions the income covariate regains its significance level (p ≤ .01). Regarding the residence
covariate, a similar result was found in the output with the sociodemographic model in the
previous chapter. This suggests that once we account for within region similarity, the impact of
rural residence is nullified.
Figure 5.15: Regression Coefficient Plot (Georgia)
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Figure 5.16: Adjusted Predictions of Education, Employment, and Income
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To analyze the substantive significance of the sociological vote predictors, Figure 5.16
plots the predictive margins of the three socioeconomic covariates. All three plots have a positive
slopped line with the red dashes signifying the ninety-five percent confidence intervals.
Substantive significance can be interpreted with by observing the inelasticity of each line. The
larger the elasticity, the small the substantive significance. All three lines appear to be elastic
thus suggesting a lack of substantive significance in all three plots. For example, the change from
‘other’ to being ‘employed’ is associated with a change in the predictive margins of only three
percentage points.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I outlined the impact of socioeconomic indicators on Armenian and
Georgian political behavior. I find that employment status is the sole socioeconomic predictor of
the vote for both the Armenian and Georgian electorate. The decades-long mismanagement of
the socioeconomic development of the Armenian and Georgian voter has, unsurprisingly, led
both electorates to emphasize employment as a condition for incumbent support. Aside from
employment, the Georgian vote function is also influenced by higher education and household
income. While Georgian Dream support among higher income earners is theoretically valid, the
positive relationship between higher education and Georgian Dream support is counter
theoretical and unexpected. What would compel higher educated Georgians to support the party
of power?
One possible explanation is the increased political polarization in higher education
institutions, which was exemplified by an election of a pro-Saakashvili appointee to the
chancellor senate board at Tbilisi State University, in 2016. The numerous human rights abuses
scandals during Saakashvili’s second term triggered a fallout between university student
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organizations and their support for Saakashvili and UNM. This was followed by an increasingly
contentious political environment between UNM and Georgian Dream, which resulted in the
polarization of student groups in higher education settings.
Another explanation relates to the bureaucratization of higher educated individuals into
state institutions. Under Georgian Dream, government employment qualifications have been
revised to include preferential consideration of applicants with a graduate education. This may
influence how college educated individuals perceive Georgian Dream. All in all, socioeconomic
indicators appear to be an all-encompassing vote predictor for the Georgian electorate but not the
Armenian electorate.
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CHAPTER 6: PARTY IDENTIFICATION & THE VOTE
In western liberal democracies, party identification is the foundation of one’s vote choice.
During an election season, the voter’s psychological attachment to a party weighs heavily in their
vote function. Candidates attach themselves to party labels and some voters, in turn, cast ballots
for a candidate because of the party label.93 The role of parties in post-Soviet politics has largely
been defined through patronal and institutional lens (Hale 2006; 2015). Parties are considered
largely void of organizational structure, ideological distinction, and tend to be tools for
charismatic leaders. As pointed out by Triesman (2009), Russia’s political parties associate
themselves with charismatic leaders, not the other way around. For example, United Russia takes
every opportunity to associate its political brand with Putin.94 Whereas in the West, candidates
take every opportunity to remind voters about the party banner under which they are competing.
The inability of parties to build an independent and durable apparatus outside of a personality
cult has limited the development of party politics in the post-Soviet space. The central question
in this chapter is whether party identification can influence the vote choice amongst voters in
Armenia and Georgia.
In the Caucasus, identification with the candidate (and not necessarily the party) exceeds
the Putinization of United Russia. For example, in the weeks leading up to the 2018 Armenian
parliamentary election, a local television station interviewed selected voters in a small village,
Lernahovit, about their partisan preferences (Azatytyun 2018).95 Surprisingly, the male village
elders voiced their support for both Prime Minister Pashinyan and RPA incumbent Karen

93

These partisan voters often engage in straight-ticket voting to minimize the information cost associated with
voting. For partisan voters, the party label is a voting heuristic by which they align their policy preferences with the
candidate’s.
94
In fact, the popularity of Putin exceeds that of United Russia (Levada Center 2019).
95
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fd2Qt-jZCMs
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Karapetyan.96 Although the elders supported Pashinyan’s velvet revolution against the RPA, they
also disclosed their primary allegiance to Karapetyan, not the RPA. After some confusion, the
elders disclosed their support toward Karapetyan was because of his connections to the village.
Karapetyan, a wealthy businessman, had grown up in the village and, according to the elders,
had taken good care of the villagers.97 Thus, their loyalty was to Karapetyan and not necessarily
the RPA.98
The above example suggests that party identification in the Caucasus can take the form of
candidate identification. This claim is furthered by the practice of Armenian and Georgian voters
to reference political parties by their de facto party leader. ‘Misha’s party (UNM); Serzh’s party
(RPA); Bidzina’s party (Georgian Dream); Gago’s party (PAP)’ and so on. This type of
partisanship is quite different than what is witnessed in the West. Whereas American partisan
voters possess a psychological attachment to a political party and may engage in straight ticket
voting, voters in the Caucasus and the rest of the post-Soviet space maintain a psychological
attachment to the party leader.99 At times, this can lead to confusion at the voting booth when
voters are unable to associate their preferred candidate to his or her party.100
One major implication from the process of party identification via candidate
identification, is to what extent does the former influence the vote function of the electorate? If

96

Karapetyan is the brother of Armenian-Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan.
The elders disclosed that he helped them find work in Armenia and Russia.
98
The village elders further stated that if Karapetyan does not seek re-election, they would vote for Pashinyan’s
party. However, in the event Karapetyan is in RPA’s party list, their vote will go to him and the RPA.
99
This is the case with Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russian (LDPR). Russia’s third largest party (after
United Russian and the CPRF) is led by a charismatic, and often erratic, leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. LDPR’s
electoral success is driven entirely by the popularity of Zhirinovsky.
100
Fortunately, these types of occurrences are not as common. However, and based on anecdotal evidence, they tend
to occur more with politically disengaged members of the electorate and elderly voters.
97
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the electorate’s true psychological attachment is to the candidate or leader of the party, can
voters accurately relate their affiliation of a specific party to their vote choice?
In this chapter, I trace the impact of partisanship in the vote function of Armenian and
Georgian voters. The rest of the chapter is divided into five sections. First, I discuss the
formation of parties of power and party identification in the Caucasus. Initially, the political
system in both Armenia and Georgia was quite unstable resulting in volatile shifts between
parties of power. However, in the case of Armenia, the RPA was able to consolidate power and
govern for almost two decades. In Georgia, the unstable nature of its competitive authoritarian
regime resulted in the government failing to hold power beyond two election cycles. The
different trajectories between the parties of power also impacted the development of party
identification. Whereas, the stability of the RPA led to a constant base of RPA identifiers, in the
case of Georgia, the failure of a single governing party to maintain power beyond two election
cycles limited the full development of incumbent partisan attachments.
The second section introduces bivariate illustrations between party identification and
incumbent vote intention. This provides a baseline, descriptive test of hypotheses H7a and H7b.
The next section advances the bivariate methodological analysis by testing the tau-b correlation
between party identification and the dependent variable. The fourth section adds the party
identification covariate to the regression model from Chapter 5. The findings, across all three
methodological tests, demonstrate that the incumbent vote function for both Armenian and
Georgian voters is heavily influenced by partisanship. In addition, the inclusion of party
identification does little to change the partial impact of sociological variables on the vote for the
Armenian electorate. However, the addition of the partisanship covariate alters the quantity of
statistically significant sociological covariates in the Georgian vote function. Given the strength
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of partisanship in the vote function, what are the implications for party development in Armenia
and Georgia? This is the concern of the concluding section of the chapter.
The Formation of Parties of Power and Party Identification in Armenia
Armenia’s party system precedes its post-Soviet independence. The Armenian
Revolutionary Federation (ARF) fostered the creation of the first Republic of Armenia (191820), after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The short-lived state was then taken over by the
Transcaucasia’s communists and Armenia became a Soviet Socialist Republic between 1936 and
1991. Founded in 1988, the Armenian National Movement (ANM) was instrumental in bringing
about the successful transition from Soviet Armenia to the Republic of Armenia. On September
21, 1991 when Armenia declared its independence the ANM was the dominant political party,
and soon thereafter became Armenia’s first party of power.
Armenian National Movement
The ANM dominated Armenian politics from 1990 to 1998. Despite lack of data on
Armenian partisanship101, we can presume that, initially, a majority of Armenians either
identified with or felt close to the new party of power. This is because the ANM candidate,
Levon Ter-Petrosyan, won Armenia’s only free and fair election in 1991 with eighty-three
percent of the vote.102 The period between 1988 and 1991 was defined by a pan-Armeno cause:

101

Armenia was included in the 1990 Survey of Soviet values (Duch 1990) and the 1992 Political Values in the
Former Soviet Union (Duch 1992). However, only 32 respondents were interviewed (compared to 2,536 Russian
respondents) and none were asked about their party identification.
102
The presidency came down to three main contenders: Ter-Petrosyan, supported by the ANM; Sos Sargsyan,
supported by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF); and Paruyr Hayrikyan, supported by the Union for
National Self Determination (UND). Ter-Petrosyan presented himself as a moderate candidate, who opposed
recognition of Karabakh as part of Armenia, supported economic reforms, and a maintained a dovish attitude
towards Russia and Turkey. The latter two candidates presented more nationalistic messages, including the
annexation of Karabakh into Armenia. Ter-Petrosyan’s main opposition, Hayrikyan, was exiled from Armenia
between 1988 and 1990, a period which witnessed the apex calls for Armenia’s independence. Thus, an
overwhelming majority of Armenians associated independent Armenia with Ter-Petrosyan.
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the security and self-determination of Karabakh Armenians and independence of Soviet
Armenia. This united the Armenian people around the movement’s leader: Ter-Petrosyan.
However, following Armenia’s independence and Ter-Petrosyan’s presidential victory, the
country’s first president began to build his patronal network around the ANM (Hale 2015). As
described by Hale, the ANM provided the formal structure for Ter-Petrosyan to secure loyalty
from the low-level entrepreneurs. In return, these businessmen could rely on favorable treatment
by the government.
Ter-Petrosyan and the ANM’s support was structured through chains of acquittances
“…beginning with family members and relatives of the candidates and including a network of
dependents” (Dudwick 1997: 95). Throughout ANM’s governing tenure, Ter-Petrosyan was the
face of the party. Many ANM partisans were in actuality Levonakan (“Levonists”) and the
psychological attachment was more toward Ter-Petrosyan than toward the ANM. Thus, upon
Ter-Petrosyan’s sudden resignation, in 1998, the ANM lost its loyalists and immediately
collapsed. Despite creating Levonakan identities among voters, Ter-Petrosyan also hindered the
growth of partisan attachments in the country. Recall that the Soviet system created antipartisans, who were distrustful of parties and the entire system, due to its single-party rule. Upon
ascending to the presidency, Ter-Petrosyan governed over a period of “mutation” within the
ANM103, leading to the banning of Armenia’s oldest party – the ARF, and creating a support
coalition that privatized state assets and plundered state resources. By the time Ter-Petrosyan had
resigned, the median Armenian voter had returned to the Soviet days of loathing the government,
being distrustful of political parties and the entire political system
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Libaridian (1999) described the splintering of ANM throughout Ter-Petrosyan’s tenure as a process of
“mutation” (23).
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Republican Party of Armenia
Armenia’s second party of power governed Armenia from 1999 to 2018.104 This period
included two presidents, Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, who each served two terms.
RPA’s initial governance strategy differed from the ANM. Whereas Ter-Petrosyan dominated
ANM’s image, the RPA did not maintain a similar relationship with President Kocharyan, whom
it supported during the latter’s reelection bid in 2003. Kocharyan, for his part, also chose to
create a distance between himself and the RPA. In fact, in both of his election campaigns (1998
and 2003), Kocharyan ran as an independent.
The Kocharyan era can be summed up through two developments: the expansion of
patronalism and the double-digit growth of Armenia’s economy. First, Armenia’s second
president expanded the scope of patronalism beyond Ter-Petrosyan’s imagination. Whereas
Armenia’s first president ruled with a smaller number of oligarchic networks, Kocharyan
expanded the politico-economic playfield to include dozens of Armenian oligarchs, some of
whom had become RPA MPs in the National Assembly.105 The RPA, in turn, was all too willing
to allow members of Kocharyan’s support coalition seek political power under their banner. This
expansion not only increased Kocharyan’s support coalition, it also led to loyalty from Armenian
citizens whose socioeconomic status was directly or indirectly tied to the oligarchs. In return for
Kocharyan allowing Armenia’s oligarchs to operate in an uncompetitive economic market, the
oligarchs used their business conglomerates to influence their employees to support the RPA and
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Although the RPA was a member of government since 1995 they were a junior coalition member until the after
of the 1999 parliamentary elections.
105
Aside from political power, an MP was a lucrative title because it carried a weight of prosecutorial immunity.
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Kocharyan. Thus, RPA partisanship and political loyalty to Kocharyan was in part based on
coercive tactics from sub-patrons and self-preservation in Armenia’s socioeconomic strata.
Second, and despite the expansion of patronalism, Kocharyan governed over a period of
economic prosperity in Armenia. The increase in Diaspora tourism and remittances from abroad
provided Armenia with the necessary capital to socioeconomically ‘catch up’ with the latter,
Soviet Armenia era. During this period, Armenia experienced a construction boom and a
revitalization of its financial credit markets. The price of real estate began to appreciate. Banks
and universal credit organizations (UCOs) increased their lending practices. The spoils of
Armenia’s economic growth, however, were not equally distributed, and an asymmetric amount
of economic reward came largely to those who maintained personal connections with the regime.
These “winners” then oriented their partisan attachment to the RPA by way of its leadership.
This attachment was not due to the alignment of police preferences, or the so-called “nationalconservative” ideology of the RPA. Rather, it was the outcome of patronal politics.
As Kocharyan’s second term came to an end, Armenia’s second president had groomed
his protégé, Serzh Sargsyan, to assume the presidency. The 2008 presidential election witnessed
the return of Ter-Petrosyan to challenge Sargsyan to become Armenia’s third president.
Sargsyan’s relationship with RPA was considerably different as he ran under the RPA party
banner and was victorious against Ter-Petrosyan. When the latter failed to concede the election
and initiated protests, Kocharyan responded by ordering the military to disperse the protestors.
On March 1, 2008 ten individuals were killed as a result of clashes between Armenia’s police,
armed forces and the protestors. Kocharyan responded to the period of instability by ordering a
state of national emergency and preventing most forms of public political behavior. This
draconian measure did not sit well with the international community, particularly the US and the
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European Union. Both moved to criticize the behavior of Armenia’s authorities. Thus, Sargsyan
took the presidency amid international pressure to liberalize the political situation. As outlined
by Levitsky and Way (2010), the initiation of liberal reforms to maintain international legitimacy
was the beginning of the end for the RPA.
First, the RPA leadership sought to replace many of its oligarchic and criminally-prone
MPs with a young cadre of technocrats, among them Arpine “Surb Arpi” Hovannisyan. Whereas
the old class of RPA MPs were favorable towards taking coercive steps against the opposition,
the new, younger and highly educated MPs were more methodical and preferred liberalizing
policies towards the opposition. Second, the RPA and president Sargsyan allowed the opposition
to periodically fill the streets and protest. Some of the protests were officially sanctioned, while
most were not.106 Finally, as Sargsyan’s presidency was nearing its end due to term limits, the
RPA amended Armenia’s constitution and replaced its governing structure from a semipresidential system to a parliamentary one. Sargsyan, in turn, promised not to run for the premier
position. The reneging of the promise and RPA’s nomination of Sargsyan for the prime
ministerial position was RPA’s biggest political mistake and brought an end to both Sargsyan
and Armenia’s second party of power.
During RPA’s tenure, political attachment to the party came in the form of attachment to
the leadership. Voters who identified with the RPA and preferred its governance were largely
consumed by the personality its leaders or by personal acquittances with party members. This is
further evidenced by party intensity among Armenian voters and how the electorate perceives
voting. In the 2017 ArmES, when asked how likely RPA voters disagreed with their party, forty-
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During Kocharyan’s tenure, opposition protests in Yerevan were quite scarce. Most were prevented before the
planning stage.
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one percent answered either “sometimes”, “often”, or “always.” Moreover, when asked about the
basis of voting in Armenia, thirty-nine percent answered that voting was based on either
“personality of the head of the party” or “personal connections to the party.”107 Thus, the role of
party attachments in Armenia stems largely from one’s psychological attachment to a party
leader or an economic pursuit.
The Formation of Parties of Power and Party Identification in Georgia
Post-Soviet Georgia has witnessed the rise and fall of three parties of power, two of
which relinquished office through non-electoral means. Georgia’s first incumbent government,
Round Table Bloc (RTB), was a short-lived party of power that ushered in a period of volatile
incumbency through the of mismanagement of authority. The dictatorial nature of RTB’s leader
and Georgia’s first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, set the stage for a line of successors with an
appetite for expansive presidential powers. In all three cases of power relinquishment, the
opposition accused the incumbent president of exceeding his constitutional authority. The
reoccurring reshuffling of the parties of power impacted the development of a stable partisan
identification with governing parties.
Round Table Bloc (RTB)
RTB was a nationalist coalition that consisted of several small pro-independence parties
which governed the country from 1990 to 1992. The bloc was led by Gamsakhurdia, a Soviet
dissident and a staunch Georgian nationalist, whose success was mainly due to his charisma.108
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Compared to twenty-eight percent who answered voting is based on “issue-related information.”
Gamsakhurdia’s realized the anti-system and anti-communist sentiment of the Georgian people and relied on his
charismatic leadership to ascend to power. Jones (2015) considers charisma as “…Gamsakhurdia’s most dependable
source of power” (93).
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Demanding immediate independence from the Soviet Union, Gamsakhurdia’s rhetoric gained
popularity across Georgia and led the RTB to oust the Georgian Communists in the 1990
Georgian Soviet Supreme elections. Not surprisingly, the election was defined by personality
types and a lack of differences between party platforms (Jones 2015). As described by Aves
(1991), “[V]oters were really being asked to cho[o]se between personalities and styles” (Aves
29). The election also exposed the dangerous sentiments of nationalism as RTC moved to
disband regional and ethnic parties and promote ethnic Georgian identity.
The following year Gamsakhurdia successfully won Georgia’s first presidential election.
Similar to the 1990 election, the presidential campaign was one of personality types. As Jones
points out, “[m]ost who voted for Gamsakhurdia voted for the man, not a program” (Jones 2015:
54). Gamsakhurdia tapped into the multicultural fear of ethnic Georgians who, in certain regions,
found themselves the minority within their own country. His support was largely limited to the
rural areas, for his politics was the politics of anti-elitism (Jones 2015). The Gamsakhurdia voter
was an identity voter as well as an economically and socially underprivileged voter who had
witnessed a nomenclatura class spring up and dominate politics during the Soviet period.
The Gamsakhurdia government (1990-2) was short-lived. Despite presiding over
economic instability, Gamsakhurdia placed priority of Georgian identity over economic policy.
Politically, the Gamsakhurdia era witnessed repressive tactics towards opposition blocs, none
more so than the 1991 expulsion of the Communist party, the second largest party, from the
Georgian parliament (Jones 2015: 153). The beginning of the end of his rule occurred when
Gamsakhurdia began to gradually consolidate power around himself by expanding presidential
authority, minimized the veto power of the parliament and retaining complete control of state of
emergency powers (Jones 2015: 88). This eventually led to his ouster in January of 1992.
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During Gamsakhurdia’s rule, the psychological attachment of the Georgian voter was not
necessarily to RTC but to its leader. This is further evidenced by the collapse of RTC following
the successful coup against Gamsakhurdia and by the ability to his supporters to violently
support the deposed lead. Dubbed the ‘Zviadists’, thousands of staunch supporters failed to
accept the military coup against Gamsakhurdia, and Georgia erupted into a civil conflict.109
Citizens Union of Georgia / For a New Georgia
Georgia’s second party of power, the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), was formed by
the country’s second president, Eduard Shevardnadze.110 Founded in 1993, the CUG consisted of
several factions. First, there were the Soviet holdovers, or a group of Georgian Communist Party
members who were associated with Shevardnadze during his tenure as Soviet Georgia’s First
Secretary. Second, the CUG included a reformer faction consisting mainly of young politicians
whose political and economic ambitions did not fully align with that of Shevardnadze. Finally,
there were the Georgian “Mafiosi” whose membership in the CUG was largely based on
maintaining power and control over their personal assets (Haindrava 2003). The latter group
lacked political experience or policy ambition. In exchange for a preferential economic playing
field the Mafiosi made sure local communities supported the Shevardnadze’s candidacy. The
CUG, according to Haindrava, “turned into something resembling a limited liability company” (
Haindrava 23) with each stockholder’s profit allocation resembling their own share.
This composition of CUG made the party of power doomed to fail. The party’s
connection with the Georgian criminal underworld resulted in some of the region’s worst cases
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The Zviadist were largely contained in Western Georgia, but their ambitions threatened the totality of the
Georgian state (Kukhianidze 2009).
110
A former foreign minister of the Soviet Union, Shevardnadze assumed leadership of the independent Georgian
state after successfully initiating an end to violence among rivaling factions.
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of corruption and resource mismanagement. Between 1995 and 1999, the popularity of
Shevardnadze and the CUG plummeted. The once savior of the Georgian state111 was now a
facilitator of the corruptive norms in Georgia’s political and social life. Shevardnadze’s inability
to address corruption and the patronal nature of Georgia’s political system further fractionalized
the CUG and led party members to defect from the party of power. The New Rights Party, the
United National Movement, and the United Democrats were all created by former CUG
members. Although initially loyal to Shevardnadze, the party leaders started to become more
critical of Shevardnadze’s policy paralysis. Shevardnadze attempted to cease the defections by
relinquishing the position of CUG chair, in September 2001. This created a leadership vacuum
and furthered CUG’s problems. Following Shevardnadze’s departure, the CUG further
fractionalized with the creation of Together Again and the Alliance for New Georgia factions.
Without Shevardnadze and a leadership crisis, the CUG collapsed (Haindrava 2003: 25).
The failure of CUG forced Shevardnadze to scramble for a new party prior to the 2003
parliamentary elections. For a New Georgia was a political bloc that combined several political
organizations of varying ideological camps. For example, the bloc included both the NationalDemocratic Party, who advocated for aligning Georgia more towards Western norms, and who
presented an anti-Russian platform, and the Georgian Socialists, who advocated for aligning
Georgia more towards Russia and were skeptical of western norms (Chikhladze and Chikhladze
2005). Despite attempting to form a party of power, For a New Georgia lacked the in-depth
patronal system present within the CUG. While patronage systems still maintained control over
local ethnic minorities, the combination of CUG’s collapse and the growth of western-backed
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Shevardnadze assumed the leadership position due to his political experience. Upon becoming president, he
quashed regional insurrection and reached out to both the West and Russia.

139

non-governmental organizations and activist groups created a climate hostile to Shevardnadze’s
tenure. On the eve the 2003 Parliamentary elections, the Shevardnadze post-Soviet political era
looked quite similar to the Shevardnadze Soviet tenure; both abundant in political patronage, yet
scarce in reform.
United National Movement
Georgia’s third party of power was the result of the rose revolution. Following the
November 2003 parliamentary elections, which bring about For a New Georgia victory, the
opposition failed to accept the results and began round-the-clock protests. Despite growing calls
for new elections, even within Shevardnadze’s administration, the Georgian president did not
discredit the electoral results. This proved to be a fateful mistake, as holding new parliamentary
elections would not directly threaten Shevardnadze’s presidency (Jones 2015). The end of the
Shevardnadze era came on November 24, when after informal talks with Putin and foreign
minister Ivanov, Georgia’s second president submitted his resignation.112 The rose revolution
ushered in Georgia’s first non-violent transfer of power.
In the aftermath of the rose revolution, United National Movement (UNM), became
Georgia’s party of power and Saakashvili its third president. However, the western-educated
leader and his party did not proceed with the standard practices of a party of power: leveraging
power and state resource extraction. Instead Saakashvili moved swiftly to tackle the corrupt and
inefficient bureaucratic organs left behind by Shevardnadze. First, Saakashvili tackled the central
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According to Companjen (2010) and Kandelaki and Meladze (2007), Shevardnadze’s inability to understand and
account for the role of civil society groups in Georgia eventually led to his political demise. Shevardnadze’s political
pathology consisted of a total withdrawal from the Tbilisi street, which by 2003 had witnessed a rise of civil society
organizations, a gradual rebalancing of politics between Shevardnadze and his young cadre, and synthesis between
his young cadre and civil society organizations. The aftermath of the 2003 election demionstrated the strength of this
synthesis.
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problem facing Georgia: corruption. The newly elected president quickly restructured the police
force113, closed a number of black markets operating throughout Georgia and decentralized
Georgia’s education system (Companjen 2010). Next, he began to shrink the size of the
Georgia’s federal bureaucracy and initiate neoliberal economic reforms (Jones 2006; Shubladze
and Khundadze 2017). Finally, Saakashvili’s administration began the process of transitional
justice to hold past officials accountable. However, these reforms did not increase the
socioeconomic wellbeing of the people (Shubladze and Khundadze 2017).114 Moreover, the
process of initiating reforms and state building was a gradual one that irritated Saakashvili and
UNM (Wheatley 2009). Thus, in 2004 both moved to amend Georgia’s constitution and expand
the scope of presidential powers.
The increasing coercive tactics by Saakashvili and the UNM were met with increasing
hostility on the part of Georgian voters, especially civil society organizations. Groups accused
the government of human rights abuses (Eurasia net 2007; Shubladze and Khundadze 2017), the
torture of prisoners by the police, and the failed policy that led to conflict with South Ossetia in
2008. Saakashvili’s second term (2008-12) was marked by further isolation of this main voting
bloc: young, educated Georgians. Moreover, the UNM’s concentration on post-material issues
led the party to neglect social welfare concerns. For many voters, UNM was starting to resemble
CUG.115
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In post-Soviet republics the police force is among the largest corrupt institutions. Their practice of “roving
banditry” consists of demanding bribes from motor vehicle drivers to commit traffic violations.
114
The average Georgian continued to be plagued by material concerns. Despite near double-digit growth rate
during Saakashvili’s first term (World Bank 2019), the Georgian electorate did not witness a substantial growth in
their purchasing power. In fact, during this period Georgia’s maintained the slowest growth of gross national income
(GNI) in the Caucasus.
115
During Saakashvili’s second term, UNM began to increasingly rely on old, coercive practices to shore up
support. For example, at the elite level, UNM pursued an uneven electoral playing field by requiring big businesses
to financially support the party or risk going bankrupt (Shubladze and Kundadze 2017).
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In 2011, a new political opposition entered the scene and posed an unprecedented
challenge to UNM. Financed by Georgian billionaire Bizdina Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream
presented itself as a party that would address the social welfare needs of the Georgian voter.
Contrary to other existing parties, the financial weight of Georgian Dream was sponsored by
Ivanishvili, whose Russian-based wealth limited the reach of UNM’s ability go after his assets
(Shubladze and Kundadze 2017). With a campaign that targeted poor and rural voters, Georgian
Dream secured an electoral victory following the 2012 parliamentary elections. Then in 2013
Georgian Dream candidate Giorgi Margvelashvili defeated UNM candidate David Bakradze and
ended UNM’s political supremacy.
UNM’s defeat was largely its own doing. The party that had inherited vital sociological
voting blocs a decade earlier managed to lose them due to mismanaged policy prioritization
during Saakashvili’s first term and a return to patronal behavior during the latter’s second term.
Georgian Dream
Having monopolized leadership in both electoral branches of government, Georgian
Dream’s electoral success is mainly due to its emphasis on social welfare and geopolitical
stability. Georgia’s current party of power maintains a large support base in rural areas and
amongst low income voters. To further its hold on political power, the party of power passed a
constitutional amendment in 2016 transitioning Georgia from a semi-presidential system to a
parliamentary government. The 2018 presidential elections, which saw Georgian Dream
candidate Salome Zurabishvili emerge as the winner, was the country’s last presidential election
to be determined by popular vote.
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Figure 6.1: Georgian Dream Party Identification
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Data availability from NDI’s periodical public attitudes survey allows us to trace the
evolution of party identification with Georgian Dream. The illustration in Figure 6.1 provides
several insights about Georgian Dream party identification. First, we notice the volatile level of
party affiliation on the part of Georgian voters. Between April 2014 and July 2015, the
percentage of Georgians who identified with Georgian Dream decreased by twenty-eight
percentage points. Second, the twin peaks of Georgian Dream partisanship occurred around
election seasons. The first peak, April 2014, was reported five months after the 2013 presidential
election. The second peak, October 2016, occurring during the 2016 parliamentary election.
Finally, since October 2016 Georgian Dream has witnessed an overall decrease in partisanship.
Overall, the unstable level of party identification with Georgia’s party of power may be
emblematic of the lack of long-term party affiliation.
Bivariate Relationships
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Figure 6.2: Party Identification in Armenia
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In the previous section, I traced the evolution of parties of power and the development of
partisanship in the Caucasus. In post-Soviet Armenia, both the ANM and RPA used their
governing status to extend their tenure and manipulate election results. Naturally, the
mismanagement of the country’s affairs by the two governing parties is likely to create a
disinterest in political parties among most voters and a depression of party attachments. Figure
6.2 illustrates the presence of party identification among the Armenian electorate. When asked if
respondents feel close to any particular party, over two-thirds answered in the negative. Only
twenty-nine percent reported feeling close to a political party. The large number of non-partisans
is in line with the conventional understanding of party politics and political behavior in Armenia.
While both RPA and PAP have relied on their patronal structure to seek out partisan loyalty,
both party apparatus lacked the financial resources and the institutional tools of a totalitarian
regime to create loyalists among the majority of the people. Thus, while the patronage-seeking
behavior of ANM and RPA may have created sub-patrons, loyalists and small group of
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supporters, it has also had a second-order effect: a sense of apathy towards politics and a
depression of partisan attachments.
Given the low levels of partisanship, how do Armenian partisans distribute themselves
along the country’s parties? Figure 6.3 divides the twenty-nine percent of Armenian partisans
according to their preferred party. Of the 275 respondents who disclosed feeling close to a
particular party, seventy-six percent identified with either RPA or PAP. This is hardly surprising
because of the nine parties below, the two largest parties, RPA and PAP, maintain patronal
networks. The skewness of this distribution not only confirms Armenia’s uneven political
playing field but also the patronal nature of Armenian party politics.
Figure 6.3: Partisanship in Armenia

RA, 32, 10%
Other, 1, 0%
ACP, 8, 2%
FD, 6, 2%
ORO, 6, 2%

DK, 2, 1%
RPA, 92, 30%

Yelk, 18, 6%
AR, 5, 2%
ARF, 15, 5%
ANC, 7, 2%

PAP, 117, 38%

Compared to party identification in Armenia, the number of partisans in Georgia is
considerably larger. What explains such a substantial difference between the two neighboring
countries? First, Georgia’s party system has always consisted of greater number of political
parties than in Armenia. The higher number of parties may translate to an increased number of
individuals with psychological attachment to parties. Preliminary support for this claim is based
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on the number of parties whose supporters are relatively large in number. In figure 6.4, this
includes Alliance of Patriots of Georgia (APG), United Democratic Movement (UDM), Free
Democrats (FD), Georgian Labor Party (GLP), and Movement State for People (MSP).
Figure 6.4: Partisanship in Georgia
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Second, the difference may be influenced by the varying questions format between the
two surveys. In the 2016 GPAS, NDI asked Georgian voters to disclose their partisanship.
However, the method in which the question was asked lacked a standard two-prong test. Instead
of considering non-partisan affiliation as a separate question, the 2016 GPAS included nonpartisan identity as a response item (labeled ‘no party’ in Figure 6.4).116 This difference in the
question format may be attributable to the higher percentage of respondents who disclosed being
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In a two-prong format, voters are asked whether they identify with a party. This allows voter to initially state they
are non-partisan. The 2016 GPAS included non-partisan as an option among political parties Georgian’s identify
with. This process may have led to the relatively high levels of partisanship in Georgia.
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partisan.117 Of the respondents that did indicate partisan attachments, a plurality of Georgian
partisans identified with Georgian Dream followed by the United National Movement. In fact, if
we isolate partisan respondents, we find that approximately thirty-five percent identified with
Georgian Dream, while twenty-seven percent identified with the United National Movement.
What do the partisan distributions in Figure 6.3 and 6.4 indicate about the Armenian and
Georgian electorate? Two brief analyses. First, party politics in both Armenia and Georgia are
dominated by a total of four parties and the partisan attachments reported in the figures above
confirms this. Although both political arenas contain a de jure multiparty field, both countries
operate under a de facto competitive two-party system.118 Second, of the Armenian respondents
surveyed prior to the 2017 election, a plurality relates their partisan attachments to PAP, not the
incumbent RPA. However, in the case of Georgia, a plurality of respondents identifies with
Georgian Dream. This may be explained by the varying stages of party of power that each party
was in. In 2017, RPA was a mature party of power, having been victim to the cost of ruling
effect (Rose and Mackie 1983). Georgian Dream, however, is a new party of power whose
popularity is relatively high.
Party Identification and Vote Intention
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 plot a bivariate distribution between party identification and vote
intention. SPM predicts that the two will align nearly perfectly because one’s vote choice is
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Recall that while twenty-nine percent of Armenian respondents indicated attachments towards a political party,
that statistic for the Georgian sample is almost twice as high.
118
In the case of Armenia, the de facto two-party system is the result of patronal politics. Both the RPA and PAP are
patronal-structured parties controlled by a patron and consisting of sub-patrons. In Georgia, the UNM may not
traditionally be considered a political party that relies on a patronal network. However, during its last tenure of
governance, UNM’s behavior resembled a traditional party of power that relied on a patronal network to support its
governing status. Thus, the reasoning behind Armenia’s and Georgia’s de facto two-party system has more to do
with patronal politics than its institutional configuration.
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primarily influenced by their party affiliation. The skewed color disribution in the horizontal bars
confirms this presumption, suggesting a strong relationship between party identification and
incumbent vote intention. In Armenia, a total of ninety-two respondents identified with the
incumbent government. Of those, eighty-six, or ninty-three percent of the respondents, intended
to vote fo the incumbent party. The salience of partisanship also applies to an opposition party’s
vote choice. For instance, of the 117 respondents who identified with the PAP, 102 (eighty-seven
percent) disclosed a vote for the PAP.

Vote choice

Figure 6.5: Party ID and Vote intention (Armenia)
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In Georgia, we find similar results with the skewed distribution of party identification and
co-partisan vote choice. Of the 653 respondents who disclosed a vote intention for Georgian
Dream, 602 (ninety-two percent) identified with the incumbent party. The bivariate relationship
between UNM party affiliation and vote is event higher. Among the 443 respondents who
intended to vote for UNM, 421 (ninety-five percent) identified with the incumbent party.
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Figure 6.6: Party ID and Vote Intention (Georgia)
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Correlation
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarize the bivariate relationship between party identification and
incumbent vote intention using the Tau-b correlation indicators. The partisanship variable is
presented in a dichotomous manner to isolate voters who identify with the incumbent party.
Recall that a positive level of association denotes a higher probability of an incumbent vote
intention among respondents who identify with the incumbent party. Prior to interpreting the
measures of association, it is worth highlighting the varying format of partisan identification
questionnaire across the two surveys. As suggested elsewhere, research on the emergence of
party identification in the most post-Soviet region contends that the research design of the
question impacts the degree of partisanship (Brader and Tucker 2001).
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Table 6.1: Partisanship and Incumbent Vote Intention (Armenia)
Partisanship (RPA = 1, others = 0)
0.7219***
Note: ***p ≤.01; p **≤.05; p *≤.10

Table 6.2: Partisanship and Incumbent Vote Intention (Georgia)
Partisanship (GD = 1, others = 0)
0.7547***
Note: ***p ≤.01; p **≤.05; p *≤.10

The levels of association in Table 6.1 and 6.2 provide preliminary support for hypotheses
H7a and H7b. Among both the Armenian and Georgian sample, the bivariate correlation statistic is
positive and statistically significant (***p ≤.01). Unexpectedly, the results also point towards a
relatively similar level of association between partisanship and incumbent vote intention, despite
the different wording of the partisan question between the two samples. Here, we can assume
that the question format may not have resulted in large differences in correlation levels across the
two samples. Finally, the strong level of association between incumbent partisanship and
incumbent vote intention also provide further evidence of the salience of party identification and
the vote choice in the Caucasus.
Inferential Results: Armenia
In Table 5.3 of the previous chapter, the results in the baseline trial suggested that
Armenian voters were primarily influenced by age and employment status. How then does party
identification alter the incumbent vote intention model? Below, we see that the inclusion of RPA
partisanship partially alters the previous results. First, the addition of the party identification
covariate significantly improves the model. The strength LR Chi-squared statistic is more than
ten-fold larger than in the sociological model. In addition, the pseudo R-squared is also
significantly higher. Overall, the addition of partisanship to the list of incumbent vote
determinants improves its explanatory power.
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Table 6.3: Partisanship and the Vote (Armenia)
(I)
(II)
PS Age
Female
Rural

(III)

-.05 (.03)
.01 (.02)
-.03 (.03)

-.04 (.03)
.004 (.02)
-.03 (.03)

-.05 (.04)
.01 (.02)
-.03 (.04)

Higher Educated
Employed
Top Quartile HH Income

.004 (.02)
.04** (.02)
.01 (.03)

.01 (.02)
.05** (.02)
.03 (.03)

.004 (.02)
.04* (.02)
.01 (.01)

Party Identification

.42*** (.06)

.40*** (.05)

.42*** (.06)

No
No

Yes
No

No
Yes

Region FE
Clustered SE

Obs.
1,059
1,059
1,059
LR Chi2
365.14***
379.46***
915.00***
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
.44
.45
.44
Note: Dependent variable is incumbent vote intention. Output is marginal effects. The omitted reference category for
‘college educated’ is all respondents without a college degree. The omitted reference category for ‘employed’ is all
respondents who are not employed (including retired, students, unemployed, etc.). The omitted reference category
for “top quartile HH income” is all respondents in the 80 percentile of household income.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10

Observing the output in the first trial, the size of the party identification coefficient
estimate presents a convincing case that RPA party identification is the leading predictor of the
incumbent vote. Specifically, one’s psychological attachment with the RPA increases their
probability of an incumbent vote share by approximately forty-two percentage points. In
addition, the inclusion of partisanship changes the direction and levels of statistical significance
of the age covariate. Whereas in two of the three trials in the sociological model (see Table 5.3)
the age covariate was statistically significant and in the expected direction, the addition of party
identification alters the directional relationship between age and incumbent vote intention. More
importantly, the relationship between age and incumbent vote share is no longer statistically
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significant. Employment status, on the other hand, retains its directional association with the
dependent variable, and the relationship remains statistically significant (***p ≤.01).119
The substantive impact of party identification is evident from the illustration in Figure 6.7
and Figure 6.8. The spatial distance between the employed covariate and RPA partisanship
(Figure 6.7) demonstrates the substantive significance of partisanship on incumbent vote
intention. This is further illustrated in Figure 6.8 by the forty-five-degree angle of the upward
sloping line. Whereas a respondent that does not identify with the RPA maintains a relatively
small probability of the RPA vote, having RPA partisanship dramatically increases the
probability of an RPA vote.

Figure 6.7: Regression Coefficient Plot (Armenia)

119

Collinearity issues between sociological covariates and party identification are not present in the output for both
Armenia and Georgia. A correlation matrix and a variance inflation factor test do not produce highly correlated
results between party identification and sociological variables.
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Figure 6.8: Adjusted Predictions

Robustness of Party Identification
To further test the robustness of party identification, I recode the variable to increase
response variance. In Table 6.4, partisanship is operationalized as a three-category item.
Respondents who disclosed a party identification other than RPA and respondents who did not
identify as partisans were coded as ‘1’; Respondents who claimed to be partisans but failed to
choose a particular party, by answering ‘don’t know’ or ‘refused to answer’, were coded as ‘2’;
Respondents who claimed to be partisans and identified with RPA were coded as ‘3’. Although
the revised operationalization of partisanship does in fact reduce the magnitude of the impact of
partisanship, it does not alter the statistical significance of the psychological covariate in any of
the three trials. In addition, the revised coding of party identification does not alter the
statistically significant (***p ≤.10) relationship between employment and incumbent vote
intention.
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Table 6.4: Robustness of Partisanship and the Vote (Armenia)
(I)
(II)

(III)

PS Age
Female
Rural

-.03 (.03)
.01 (.02)
-.02 (.03)

-.03 (.03)
.01 (.02)
-.02 (.03)

-.03 (.04)
.01 (.02)
-.02 (.03)

Higher Educated
Employed
Top Quartile HH Income

.01 (.02)
.04* (.02)
.004 (.03)

.01 (.02)
.04** (.02)
.02 (.03)

.01 (.02)
.04* (.02)
.004 (.01)

.17*** (.02)

.17*** (.02)

.17*** (.02)

No
No

Yes
No

No
Yes

Party Identification120
Region FE
Clustered SE

Obs.
1,059
1,059
1,059
LR Chi2
335.22***
348.49***
999.11***
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
.40
.42
.40
Note: Dependent variable is incumbent vote intention. Output is marginal effects. The omitted reference category for
‘college educated’ is all respondents without a college degree. The omitted reference category for ‘employed’ is all
respondents who are not employed (including retired, students, unemployed, etc.). The omitted reference category
for “top quartile HH income” is all respondents in the 80 percentile of household income.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10

Inferential Results: Georgia
Table 6.5 presents the updated incumbent vote function for the Georgian electorate.
Recall that the sociological model (See: Table 5.2) found four of the six covariates statistically
significant: age, education, employment, and household income. The inclusion of party
identification not only increases the explanatory power of the model, but also alters the impact of
sociological covariates on the dependent variable. First, we notice significant changes in both the
LR Chi-squared statistic and the pseudo R2 term. The inclusion of partisanship dramatically
improves the incumbent vote choice model.
Second, of the seven covariates, incumbent party identification is the leading predictor of
the vote for Georgian Dream. Specifically, a respondent who maintains a psychological

120

Coded as: 1 = no RPA Party ID (those who are not close to any party and those are close to non-RPA parties); 2
= DK/RA; 3 = RPA ID
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attachment to Georgian Dream is approximately twenty-six percentage points more likely to vote
for the incumbent than a voter who does not identify with Georgian Dream. The magnitude of
the coefficient estimate is almost half the size of the estimate found in the Armenian sample,
suggesting that the impact of partisanship on the vote choice is much less for the Georgian
sample than for the Armenian sample. As suggested earlier, this may be due to the fact that
Georgian Dream is a relatively new party while the RPA has been in government since 1999.
Table 6.5: Partisanship and the Vote (Georgia)
(I)
(II)
PS Age
Female
Rural
Higher Educated
Employed
Top Quartile HH Income
Party Identification
Region FE
Clustered SE

(III)

-.05*** (.01)
.01 (.01)
.01 (.01)

-.05*** (.01)
.01 (.01)
-.01 (.02)

-.05*** (.02)
.01 (.01)
-.01 (.01)

.01* (.01)
-.001 (.01)
.03* (.01)

.02* (.01)
.001 (.01)
.02 (.01)

.01 (.01)
-.001 (.01)
.03** (.01)

.26*** (.01)

.24*** (.02)

.26*** (.03)

No
No

Yes
No

No
Yes

Obs.
4,077
4,077
4,077
LR Chi2
1,972.54***
2,020.04***
1,742.05***
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
.54
.55
.54
Note: Dependent variable is incumbent vote intention. Output is marginal effects. The omitted reference category for
‘college educated’ is all respondents without a college degree. The omitted reference category for ‘employed’ is all
respondents who are not employed (including retired, students, unemployed, etc.). The omitted reference category
for “top quartile HH income” is all respondents in the 80 percentile of household income.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10

Finally, the addition of the party identification covariate alters the impact of employment
status and income in two of the three trials; only age remains statistically significant (***p ≤.01)
across the three trials. Based on the change in the statistical significance of the sociological vote
predictors, we can conclude that partisan identification alters the direct relationship between
sociological covariate and the vote choice, as predicted by SPM.
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Figure 6.9: Regression Coefficient Plot (Georgia)

Figure 6.10: Adjusted Predictions

The substantive significance of partisanship is illustrated in Figures 6.9 and 6.10. The
spatial difference between income and party identification points to the psychological variable’s
power in predicting the incumbent vote choice. Similar to the Armenian voter, in Figure 6.10, we
witness a forty-five degree upward sloping line that denotes the substantive significance of an
incumbent vote intention as we move between voters who do not identify with Georgian Dream
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and those who do. The two figures point to a dramatic shift in Georgian Dream support between
voters who identify with the incumbent party and those who do not.
Robustness of Party Identification
Table 6.6: Robustness of Partisanship and the Vote (Georgia)
(I)
(II)
PS Age
Female
Rural

(III)

-.04*** (.01)
.003 (.01)
.01** (.01)

-.04*** (.01)
.0004 (.01)
-.01 (.01)

-.04*** (.01)
.003 (.01)
.01 (.01)

Higher Educated
Employed
Top Quartile HH Income

.01** (.01)
.002 (.01)
.03** (.01)

.01** (.01)
.002 (.01)
.02* (.01)

.01* (.01)
.002 (.01_
.03** (.01)

Party Identification121

.12*** (.01)

.11*** (.01)

.12*** (.02)

No
No

Yes
No

No
Yes

Region FE
Clustered SE

Obs.
4,077
4,077
4,077
1,809.98***
1,870.34***
LR Chi2
729.93***
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
.49
.51
.49
Note: Dependent variable is incumbent vote intention. Output is marginal effects. The omitted reference category for
‘college educated’ is all respondents without a college degree. The omitted reference category for ‘employed’ is all
respondents who are not employed (including retired, students, unemployed, etc.). The omitted reference category
for “top quartile HH income” is all respondents in the 80 percentile of household income.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10

The findings in Table 6.6 provide further evidence of the strength of the party
identification covariate. Here too, I recode the partisanship variable from a dichotomous
structure to a categorical variable ranging between ‘1’ and ‘3’. The increase in response variance
does lessen the size of the coefficient estimate. However, across all three trials, the impact of
party identification on the Georgian Dream vote is statistically significant (***ρ ≤.01) and in the
expected direction. The results below suggest that the Georgian electorate is mainly driven by
their partisanship when casting a vote for Georgian Dream. Overall, the party identification

121

Coded as: 1 = no RPA Party ID (those who are not close to any party and those are close to non-RPA parties); 2
= DK/RA; 3 = RPA ID
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covariate performs as expected across all trials. The inclusion of incumbent partisan does
influence some sociological indicators, although post-Soviet age, higher education, and
household income retain their statistical significance in the hypothesized direction.
Conclusion
An anti-incumbent vote is perhaps the overarching political legacy of the Soviet Union. A
one-party state which led to the creation of anti-incumbent sentiment among its residents, the
Soviet political system was thought to prolong, even depress, the emergence of party
identification. In this chapter, we have witnessed that partisanship is in fact a leading predictor of
the vote for the incumbent across both Armenia and Georgia. Although the evidence presented in
this chapter furthers SPM’s explanatory power of voting behavior in the Caucasus, the findings
to create several important implications and grounds for future analysis. For instance, does
partisan also act as a leading predictor of the vote for non-incumbent parties? Furthermore, does
the relationship between partisanship and vote choice apply to non-competitive parties as well?
Taken together, the descriptive illustrations and inferential analyses point toward
heightened loyalty among RPA and Georgian Dream partisans. Then, to what extent are voter
perceptions of issues “rationalized” by their party identification? In the next chapter, I address
this important empirical question by adding prospective-pocketbook perceptions of the economy
to the model. The inclusion of respondent economic attitudes will then allow us to better
understand the extent to which partisanship impacts the vote choice.
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CHAPTER 7: ECONOMY & THE VOTE
The economy is an issue that concerns both democratically-elected governments and
competitive authoritarian leaders alike. This is evidenced by the volume of studies that have
assessed the impact of the economy on incumbent electoral fortunes, making economic voting
among the largest sub-fields of voting behavior (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier 2000; 2008; 2013). Economic voting posits a dichotomous action of electoral reward
and punishment (Key 1966; Lewis-Beck 1990). Since the general wellbeing of the economy is a
valence issue, then voters are expected to vote against the incumbent during distressful economic
periods but reward them during times of economic prosperity. The reward-punishment
dichotomy has been demonstrated across many polities and research suggests that voters orient
their economic judgements toward incumbent party (Benton 2005; Duch 2001; Key 1964), thus
making the electorate an incumbent-oriented economic voter.
In western liberal democracies, “free” voters periodically engage in economic voting. 122
Reelecting officials or ‘throwing the rascals out’ for the stewardship of the national economy is a
fundamental pillar of electoral accountability. In the Caucasus, “partially free”123 voters cast
ballots within a multiparty electoral environment, but parties of power routinely come out
victorious in elections due to their asymmetric access to state resources and manipulation of
media and bureaucratic organizations. Thus, elections in Armenia and Georgia are categorized as
“often unfree and almost always unfair” (Levitsky and Way 2010: 8).

122
The constantly changing business cycle creates an inconstant effect of the economy on elections (Singer 2011a;
2011b).
123
Fumagalli and Turmanidze (2017) refer to the Armenian and Georgian electorate as “partially free voters” in
reference to their Freedom House scores. Here I use the phrase “partially free” to refer to the regime type of both
Armenia and Georgia. Partially free regimes are synonymous with hybrid regimes (Levisky and Way 2010), a
category that applies to both Armenia and Georgia.
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If parties of power create “unbalanced” electoral playfields by constantly manipulating
the flow of information, then are “partially free” voters able to relate changes in their economic
situation to the electoral fortune (or misfortune) of the incumbent? That is, can the Armenian and
Georgian electorate base their vote function on prospective-egotropic perceptions of the
economy? This is the central question that the following chapter will address. In expanding the
vote function of the Armenian and Georgian electorate, I consider whether Armenian and
Georgian voters engage in economic voting, despite operating in a manipulated electoral
environment. The ability to relate pocketbook trends to support for the government is an
important aspect of electoral accountability, particularly in countries where the incumbent makes
every attempt to create an uneven playing field.
The rest of the chapter follows a similar path as the preceding three: prior to applying the
troika of methodological tests (bivariate illustration, tau-b correlation, binary response
regression), I discuss the evolution of the post-Soviet economy in Armenia and Georgia, and the
impact economic attitudes have had on both groups of voters. At the onset of post-Soviet
independence, both countries experienced an unprecedented drop in economic activity and a
collapse of the government’s role in managing economic affairs. Both countries responded to the
crisis by seeking external aid, all the while mismanaging the privatization of industry. This
facilitated the rise of patronal politics and further marginalized residents in both countries.
Instead of assisting in the transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented one,
the Armenian and Georgian state facilitated the creation an oligarchic economy, through
privatization schemes that witnessed the rise of oligarchs who controlled entire industries. The
continued mismanagement of economic affairs has thus forced voters emphasize their changes in
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their pocketbooks.124 Here, I find that while Armenians have become more optimistic about their
household’s relative economic situation, Georgian voters have become more pessimistic.
After a brief discussion of pocketbook perceptions, I test the impact of prospectiveegotropic perceptions on the economy on the incumbent vote choice.125 I start with a bivariate
illustration between the covariate of interest and the dependent variable. To test for any traces of
party rationalization, I also analyze the relationship between prospective-egotropic perceptions
and partisan identification. Next, I analyze the correlation coefficient between economic
perceptions and incumbent vote choice. I find a statistically significant and positive directional
relationship between the two variables. Finally, I include the covariate of interest in the vote
choice regression. I find that prospective-egotropic economic attitudes are a statistically
significant predictor of incumbent vote intention in both the Armenian and Georgian electorate.
As voter’s perceptions of their pocketbook increases they become more likely to vote for the
government.
The Economy & The Armenian Electorate
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia’s economy experienced an initial
downfall followed by a period of recovery. Despite averaging five percent GDP growth rate
between 1994 and 1999 (World Bank 2019), the state of economic affairs was dismal due to the
unprecedented drop in economic activity between 1991 and 1993. For example, in 1992 alone
GDP growth rate contracted by an astonishing forty-two percent (World Bank 2019). The

124

This is due to the dysconnectivity between the national economic barometer and the pocketbook of the average
Armenian or Georgian. The allocation of economic sectors to a handful of oligarchs and their associates created a
system where the growth of the economy did not trickle down to the pocketbook of the voter. Thus, sociotropic
changes in the economy have limited impact on changes in one’s pocketbook.
125
In this chapter, my analysis of economic perceptions is limited to pocketbook attitudes. This is because of data
availability and the fact that pocketbook perceptions of the economy tend to be prevalent in economically less
developed societies (Singer and Carlin 2013).
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economic crisis was partially triggered by an interstate war with neighboring Azerbaijan and a
blockade by neighboring Turkey. To help alleviate the economic distress, the government
applied to the International Monetary Foundation (IMF) for a Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) in
the amount of forty-four million US Dollars. This was followed by an Extended Credit in the
amount of 109 million US Dollars (IMF 2019).126 In turn, the Fund required Armenia to initiate a
multitude of market-friendly policies aimed at lessening the state’s presence in the economic
arena.
Armenia’s neoliberal reforms included steps taken to privatize the state’s inherited
industries and assets.127 The process of privatization became a main source of economic
malpractice. Armenia’s first president, Ter-Petrosyan, initiated patronal policies that saw his
family members oversee Armenia’s privatization commissions (Hale 2015). Ter-Petrosyan
placed his brothers into leadership roles of such commissions. In return, the brothers established
methods of privatization that led to the establishment of Armenia’s oligarchs and the foundation
of Ter-Petrosyan’s patronal network. Instead of creating competition amongst businesses and
ensuring the proper sale of state assets, the Ter-Petrosyan administration favored political
loyalists and members within Ter-Petrosyan’s patronal network.
After Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation, President Kocharyan (1998 – 2008) continued the
patronal framework established by his predecessor. Fortunately, for Kocharyan, his malpractice
was overshadowed by Armenia’s double-digit economic growth. During his tenure, Kocharyan
expanded his patronal network throughout Armenia’s businesses (Hale 2015). Instead of
reforming the economy and introducing market competition among firms, Kocharyan and

126
127

https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?memberkey1=35&date1Key=2017-02-28
The Armenian government inherited these industries from the Soviet Union.
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members of his family and inner circle seized control of sectors including importation of mobile
phones, oil imports, and gas stations (Hale 2015). By the end of his presidency, Kocharyan and
his family had accumulated stakeholder positions in dozens of Armenian businesses (Hetq
2018).128
The 2007-9 global financial market impacted Armenia’s construction boom and altered
its unprecedented economic growth. In 2009, the economy contracted by fourteen percent
(World Bank 2019). Total remittances received dropped from almost 2 billion US dollars in 2008
to 1.4 billion in 2009. This drop placed pressure in the valuation of Armenia’s currency, the
Dram. The country’s central bank responded by propping up the Dram. This policy proved
disastrous when the bank gave up the practice, which then led to a strong devalue of the Dram on
March 3 2009. That day, the Dram lost thirty percent of its value within a few hours (Garbis
2009129; Recknagel 2009130). Three days later, the government responded by seeking financial
assistance from the Fund to the tune of 500 million US Dollars (IMF 2019).
Since the financial fallout from 2008, Armenia’s economy has recovered but has yet to
return to the double-digit growth rates it witnessed in the 2000s. Today, Armenia maintains a
rising information technology sector, which accounts for four percent of its GDP, a number that
is comparable to economically advanced countries (Hovhannisyan 2018).131 Despite this, there
exists a duality of economies: a small, high-skilled economy that revolves around young, highly
educated Armenians and a large, low-skilled economy that is relies on remittances and tourism.
The duality has then led to a furthering of the income gap and wealth disparity. While
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https://hetq.am/en/article/92273
https://armenianweekly.com/2009/03/18/finding-common-ground-armenians-cope-with-a-floating-currency-rate/
130
https://www.rferl.org/a/Armenian_Currency_FreeFalls_As_Central_Bank_Ends_Intervention/1503438.html
131
https://finport.am/full_news.php?id=35132&lang=3
129
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approximately ten percent of families generate monthly incomes in excess of one-thousand US
Dollars, the majority of the population makes upwards to three-hundred US Dollars (ArmES
2017). The widening income gap has also led Armenians to assess economic progression through
their pocketbooks.
Figure 7.1: Perceived Relative Pocketbook Conditions in Armenia
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How do Armenians perceive their current pocketbook status? Figure 7.1 plots the positive
and negative perceptions of households who were asked about their pocketbook conditions
“relative to most households around them” (Caucasus Barometer 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012;
2013; 2015; 2017). This question differs from a standard egotropic perception questionnaire
because of the presence of relativity. Respondents were asked to assess their economic situation
relative to others. The results in Figure 7.1 point toward a decreasing trend of negative economic
perceptions. For instance, in 2008 twenty-three percent of respondents perceived a negative
wellbeing of their pocketbook in relation to others. By 2017, this statistic dropped by more than
half. At the other end, positive economic perceptions have gradually risen, though not at the
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same rate as negative perceptions have declined. In 2008, thirteen percent of respondents
disclosed a negative welling of their pocketbook in relation to others. In 2017, the number
slightly increased to seventeen percent.
The Economy & The Georgian Electorate
Georgia’s post-Soviet economic path followed a similar trajectory as its western
Caucasus neighbor. However, the economic collapse in Georgia was the most severe of all the
post-Soviet republics (Jones 2015). In the year following Soviet independence, Georgia’s GDP
growth rate declined by forty-five percent (World Bank 2019). The mercantilist policies taken by
the country’s first president, Gamsakhurdia, extended the economic pain as Georgia cut its
economic ties with Russia. This action only furthered the decline of trade which dropped by
almost sixty percent (Gurgenidze et al. 1994; Jones 2015). Georgia’s economic ills were the
combination of several factors that, unfortunately, were simultaneously present in the small
Caucasus republic. These included: the collapse of trade and production, cut off of all trade with
Russia, the eruption of a multidimensional civil war – between the Zviadists and their enemies,
and between the Georgian forces and the Abkhaz and South Ossetian nationalists – that led to a
period of non-government, and the constant presence of corruption and the black market (Jones
2015).
The Shevardnadze presidency (1994 – 2003) attempted to reroute Georgia towards a
prosperous path. Upon taking the presidency, Shevardnadze sought to curbe rising inflation,
which reached 160 percent in 1995 (World Bank 2019). This required Georgia to seek IMF
assistance and initiate neoliberal economic reforms. Naturally, the market-oriented reforms
reduced the government’s role in the economy through deregulation and privatization. However,
Shevardnadze’s economic reforms also brought about decreases in public expenditures, which
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then weakened labor markets and led to a rise unemployment (Jones 2015; World Bank 2019).
Shevardnadze’s initiation of privatization did not occur under the auspices of the IMF. Instead,
Georgia’s policy to relinquish the state’s ownership of factories and other resources occurred
similar to that of Armenia and rest of the region. Preference was given to sub-patrons within
Shevardnadze’s network, particular members of his extended family (Hale 2015). Thus, despite
Shevardnadze’s rhetoric to “open” Georgia’s economy to the west, Georgia ended up being
“monopolized” rather than “marketized” (Jones 2015: 183).
The Saakashvili presidency (2004 – 2012) attempted to steer Georgia’s economy off of
the patronal path that Shevardnadze geared it toward. Saakashvili’s economic reforms involved a
two-pronged approach: opening Georgia’s markets to western investors and seeking criminal
prosecution of entrepreneurs operating the black market. Internally, these policies led to greater
compliance, including the government’s initiative to increase its revenue collection. For instance,
between 2003 and 2008, government revenue from taxes rose from fourteen percent of GDP to
twenty-five percent of GDP (Jones 2015). However, the government’s notion of Georgian
companies flourishing in the global market did not come to fruition. According to Jones (2015),
the laissez-faire approach of Saakashvili towards not leveraging local companies to compete with
international firms, meant that Georgia’s infant industries, left on their own, could not
successfully compete with much mature global firms.
The global financial recession halted Georgia’s macroeconomic growth as the country
went into recession in 2009. Until his last years in office, Saakashvili’s economic agenda lacked
a comprehensive policy towards social welfare. The government’s pursuit opening Georgia to
the West and riding the country of corruption failed to resonate with voters, who increasingly
became hostile of Saakashvili and UNM, and shifted their support towards Georgian Dream.
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Georgia’s new party of power emphasized the role of social welfare and the pocketbook of the
Georgian voter. The new government’s economic policy involved a economic détente with
Russia and a nation-wide promise to create jobs. Although relations with Russia are still limited
in terms of trade, Georgian Dream has managed to lower the unemployment rate from twentypercent in 2012 to just under fourteen percent in fourteen percent in 2017. That said, access to
employment continues to be the single most important issue for the Georgian electorate (GPAS
2016).
Figure 7.2: Perceived Relative Pocketbook Conditions in Georgia
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The salience of employment opportunities among the Georgian population points toward
an electorate that primes pocketbook measures of the economy. In Figure 7.2, I trace the
pocketbook conditions of Georgian voters relative to their fellow citizens. Here, we witness the
impact that the global financial recession had on Georgian voters. From 2008 to 2009, negative
pocketbook perceptions increased by twenty-five percent, while positive perceptions decreased
by twenty-one percent. Since then, Georgian voters have maintained a net negative perception
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index. However, since the incumbency of Georgian Dream negative perceptions have decreased
from twenty-seven percent to eighteen percent, but positive perceptions have remained flat.
Compared Figures 7.1 and 7.2, we find that Armenians are generally more optimistic
about their relative economic situations than are Georgians. We also witness that the impact of
the great financial recession was largely in Georgia than in Armenia, as evidence by the rise of
negative perceptions in the former country. Finally, the percent of Armenians with positive
pocketbook perceptions has gradually increased, while in Georgia this statistic has remained flat.
In sum, the figures above portray a greater sense of economic insecurity among the Georgian
electorate than the Armenian. In the next section, I expand pocketbook analysis and assess how
both groups consider changes in their household’s future economic status.
Bivariate Analysis
The 2017 ArmES asked respondents, “what are your expectations regarding the
economic situation of your household for the next twelve months?” Figure 7.3 illustrates the
distribution of responses among the 1,062 respondents. A plurality of respondents (480, or fortyfive percent of respondents) provided a neutral answer claiming that they expect their
household’s economic situation to remain the same through 2018. This was followed by an
optimistic claim (289, or twenty-seven percent of respondents) that their household’s economic
situation will improve somewhat. Some 139 respondents (or thirteen percent of respondents)
disclosed a pessimistic perception of their prospective-egotropic wellbeing, predicting that their
household’s economic situation will worsen somewhat. Overall, the distribution of responses
points toward an electorate that is relatively optimistic about their household’s future economic
situation.
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Figure 7.3: Economic Perceptions in Armenia
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Figure 7.4: Economic Perceptions in Georgia
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In Georgia, we find a similar trend with voters optimistic about their household’s
economic future. Although the respondent sample size is larger, a plurality of Georgian residents
(1,830, or forty-four percent) also disclosed a neutral response when asked about their
prospective-egotropic perceptions of the economy. This was followed by some 930 respondents
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(or twenty-three percent) who claimed that their household’s future economic situation will
improve somewhat. Only 310 respondents (eight percent) claimed that their situation will worsen
somewhat, while an even small number of ninety-five respondents (two percent) mentioned their
household’s financial situation will worsen a lot. Thus, Georgian voters appear equally optimistic
as Armenian voters, but are less pessimistic about their household’s economic future.
Figure 7.5: Economic Perceptions by Partisanship (Armenia)
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Given the distribution of responses above, to what extent are voter economic perceptions
being influence by partisan identification? Recall that the authors of SPM claimed the presence
of partisan rationalization among the voting public (see: Campbell et al. 1960). To test the
relationship between party identification and economic perceptions, Figures 7.5 and 7.6 plot the
distribution of prospective-egotropic perceptions across partisanship. Here, we witness that the
majority of RPA partisans perceived a positive shift in their future economic wellbeing. Fiftyfour percent of RPA partisans noted that their household’s economic situation would ‘improve
somewhat’ in the future. In addition, economic pessimism was lowest among RPA supporters,
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with twelve percent of RPA partisans noting that their economic situation will turn for the worse.
When analyzing PAP partisans, we find that their level of optimism is the lowest among the
group with twenty-four percent of respondents disclosing that their economic situation would
‘improve somewhat’. Thus, the bivariate illustration provides some evidence of partisan
rationalization among Armenian voters.132
Figure 7.6: Economic Perceptions by Partisanship (Georgia)
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In Georgia, we find a similar trend between positive perceptions of the economy among
Georgian Dream partisans. In fact, forty-two percent of individuals who identify with Georgian
Dream perceived that their household’s future economic status ‘will improve somewhat’. Not
surprisingly, the lowest percent of optimism is recorded among UNM supporters. Here, only
fourteen percent considered their future economic status as ‘improve somewhat’. In all, we find
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The bivariate relationship does not test for causality. That is, the illustration does not support the notion the
partisan identification causes greater or less economic optimism. It does however, point toward a relationship
between the two variables.
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that both Armenian and Georgian voters who identify with the incumbent party are more likely
to possess a positive economic outlook than voters who identify with the main opposition party.
Figure 7.7: Economic Perceptions and Vote Preference (Armenia)
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Figure 7.8: Economic Perceptions and Vote Preference (Georgia)
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Given a relationship between economic perceptions and partisanship, do Armenian and
Georgian voters relate their economics perceptions with vote choice? Figures 7.7 and 7.8 provide
evidence towards the claim that voters in the Caucasus associate positive economic wellbeing
with incumbent vote intention. In Figure 7.7, we find that forty-five percent of RPA supporters
mentioned that their household’s economic situation would ‘improve somewhat’. Among PAP
voters, the percentage of a positive economic look registers the lower at only twenty-five
percent. In Figure 7.8, we find a similar trend with Georgian voters. Among Georgian Dream
voters, forty-five percent disclosed “somewhat” improvement in their household’s economic
future. The lowest percentage of positive economic perception was registered among UNM
voters, sixteen percent of whom reported “somewhat” of an improvement. The illustrative results
in the figures below furthers the two hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2: that positive perceptions
of the economy will be associated with increased incumbent vote intention.
Correlation
Before shifting our attention to the multivariate analysis, I briefly discuss the bivariate
correlation between prospective-egotropic perceptions of the economy and incumbent vote
intention. Table 7.1 and 7.2 report the tau-b correlation coefficient for the Armenian and
Georgian electorate. Here, a positive relationship suggests that an increase in economic
wellbeing is associated with higher vote intention for the incumbent. The output below points
toward a positive, statically significant (***p ≤.01) relationship between the “economy”
covariate and the dependent variable. This is in line with the two hypotheses outlined in Chapter
2. When we explore the relationship further, we find that the tau-b measurement for the
Armenian sample (0.1323) is almost half the size of the Georgian sample (0.2564). The
difference not only suggests that the bivariate relationship between economic attitudes and
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incumbent vote intention is stronger among the Georgian electorate than the Armenian electorate
but may hint at a similar output in the multivariate results below.
Table 7.1: Economic Perceptions and RPA Vote Intention
Prospective-Egotropic Attitudes
0.1323***
Note: ***p ≤.01; p **≤.05; p *≤.10

Table 7.2: Economic Perceptions and Georgian Dream Vote Intention
Prospective-Egotropic Attitudes
0.2564***
Note: ***p ≤.01; p **≤.05; p *≤.10

How does the output above relate to tau-b measures in previous chapters? At first glance,
it is clear that the correlation levels are nowhere near the magnitude of partisan identification and
the vote. Recall that the correlation levels between the latter two variables were 0.7219 and
0.7547, respectively. In comparison, the tau-b measures for economic attitudes are a fraction of
party identification output. Beyond the psychological variable, we find that the statistics above
perform quite well in relation to the six sociological variables: age, sex, residence, education,
employment, and income. In none of the six preceding variables, do we find the tau-b statistic
greater than the output above. This may point us toward a similar hierarchy in the multivariate
analysis. That is, the strength of the bivariate relationship may be a heuristic of how each
covariate will perform in the Tables and Figures below. Thus, I expect the incumbent vote choice
to be influenced by partisanship and economic perceptions, above all. To test this, we shift our
attention to the section below.
Inferential Results: Armenia
The regression output with the inclusion of the “economy” covariate is found in Table
7.3. In the case of the Armenian electorate, a positive change in the prospective-egotropic
perception of the economy is associated with a higher probability for an RPA vote by
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approximately three percentage points. Armenians who perceive a positive change in their
household’s economic situation in the next twelve months are more likely to support RPA than
those who perceive negative or no change in their prospective-egotropic economic attitudes. The
statistical significance of the economy covariate suggests that its effect on the incumbent vote
intention is independent of party identification.
Table 7.3: Economy and the Vote (Armenia)
(I)
(II)

(III)

PS Age
Female
Rural

-.06* (.03)
.01 (.02)
-.03 (.03)

-.05* (.03)
.01 (.02)
-.03 (.03)

-.06* (.03)
.01 (.02)
-.03 (.04)

Higher Educated
Employed
Top Quartile HH Income

.004 (.02)
.04** (.02)
.004 (.03)

.01 (.02)
.04** (.02)
.02 (.03)

.004 (.02)
.04* (.02)
.004 (.01)

Party Identification

.41*** (.06)

.39*** (.06)

.41*** (.06)

Economy

.03** (.01)

.03* (.02)

.03** (.01)

No
No

Yes
No

No
Yes

Region FE
Clustered SE

Obs.
1,059
1,059
1,059
LR Chi2
369.36***
382.90***
1,247.49***
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
.44
.46
.44
Note: Dependent variable is incumbent vote intention. Output is marginal effects. The omitted reference category for
‘college educated’ is all respondents without a college degree. The omitted reference category for ‘employed’ is all
respondents who are not employed (including retired, students, unemployed, etc.). The omitted reference category
for “top quartile HH income” is all respondents in the 80 percentile of household income.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10

How does the addition of the “economy” variable impact other covariates and the overall
model? In Table 7.3, we notice that its addition changes the relationship between one
sociological variable and the vote. Recall that in Chapter 6, inclusion of party identification led
the age covariate to lose its statistical significance. Here, we witness that the age covariate has
regained its significant relationship with RPA vote intention. Beyond age, the statistical
significance and magnitude of other variables remain unchanged. The addition of the “economy’
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covariate also improves the predictability of the model as evidenced by the LR Chi-squared and
the Pseudo R-squared statistic across the first two trials.
The next two figures, Figure 7.9 and 7.10, illustrate the substantive significance of the
“economy” covariate. Figure 7.9 presents the regression coefficients in a plot format, which
allows us to compare the spatial distance of the marginal effects. From the figure below, it is
clear that the Armenian voter is predominately influenced by party identification with
pocketbook perceptions registered a marginal impact on the vote. Figure 7.10 distribution the
probability of an RPA vote across the five types of pocketbook wellbeing response items.
According to economic voting theory, we expect to witness a linear, upward sloping line
suggesting a greater probability of an incumbent vote at each ‘higher’ level of wellbeing. As
expected, the illustration in Figure 7.11 encompasses a linear line and narrow confidence
intervals around the center. This is due to the large number of respondents who reported either
no changes in their economic situation or “somewhat” changes (in either direction) in their
pocketbook perceptions.
Figure 7.9: Regression Coefficient Plot (Armenia)
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Figure 7.10: Adjusted Predictions

The output in this section comprises the three blocks of the funnel-of-causality and can be
interpreted as the final incumbent vote choice model for the Armenian electorate. With the final
vote choice model presented in Table 7.3, what type of an empirical image do the results
suggest? First, we find that RPA party identification is, by far, the leading predictor of the vote
for the incumbent. The difference in the magnitude of the party identification coefficient with the
rest of the covariates is quite large (see Figure 7.9).
Second, Armenian voters are also economic voters. Two of the four statistically
significant covariates, employment and prospective-egotropic economic attitudes, are driving the
vote for the RPA. In fact, the magnitude of the employment statistic (.04) surpasses that of the
prospective-egotropic coefficient estimate (.03). The impact of the economy on the incumbent
vote function is hardly surprising. In both the 2017 and 2018 ArmES study, the overwhelming
majority of Armenians disclosed “jobs” as the most important issue facing the country.
Furthermore, as outlined in the section above, Armenia’s widening income gap and the rise of a
highly-skilled, IT-driven middle class has led to employment becoming more lucrative and
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demanding. All this point toward an Armenian electorate whose electoral judgements are
influenced by their personal economic motives.
Finally, youth is also a significant predictor of the vote, although its impact is not as
constant across the twelve trials introduced in this study. This is perhaps the most foretelling
result as the 2018 velvet revolution was largely orchestrated and led by youth movements. The
“take a step, reject Serzh” and “take a step, reject RPA” slogans were at the foundation of youth
protestors. In fact, the youth movement was the most active and idealistic among Pashinyan’s
coalition groups. From blocking subway carts from leaving their stops to shutting down
Armenia’s higher education system, by having systemic walkouts from class, Armenia’s youth,
similar to Georgia’s Kmara movement, was instrumental in bringing about the end of the
Sargsyan regime and the RPA.
Inferential Results: Georgia
Next, we shift out attention to the Georgian electorate. The results with addition of
prospective-egotropic perceptions are presented in Table 7.4. For Georgian voters, an increase in
their prospective-egotropic wellbeing is associated with a three-percentage point increase in the
vote for Georgian Dream. This is constant across all three trials. Beyond the statistically
significant relationship (***p ≤.01), we find that the addition of the “economy” covariate alters
the impact of other variables. Specifically, the addition of prospective-egotropic perceptions
shifts the relationship between education and incumbent vote intention. That relationship is no
longer significant. The inclusion of the economy covariate also impacts the level of significance
between income and vote intention in the baseline model. In the previous chapter, the
relationship between income and vote intention was significant at the [p ≤.05] level. However,
with the addition of the economy covariate the significance drops down to [p ≤.10].
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Table 7.4: Economy and the Vote (Georgia)
(I)
(II)
PS Age
Female
Rural

-.05*** (.01)
.01 (.01)
.004 (.01)

Higher Educated
Employed
Top Quartile HH Income

(III)

-.05*** (.01)
.01 (.02)
-.01 (.02)

-.05*** (.02)
.01 (.02)
.004 (.01)

.01 (.01)
-.004 (.01)
.03* (.01)

.01 (.02)
-.003 (.01)
.02 (.01)

.01 (.01)
-.004 (.01)
.03** (.01)

Party Identification

.24*** (.02)

.23*** (.02)

.24*** (.03)

Economy

.03*** (.01)

.03*** (.01)

.03*** (.01)

No
No

Yes
No

No
Yes

Region FE
Clustered SE

Obs.
4,077
4,077
4,077
LR Chi2
2,008.66***
2,053.47***
8,805.78***
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
.55
.56
.55
Note: Dependent variable is incumbent vote intention. Output is marginal effects. The omitted reference category for
‘college educated’ is all respondents without a college degree. The omitted reference category for ‘employed’ is all
respondents who are not employed (including retired, students, unemployed, etc.). The omitted reference category
for “top quartile HH income” is all respondents in the 80 percentile of household income.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10

The results in Table 7.4 can be interpreted as the full incumbent vote choice model for
the Georgian electorate. The findings suggest that Georgian voters rely on a mixture of
sociological and psychological variables when assessing the electoral performance of the
incumbent. Although both sociological and psychological factors influence the incumbent vote
choice, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates illustrates a hierarchy of voting impact. First,
party identification has the largest impact on the vote choice with an estimated twenty-four
percentage point increase in the vote for Georgian Dream among the portion of the electorate
who identifies with the party of power. Second, we find that the impact of being born after the
fall of the Soviet Union negatively impacts the vote for Georgian Dream by approximately five
percentage points. Third, we find a three-percentage point increase in voting for Georgian Dream
among voters who perceive a prospective positive change in their household’s economic
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wellbeing. Finally, voters who are in the top quartile income bracket are more three percentage
points more likely to vote for Georgian Dream, although the significance of this relationship is
not constant across the three trials. All this suggests that the Georgian incumbent vote choice is
influenced by party identification, the economy, and post-Soviet age.
Figure 7.11: Regression Coefficient Plot (Georgia)

Figure 7.12: Adjusted Predictions

Beyond statistical significance, what is the substantive impact each covariate in the
model above? In Figure 7.11 and 7.12, I illustrate the substantive significance of the vote choice
180

model for the Georgian electorate. Below, we notice that the substantive significance of
prospective-egotropic economic perceptions is quote limited, when taking the impact of party
identification in account. The spatial distance between Georgian Dream partisanship and the
“economy” covariate points to an electorate whose vote function is almost entirely consumed by
partisanship. In Figure 7.12, we the linear, upward sloping line points to increased probability for
Georgian Dream as we move up each level of economic wellbeing. Despite this expected
relationship, its impact on the probability for a Georgian Dream vote is quote limited. All this
points to the fact that while economic measures drive the Georgian electorate (economic
perceptions and income), they dwarf in comparison to partisanship.
Conclusion
This chapter tested the impact of economic perceptions on incumbent vote intention.
Considered a salient issue within the vote function, the economy’s role in electoral outcomes has
been extensively studied elsewhere. In Armenia and Georgia, the sudden decline in the standard
of living, following the collapse of the USSR, paved the way for economic concerns to be the
core foundation of how Armenians and Georgians prioritize the role of issues in their vote
calculus. The saliency given to jobs, the widening income gap, and the primacy of pocketbook
concerns made egotropic perceptions a natural proxy of the economic vote.
The addition of economic attitudes into the voting choice led to the completion of the
model and to the following two conclusions. First, the economy maintains an independent impact
on the vote for the Armenian and Georgian electorate. Although within both groups of voters,
those who identify with the incumbent tend to have higher percentages of an optimistic economic
outlook, the multivariate results suggest that prospective-egotropic attitudes independently
influence the incumbent vote intention. This is an important finding for works that advocate for
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the presence of economic voting. The ever-expanding literature now includes two new cases
studies furthering its universal reach.
Second, the economic impact on the vote appears to be identical for the Armenian and
Georgian electorate. Comparing Figure 7.10 and 7.11 we find a similar linear pattern of
increased economic wellbeing and higher probability of incumbent vote intention. It is important
to note the relationship maintains its linear path across the five-categories of economic
wellbeing. This points to actual differences in how voters in the Caucasus evaluate the
incumbent based on the specific type of economic perception they possess.
In the final chapter of this dissertation, I expand on the behavioral traits of the Armenian
and Georgian voter and discuss the extent to which SPM accurately predicted the vote calculus
of each electorate.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
What is the value of voting behavior analyses in the post-Soviet space? Historically,
“taking partly free voters seriously”133 was often overlooked by scholars because of the limited
“fruits” of such research. In competitive authoritarian regimes, where elections become political
theatre for the incumbent to extend its rule, the will of the voters is of second-order importance,
and often does not correspond to election results. Further academic neglect is due to the validity
of electoral results, which compromises the ability to conduct aggregate-based research.
However, the institutional “window-dressing” and the uneven playfield in electoral settings,
should not drive away curious minds. Instead, it should refocus attention towards the behavioral
traits of post-Soviet voters themselves. What sort of components impact the decision to vote?
Which type of indicators influence the vote choice? Are voters driven by sociological or
psychological vote determinants? How does party volatility impact political socialization? These
are only a handful of questions that that yet to be addressed.
The preceding four chapters attempted to fill the void and provide insight into post-Soviet
voter behavior through a study of the electorate in the Caucasus. This region consists of two
competitive authoritarian regimes that provide voters with the opportunity to cast ballots in
reoccurring, uninterrupted elections. The Armenian and Georgian electorate routinely participate
in multiparty elections, but the competitive nature of such elections is almost always skewed in
favor of the party of power. This creates a disequilibrium between the will of the voters and the
final aggregate election results. Furthermore, it complicates the process of partisan development
and party identification because both regimes are categorized by large party volatility and parties

133

A reference (and homage) to Fumagalli and Turmanidze (2017) for their endeavor in voting practices among the
Armenian and Georgian electorate.

183

are not structured along ideological lines. If the emergence of the two “anchor” variables (party
identification and ideology) is complicates, does SPM apply to voting behavior in Armenia and
Georgia?
In this dissertation, I set out to model the post-Soviet voter through a western-based
theory of voting behavior. Each chapter tested the applicability of SPM with two groups of
voters in the Caucasus. The results point toward an electorate whose behavioral traits are
commensurate with SPM. Despite the infancy of multiparty elections in the region; Despite
Armenia’s and Georgia’s infant party system; And, despite reoccurring elections that are not
necessarily free or fair, voters in the Caucasus base their electoral judgements on a combination
of political and economic considerations. However, it would be premature to conclude this
dissertation with the following: that voting behavior traits of Armenian and Georgian voters
mirror the political behavior in western liberal democracies. The similarities observed in this
dissertation should not overshadow the differences that exist between the post-Soviet electorate
and their counterparts in the West.
The rest of the concluding chapter proceeds in the following order: The first section
summarizes the behavioral traits of the Armenian and Georgian voter and provides a
comparative analysis of both electorate groups. The second section applies the findings of both
groups to the wider post-Soviet region. The central role of parties of power not only creates
incumbent-centric voters in Armenia and Georgia but also throughout much of the post-Soviet
republics. In the final section, I propose avenues of future research that can help expand our
understanding of the post-Soviet voter. Specifically, I call for future works to analyze the
emergence of party identification in the region and the process by which individuals become
political socialized. From previous works, we find that the patronal nature of politics and the lack
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of institutional autonomy in the post-Soviet region “personalizes” political participation. How
does this personalization effect then impact the development of party identification and party
rationalization? I conclude the chapter and the dissertation by suggesting two paths of partisan
development in the post-Soviet region.
Voters in the Caucasus
At the onset of independence, Armenia and Georgia followed a similar path of political
development and economic reform. Both countries witnessed an initial party of power that was
short-lived due to internal political instability. In addition, both countries undertook neoliberal
economic reforms to ease the pressure of unstable macroeconomic indicators. However, the
evolution of parties of power was quite different in Georgia than in Armenia. The reoccurring
internal instability of the former country resulted in shorter periods of incumbent rule. In
contrast, the RPA in Armenia ruled for almost two decades. Ultimately, the RPA was brought
down in a similar, non-violent manner as the CUG in 2003.
The above description should predict similar sociological traits between Armenian and
Georgian voters. The rise of parties of power, the mismanagement of economic reform and the
competitive authoritarian nature of both regimes will result in voting behavioral traits that
emphasize youth and income disparity. Fortunately, the vote function of Armenian and Georgian
voters is relatable to the context of post-Soviet political and economic development. Young
voters in both countries display behavioral traits that are antithetical towards incumbent support.
In fact, the magnitude of the impact is nearly identical (see: Table 7.3 and 7.4) across the two
regimes. Why are younger voters less supportive of the incumbent? The answer to this question
is found in the historical analysis of the rose revolution and the velvet revolution. In both cases,
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youth protest was due to corruption, electoral fraud, politicization of the education system and an
overall lack of opportunities in the country.
Beyond youthfulness, we find that socioeconomic factors also impact the vote, albeit with
varying indicators. In Armenia, voters who are employed are more likely to intend to vote for the
RPA. Thus, employment translates to a positive referendum on the incumbent. In Georgia, voters
who are in the top quartile of the household income bracket are more likely to support Georgian
Dream. At first, the varying socioeconomic indicators may point to contrasting behavioral traits
among the two groups. However, we can consider employment status and household income to
be proxies of monetary resources. In both Armenia and Georgia, where social welfare is quite
limited and where retirement pensions are a fraction of the median household income, access to
monetary resources are a salient factor towards judging the incumbent. Thus, both groups of
voters relate their access to monetary resources with incumbent support.
Moving toward psychological factors, we find that voters in the Caucasus rely on party
identification when casting a vote for the government. In both Armenia and Georgia, incumbent
partisanship is, by far, the largest predictor of incumbent vote choice. How does this finding
relate to SPM and the overall polity in both countries? Recall that the party system in Armenia
and Georgia is defined by a high level of party volatility. However, this is often limited to nonincumbent parties. That is, parties of power often survive for decades on end. For example, the
RPA has been in existence for almost three decades, while Georgian Dream has existed for
almost a decade. Surely, if partisanship is to exist in Armenia and Georgia, it will most likely to
exist among voters who identify with the party of power. Thus, the fact that incumbent vote
intention is driven by partisanship is not all that surprising when considering the political
maturity both parties. Finally, the association between incumbent partisanship and vote intention
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is commensurate with SPM, and the finding strengthens the applicability of SPM in the
Caucasus.
Another psychological force that both Armenian and Georgian voters rely on is their
perception of the economy. Here we find that voters in the Caucasus are driven by prospective
and egotropic economic attitudes. The prevalence of pocketbook perceptions not only
corresponds to the income-based socioeconomic traits mentioned earlier, but also to evidence
suggesting lower income voters emphasize pocketbook attitudes (Singer and Carlin 2013). Why
are voters in the Caucasus priming pocketbook perceptions of the economy? One reason may be
the dysconnectivity between macroeconomic perceptions indicators and the socioeconomic
status of much of the people. As discussed earlier, the wealth gap may trigger the prevalence of
pocketbook attitudes since both Armenia and Georgia have struggled with median income
growths since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Table 8.1: Confirmation of Hypotheses
Hypotheses

Armenia

Georgia

H1: Young voters are less likely to vote for the incumbent.
H2: Female voters are less likely to vote for the incumbent.
H3: Rural voters are more likely to vote for the incumbent.
H4: College educated voters are less likely to vote for the incumbent.
H5: Employed voters are more likely to vote for the incumbent.
H6: Voters whose household income is in the top quartile bracket are more
likely to vote for the incumbent.
H7: Voters who identify with the incumbent party are more likely to vote for
the incumbent.
H8: Voters who perceive a positive change in their prospective-egotropic
economic perception are more likely to vote for the incumbent.

Confirmed
Rejected
Rejected
Rejected
Confirmed
Rejected

Confirmed
Rejected
Rejected
Rejected
Rejected
Confirmed

Confirmed

Confirmed

Confirmed

Confirmed

Voters in the post-Soviet Space
Can the vote functions of Armenian and Georgian electorate apply to voters in the rest of
the post-Soviet region? A preliminary observation points toward the ability to generalize what
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we have learned about the Armenian and Georgian voter to the rest of the region. This is due to
the similar nature of politics and parties across the region. According to Hale (2015) political
relations in the post-Soviet space takes the form of patronalism. In addition, according to
Levitsky and Way (2010), the post-Soviet region consists of stable competitive authoritarian
regimes, unstable competitive authoritarian regimes, and full authoritarian regimes. The
difference between the first two and the latter is the degree to which the party of power allows
the opposition to contest the position of the executive (Levitsky and Way 2010: 23). The full
authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan may fully prevent the development of partisan
identity among opposition groups but the system does allow the sustainability of incumbentoriented partisanship, since parties of power in full authoritarian regimes tend to have similar
levels of existence as their counterparts in competitive authoritarian regimes. Thus, we expect
partisanship to be the driver of the vote in Armenia as well as in Azerbaijan or Kyrgyzstan. This
is because in the latter regimes, the only type of partisan identification that can emergence and
flourish is an incumbent-based one.
Besides partisanship, can voters in the rest of the post-Soviet space rely on sociological
groups and perceptions of the economy? The wave of counter-incumbent protests may suggest
that voters in Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and the rest of the region have similar
sociological behavioral traits. In the region, the youth has been the most vocal opposition of the
government, leading protests against civil liberty abuses in Azerbaijan, orchestrating the Maidan
movement in Ukraine, and Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan. The dissatisfaction with the
incumbent among the region’s youth is due to similar concerns: prevalence of corruption,
mismanagement of the economy, and lack of opportunities. Thus, a cross-national study of the
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post-Soviet voting behavior may disclose the same result as in the Caucasus: that post-Soviet
voters are less likely to vote for the incumbent.
Regarding the prevalence of socioeconomic factors, the region’s experience with
economic restructuring towards capitalism brought about similar results of increased income
inequality. Throughout much of the post-Soviet space, this remains to be unresolved and wealth
in the region is tied to acceptance of the regime. That is, anti-government businesses and wealthy
individuals are quite rare in the region. Thus, we can assume that one’s employment status or
location in the income bracket may relate to their satisfaction and approval of the government.
Direction of Future Research
In this dissertation, I traced the vote function of the Armenian and Georgian electorate.
The results here extend our understanding of voting behavior, as theorized by SPM, into nondemocratic polities with volatile party systems. Although voters in Armenia and Georgia rely on
a combination of sociological and psychological behavioral traits when casting a ballot, the
results here lead to further questions about political behavior in the post-Soviet region.
First, this study has identified the relationship between incumbent partisanship and vote
choice. Although voters who identify with either the RPA or Georgian Dream are more likely to
vote for that party during an election, my analysis did not investigate the emergence of party
identification in the Caucasus. Nor did my study empirically test the process by which political
socialization occurs in Armenia and Georgia. Future work may consider analyzing political
socialization in the region. Is it driven by agents such as one’s family, peers, teacher, events,
etc.? Or is the process of political socialization void of any direct influence and instead is
primarily driven by charismatic political leaders? In the West, the conventional theory surrounds
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the work of Herbert Hyman (1959) who suggested that “political behavior is learned behavior”
(Hyman 10) that is transferred from the family and other primary agents. However, in the postSoviet region parties lack existence beyond a few years. In addition, the prevalence of
charismatic politicians, the existence of patronal politics, and the volatility of party systems may
relate political socialization with political personalities.
Figure 8.1: Proposed Path of Party Identification in the Post-Soviet region

Voter

Party Leader

Party ID

Voter

Personal
Acquitance

Party ID

Second, this study operationalized partisanship through identification with a political
organization. In reality, the post-Soviet space is dominant with personality types who create
parties and use them as vehicles for their political ambitions. In this sense one’s identification
with a particular party may come into existence through identification with the party leader.
Alternatively, voters in the region may identify with a particular party through a personal
acquittances. Here, identification is purely rational and void of any abstract notion of ideology or
psychological attachment. Identification primarily occurs because of anticipated material gain.134
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This can be related to Hale’s (2015) discussion of the theory of expectations.
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Thus, future research can explore this topic by analyzing whether post-Soviet voters, particularly
in the Caucasus, identify with the party leader more so than the party? Or do post-Soviet voters
rely on acquittances to identify with a particular party? If it is the latter two, then the type of
partisanship present in the region is quite different from what has been documented in the West.
Third, this study analyzed sociological questions present in both surveys. In Appendix B,
I include a regression output that is specified to Armenia. One of the main findings is the
influence of public employment on incumbent vote intention. In fact, this result strengthens the
applicability of patronal politics in the field of voting behavior. Unfortunately, GPAS did not
include a question relating to public employment. More importantly, it omitted a question about
the respondent’s religion. Future surveys and research analyzing the post-Soviet vote can
consider the impact of both sociological variables. The rejuvenation of religious practices
following the collapse of the Soviet Union has been documented elsewhere (Agadjanian et al.
2017). Whether its impact is felt in the voting booth remains to be seen.
Finally, this study tested the impact of sociological and psychological factors of voting
behavior. In the west, scholars have divided these factors into short-term or long-term indicators
(see: Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2016). Sociological predictors of the vote as well as party
identification are considered long-term forces because their impact rarely changes from election
to election. By contrast, issues are considered short-term indicators because the impact of an
issue tends to differ from election to election. Future works analyzing political behavior in the
post-Soviet region may consider whether sociological indicators and party identification are
long-term indicators of the vote and whether the constant salience of the economy categorizes
the issue as a long-term determinant of the vote.
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Appendix A: Alternative Models for Non-Responses
Table A1: Non-Responses in Armenia
PS Age
Female
Rural
Higher Educated
Employed
Top Quartile HH Income
Party Identification
Economy
Region FE
Clustered SE

DK/RA Omitted
-.12 (.08)
.03 (.06)
-.07 (.08)

RA Omitted
-.07* (.04)
.01 (.03)
-.03 (.04)

DK/RA = 1
.06 (.04)
.06* (.03)
-.03 (.04)

.02 (.06)
.12** (.06)
.02 (.07)

.01 (.03)
.07** (.03)
.01 (.04)

.04 (.03)
.05 (.03)
-.02 (.05)

1.18*** (.28)

.55*** (.09)

-.70*** (.11)

.07* (.04)

.04** (.02)

.002 (.03)

No
No

No
No

No
No

Obs.
575
878
1,059
LR Chi2
291.10***
349.04***
86.78***
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
.45
.45
.06
Note: In the first trial, the dependent variable is RPA vote intention. The sample omits ‘don’t know’ and ‘refused to
answer’ responses. In the second trial, the dependent variable is RPA vote intention. The sample includes ‘don’t
know’ responses but omits ‘refused to answer’. In the third trial the dependent variable is respondents who answered
‘don’t know’ or ‘refused to answer’ in the vote intention question. Output is marginal effects. The omitted reference
category for ‘college educated’ is all respondents without a college degree. The omitted reference category for
‘employed’ is all respondents who are not employed (including retired, students, unemployed, etc.). The omitted
reference category for “top quartile HH income” is all respondents in the 80 percentile of household income.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10

192

Table A2: Non-Responses in Georgia
DK/RA Omitted
-.13* (.08)
.08* (.05)
.07 (.05)

RA Omitted
-.07*** (.02)
.01 (.01)
-.002 (.01)

DK/RA = 1
-.03 (.03)
.003 (.02)
.07*** (.02)

Higher Educated
Employed
Top Quartile HH Income

.12*** (.05)
.05 (.05)
.08 (.08)

.02 (.01)
-.004 (.01)
.02 (.02)

-.004 (.02)
.04** (.02)
-.01 (.03)

Party Identification

1.16*** (.06)

.31*** (.02)

-.35*** (.02)

Economy

.15*** (.03)

.04*** (.01)

.02 (.01)

No
No

No
No

No
No

PS Age
Female
Rural

Region FE
Clustered SE

Obs.
1,832
3,564
4,076
LR Chi2
1,602.17***
1,983.77***
281.80***
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
.66
.57
.05
Note: In the first trial, the dependent variable is Georgian Dream vote intention. The sample omits ‘don’t know’ and
‘refused to answer’ responses. In the second trial, the dependent variable is Georgian Dream vote intention. The
sample includes ‘don’t know’ responses but omits ‘refused to answer’. In the third trial the dependent variable is
respondents who answered ‘don’t know’ or ‘refused to answer’ in the vote intention question. Output is marginal
effects. The omitted reference category for ‘college educated’ is all respondents without a college degree. The
omitted reference category for ‘employed’ is all respondents who are not employed (including retired, students,
unemployed, etc.). The omitted reference category for “top quartile HH income” is all respondents in the 80
percentile of household income.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10

193

Appendix B: Country-Specific Regression Output
Table A3: Determinants of Voting Behavior in Armenia
(I)
(II)
PS Age
Female
Rural

-.10* (.06)
-.03 (.04)
-.05 (.05)

-.06** (.03)
.01 (.02)
-.02 (.03)

Higher Educated
Employed
Private Employment
Public Employment
Top Quartile HH Income

.05 (.05)
----.13*** (.05)
-.03 (.05)

-.002 (.02)
--.03 (.02)
.20** (.08)
.01 (.03)

Party Identification

.54*** (.12)

.37*** (.05)

.05* (.03)
.04 (.02)

.02 (.02)
.05*** (.01)

No
No

No
No

Prospective-Egotropic
Retrospective-Sociotropic
Region FE
Clustered SE

Obs.
455
1,059
195.10***
391.30***
LR Chi2
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R2
.47
.47
Note: Dependent variable is RPA vote intention. The first trial includes all employed respondents. The public
employment covariate is coded as a ‘1’ if the respondent works for the national or local government and ‘0’ if they
do not. The second trial includes the entire sample. The ‘employed’ covariate is coded as ‘1’ for unemployed
respondents; ‘2’ for privatively employed respondents; ‘3’ for publicly employed respondents. The omitted
reference category is unemployed respondents. Output is marginal effects. The omitted reference category for
‘college educated’ is all respondents without a college degree. The omitted reference category for “top quartile HH
income” is all respondents in the 80 percentile of household income.
*** ≤ .01; ** ≤ .05; * ≤ .10
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